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ONE
INTRODUCTION
“The large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision.
Indeed, it does not fit.”
– Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets1
The relationship between business and politics is of pivotal importance for modern
democracies. If business interests would have a privileged position in influencing pol-
icy outcomes, the legitimacy of democratic decisions would be greatly undermined
leading to both political as well as economic inequalities (Hacker and Pierson, 2010;
Lindblom, 1977; Dahl, 1989). Considerably influenced by Robert A. Dahl’s (1959)
seminal paper on “Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science”
have researchers started to thoroughly investigate the links between politics and the
economy.2 Criticising the predominant emphasis by political science research on gov-
ernment relations, political institutions and public policies, Dahl (1959) accentuates
the importance of studying the influence of business on politics and vice-versa.3 Sup-
porting his argument, he raises fundamental questions that have guided the research
agenda ever since. Inter alia, he asks: (1) what distinctions shall be made among busi-
ness actors?, (2) what is the basis of business influence?, (3) what techniques are being
used to exert influence?, and (4) how successful are the attempts to influence politics?
Recent decades brought about significant advances in understanding the relation-
1Original citation from Lindblom (1977, p. 356).
2Admittedly, the political influence of business in legislative processes has been an integral part of
political thought for a long period of time (e.g. Machiavelli, 1532).
3While Dahl (1959, pp. 2-3) stresses the importance of analysing the role of business in politics, he
explicitly does not understate the importance of the existing fields of study in political science.
1
ship between business and politics. Conceptually, instrumental power describes power
that is actively exercised by business actors, e.g. through organisational lobbying or
campaign contributions (see Culpepper and Reinke, 2014; Dahl, 1961; Hacker and
Pierson, 2010). Significantly influenced by Charles Lindblom (1977; 1982), the liter-
ature on structural business power, in comparison, postulates a distinct advantage of
business actors in market societies: since states depend on business investments, any
new legislation that may cause disinvestment is automatically ruled out (see also Bell
and Hindmoor, 2014; Block, 1977; Culpepper, 2015; Fairfield, 2015b; Hacker and Pier-
son, 2002; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1998; Swank, 1992). This power is structural
since “the pressure to protect business interests is generated automatically and apo-
litically” (Hacker and Pierson, 2002, p. 281). While the theoretical conceptualisation
of structural power is clear, demonstrating its empirical validity has been an enduring
problem in the respective literature (see Culpepper, 2015; Hacker and Pierson, 2002;
James, 2018).
Similarly, scholars studying instrumental power – i.e. lobbying by business organi-
sations – have had persistent di culties in demonstrating the success of those lobbying
e↵orts (see Lowery, 2013; McKay, 2018). In fact, another major strand of literature
is specifically devoted to analysing the influence of interest groups on policy-making
both in the United States (US) (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Gilens and Page, 2014; Kol-
mann, 1998; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, 1987; Smith, 2000; Webb Yackee and Webb
Yackee, 2006) as well as the European Union (EU) (Bunea, 2013; Du¨r, 2008b; Du¨r and
Mateo, 2014; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2009, 2013; Junk, 2019).4
Lobbying success of large business organisations is frequently discussed in the media
(Goodman, 2019; Kang and Vogel, 2019; O’Reilly, 2018; Traynor, 2014) and there is
ample evidence of business lobbyists increasing their e↵orts to gain access and influ-
ence in legislative processes. Since 2012, the number of lobbyists in the EU registered
in the Transparency Register has more than doubled (see Figure 1.1a). While it is
not clear whether those numbers are solely generated by the creation of new lobbying
organisations or by late registrations by already established organisations, Figure 1.1a
still illustrates the importance lobbyists attribute to the European Union as a political
arena. In addition, Figure 1.1b shows the number of registered lobbying organisations
in 2019 by group type. Business actors are by far the largest group (52.0 per cent of
all registered entities), followed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who con-
stitute 26.0 per cent of all registered organisations and by professional consultancies
and law firms (9.1 per cent). Academic institutions, public or mixed entities as well
4For a more in-depth discussion of the relevant literature see the subsequent chapter on “Business
Power and the State”.
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Figure 1.1: Lobbying in the European Union
(a) Shows the number of lobbying organisations registered in the EU (2012-2019). (b) Illustrates the total total number
of registered lobbying organisations by group type in 2019. Data source: https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/
public/homePage.do (date of access: November 25, 2019).
as religious organisations are less frequently represented. In comparison to the EU,
reliable data on the activity of lobbying organisations in the US is much easier to ac-
quire. Supporting the tentative evidence of the EU Transparency Register, data for
the US show that, during the last decades, the number of lobbyists in Washington (see
Figure 1.2a), as well as the total spending on lobbying by business actors has largely
increased (see Figure 1.2b). While the assumption of a strong and increasing influence
of business on policy-making processes seems reasonable, the respective literature has
had recurrent problems in providing empirically coherent and robust findings. In fact,
many studies did either not find any e↵ect of lobbying on policy-making, or featured
contradicting results which impede scientific consensus and the development of over-
arching theoretical frameworks, as such (see Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Burstein
and Linton, 2002; Du¨r, 2008b; Lowery, 2013; Smith, 1995).
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the respective theoretical literature
and to provide empirical insights that help answering the above-mentioned questions.
As I am interested in the role of business in politics, I investigate di↵erent institutional
settings, di↵erent stages of the policy-making process as well as di↵erent actor con-
figurations to make inferences about the success of business actors in attaining their
preferences during legislative processes, as well as its general position in advocacy
coalitions. The first and second paper of this dissertation study business groups in the
context of the EU. While the first paper primarily investigates the conditions and issue
characteristics that can increase or decrease the success of business organisations in
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Figure 1.2: Lobbying in the United States
(a) Shows the number of lobbyists active in Washington DC, US (1985-2005). The black line is a LOESS smoothed
average, 95% confidence intervals are shown in shaded grey. Data source: Drutman (2015). (b) Illustrates the total
spending (in million US-Dollar) of lobbying organisations by group type (1998-2018). Data source: U.S. Senate O ce
of Public Records.
attaining their preferences during the EU audit market regulation, the second paper
analyses the determinants of interest group coalitions during the regulation of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The third and last paper features an analysis of
the role of business power in the process of local government financialisation in Eng-
land. Hence, the studies provide insights into the role and influence of business both
on the sub-national as well as the supranational level and investigate direct success
as well as the formation of lobbying coalitions, which are generally considered to be
an important antecedent to political influence (see Baumgartner et al., 2009; Junk,
2019; Klu¨ver, 2013; Leech et al., 2005; Nelson and Yackee, 2012; Rasmussen, Ma¨der
and Reher, 2019).
Another main objective of this dissertation is to pay careful attention to interest
heterogeneity across business actors. One major reason for the scholarly di culties in
assessing the success of business in influencing political processes might be the fact that
business interests can and should not be universally described as homogeneous. Fol-
lowing Pagliari and Young (2014) and Vogel (1987) who stress the importance of actor
plurality in politico-economic processes, all papers comprised in this dissertation make
deliberate choices of actor classifications. The first paper (Chapter 2) distinguishes
between large firms and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), the second pa-
per (Chapter 3) identifies a clear disparity in interests among business actors between
energy intensive industries and energy suppliers and the last paper (Chapter 4) solely
investigates the power of the financial sector rather than business as a whole.
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Next, this dissertation was written with the clear purpose of using methodological
innovations to generate relevant theoretical and empirical insights and circumvent some
of the problems inherent to the respective literature.5 Hence, the first paper introduces
a more detailed measurement of interest group preference attainment in EU politics,
while the second paper uses state of the art approaches to analyse policy networks com-
bined with techniques of quantitative text and mediation analysis to study advocacy
coalition formation. The last paper is not only one of the first major large-N studies
to study local government financialisation and the role of financial sector power but
also implements Cox proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates to shed
light on the dynamic nature of financialisation processes over time.
This dissertation is structured as follows: the subsequent chapter in the introduction
provides an overview of the definitions of business power, the literature on structural
as well as instrumental business power and the use of power concepts in the study
of policy networks. Next, I will discuss the methodological approaches used in this
dissertation followed by a brief description of each of the included studies. The last
two chapters of the introduction will discuss the relevance and the broader implications
of the included articles as well as their publication status. Next, the the three main
chapters (2, 3, and 4) comprise the main body of this thesis: chapter 2 contains the first
paper entitled “Regulating the audit market in the European Union: who dominates,
who loses?”, chapter 3 includes the second paper (“United in disagreement: analysing
policy networks in EU policy-making”) and chapter 4 the third paper (“The political
economy of local government financialisation and the role of policy di↵usion”). The
respective appendices to each study are assembled in the concluding chapter.
1.1 Business Power and the State
1.1.1 Defining Business Power
A clear definition of business power is a crucial pre-condition to the study of the
relationship between business interests and the state. However, power “is not only
one of the most important, but also one of the most contested concepts in the field of
political science” (Du¨r, 2008a). Following Simon (1953), one can broadly distinguish
between the exercise of power (when one actor compels another actor to behave in a
way she would not otherwise do) and the bases of power (the power resources that allow
5See chapter 1.1 for a discussion of the problems in the literature and chapter 1.2 for a more detailed
discussion of the methodological approaches featured in each study of this dissertation.
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an actor to exercise its power). While this distinction is agreed upon by most scholars
(see Lowery, 2013), one can further di↵erentiate between what is commonly referred
to as the three faces of power : (1) the first face of power examines who wins and who
loses in policy-making processes (coming close to what Simon (1953) describes as the
exercise of power) (Dahl, 1957, 1961); (2) the second face focuses on actors’ abilities to
set the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962); and (3) the third face of power comprises
the capacity to prevent other actors from recognising their genuine interests (Lukes,
1974).
The application of those concepts to study business power can, however, be very
challenging. Especially the second and third face of power require the analysis of mostly
non-observable phenomena. Given the di culties in determining actual preferences
of an actor, identifying an actor’s genuine interest seems unattainable (Du¨r, 2008a,
pp. 1220-1221). While many scholars consequently resort to studying the first face of
power, here, too, many problems remain. Counting the winners and losers in legislative
processes to make inferences about the fact that one actor A compelled another actor
B to do something she would not have done otherwise comes with the problem of
determining the counterfactual – i.e. was actor B really influenced by actor A or would
she have performed his action anyway? (see Lowery, 2013, p. 5; Banfield, 1961)6.
Second, power can be exercised through di↵erent channels, some of which are hard or
even impossible to observe directly (e.g. influence that rests upon respect, friendship,
or benevolence) (Banfield, 1961, p. 4). Next, the exercise of power from actor A to
actor B does not have to be unidirectional (e.g. preferences of business interests can
also be manipulated by state actors) (see Loomis, 2007; Peterson, 1992; Simon, 1953;
Vogel, 1987). And, finally, the study of power needs to consider anticipated reactions
(Simon, 1953). According to Lowery (2013, pp. 6-7), “a lot of what rightfully should be
labelled influence probably takes place via [...] shaping of initial bargaining positions
by anticipated reactions, but it is essentially invisible to most research on lobbying.”7
Despite these problems, political science literature has made continuous progress
during the last decades in conceptualising the power of business in politics and in
providing empirical results that help to better understand the relationship of business
actors vis-a`-vis the state. The subsequent chapters will provide a brief but thorough
6Klu¨ver (2013, p. 8) argues that influence and luck can be disentangled if there would be a “causal
connection between the attributes of this interest group and the political decision.” Hence, she
postulates that if some property of an actor can be systematically linked to a policy output, one
could conclude that this actor “at least exerted some influence” (Klu¨ver, 2013, pp. 8-9). I largely
follow this line of argumentation in this dissertation.
7For excellent reviews on the definitions of power in the study of business influence on policy-making
processes see Lowery (2013) and Du¨r (2008a).
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overview of the relevant literature discussing the structural and instrumental power of
business, the influence of business on policy-making through lobbying, more specifically,
as well as the utilisation of power concepts in policy network studies.
1.1.2 The Structural and Instrumental Power of Business
From the late 1950s through the 1980s, the role of business power was of major concern
to political scientists (see Hacker and Pierson, 2002, pp. 279-280).8 Analysing business
power derived by “instrumental” means – i.e. sta ng government bureaucracies with
business supporters, donating to campaigns or directly lobbying government o cials –
scholars emphasised a pro-business climate and the extensive power of business both
from a Marxist (Miliband, 1969) as well as a pluralist (Mills, 1956; Domho↵, 1967)
perspective. However, following Dahl (1961), a critical consensus emerged which con-
tested the notion of a paramount influence of business in politics and asserted an equal
amount of influence to non-business groups. In addition, “[i]nstrumentalists greatly
exaggerated the extent to which business controlled access to high governmental po-
sitions [and] glossed over the deep cleavages that divided the business community on
many issues” (Hacker and Pierson, 2002, p. 280).
When the debate on instrumental business power eventually came to an intermittent
halt, a di↵erent conceptualisation of “structural” power emerged which altogether ques-
tioned “the approach of assessing influence based on active political participation alone”
(Fairfield, 2015a, p. 16). Similar to the preceding debate on the instrumental power
of business, structural business power was simultaneously discussed among Marxists
(Block, 1977, 1981; Poulantzas, 1973) and pluralists (Dahl and Lindblom, 1976; Dahl,
1982; Lindblom, 1977, 1982) alike. Both Block (1977) and Lindblom (1977) argue that
structural power arises because market economies depend on private sector investments
to generate growth and employment. Since individual investment decisions by busi-
ness organisations can have profound aggregate economic e↵ects (i.e. unemployment
or decreasing economic growth) and firms change their investment decisions based on
profit-maximising objectives, policy-makers would face strong incentives to “maintain
the profitability of private investment” (Hacker and Pierson, 2002, p. 281). Lindblom
(1982, p. 324) thus describes structural business power as “automatic punishment”
that “follows from the very act intended to change the system”. Since government of-
ficials want to prevent a public backlash caused by deteriorating economic conditions,
they are obligated to protect business interests and hence are limited in their political
8For in-depth discussions of the most prominent literature on structural and instrumental power see
Hacker and Pierson (2002), Culpepper (2015), and Woll (2016).
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decisions. According to Lindblom (1982, p. 329), the market can consequentially be
characterised as a “prison” for policy-making.
Nevertheless, this structural view on the nature of business influence was not with-
out problems. Among its critics, Vogel (1987), most notably, argued that the general
claim by Lindblom with regard to the privileged position of business interests in market
economies could not explain the existing variation in the political power of business
both over time and across countries. In fact, structural business power might be me-
diated by the economic cycle and by the di↵erent degree to which governments are
willing to pass legislation that increases unemployment (Vogel, 1987).9 In addition,
it was argued that business interests should not be viewed as a homogeneous unit.
This, in turn, would enable governments to craft sector-specific policy coalitions and
hence “play o↵ di↵erent segments of business against each other” (Vogel, 1987, p. 395).
The “seeming incapacity of structural arguments [. . . ] in explaining policy variation”
(Hacker and Pierson, 2002, p. 281) and the “unresolved debates on the nature and
the extent of business power” (Fairfield, 2015a, p. 17) greatly decreased the interest of
political science in concepts of structural business power in the subsequent decades.10
While being almost entirely neglected by mainstream political science for more than
two decades, the financial crisis of 2008 brought about a “renaissance” of research on
structural business power by “simultaneously sh[aking] the foundations of international
finance and challeng[ing] the economic and political models political science had used
to understand power” (Culpepper, 2015, p. 392).11 In recent years, an increasing
amount of research found both new ways to tackle old criticisms and provide empirical
results which help to advance the conceptualisation of business power, as such. In
their influential article on structural power and bank bailouts in the UK and the US
during the financial crisis of 2008, Culpepper and Reinke (2014) make important con-
tributions to the literature by juxtaposing the di↵erent dimensions of structural and
instrumental power. Contrasting the common perception of structural power as work-
ing automatically and instrumental power solely strategically, they argue that both
9Prominent examples of governments tolerating high levels of unemployment while still being re-
elected include the Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom (UK) and the presidency of
Ronald Reagan in the US. For a more detailed discussion, see Vogel (1987, pp. 395-396).
10Notable exceptions include Swank (1992), who investigates the e↵ects of structural business power
on tax policies, Winters (1996), who analyses variation in structural power in Indonesia, and Smith
(2000), who explores the relationship between business power and public opinion in the US, finding
that unifying policy issues are, in fact, more often than not resolved in favour of public opinion
rather than the predominant stance of business. Last, Hacker and Pierson (2002) explain welfare
state developments with varying business influences over time, which in turn, is strengthened in
federal political systems by giving firms easy exit options.
11Especially banks being denoted as “too big to fail” reignited the interest in concepts of structural
business power.
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dimensions of business power can, in fact, work both ways: while instrumental power
can be deployed strategically through organisational lobbying or campaign contribu-
tions, it can also work automatically with pro-business policy-makers or the mechanism
of public-private revolving doors. At the same time, structural power cannot only func-
tion automatically through (perceived) threats of disinvestment but can also be used
actively when business has “outside options” – i.e. alternatives to what is o↵ered by the
respective government (see Bernhagen and Bra¨uninger, 2005; Culpepper and Reinke,
2014; Farrell and Newman, 2015). Another advancement in the literature is the notion
of the mutual reinforcement of structural and instrumental power (e.g. Culpepper and
Tesche, 2019; Fairfield, 2015a,b; James, 2018; Paster, 2018). First, structural power
“can be instrumentally enhanced [since] lobbying from a position of strong instrumental
power may augment policymakers’ concerns over potential disinvestment” (Fairfield,
2015a, p. 274). A high degree of structural power, on the other hand, might incen-
tivise policy-makers to recruit more business personnel into government positions to
reduce the likelihood of disinvestment. In a similar manner, James (2018) augments the
concept of structural power by an informational component (“structural-informational
power”) since business needs to have the capacity to credibly convey claims about the
economic costs of public policies and Trampusch and Fastenrath (2019) illustrate that
structural power can foster instrumental power (augmented power) under certain scope
conditions.
Another advancement in the literature describes the role of ideas in mediating the
structural power of business – government o cials perceive structural power through
ideas and ideational processes (Bell, 2012; Bell and Hindmoor, 2014, 2015, 2017; Marsh,
Akram and Birkett, 2015; Trampusch, 2019). Business power is not an objective condi-
tion but shaped subjectively and inter-subjectively and ultimately comes down to how
it is perceived by policy-makers. While structural power was originally conceptualised
with a rather one-sided focus on business actors, contemporary literature explicitly
emphasises the role of the state and the reciprocal power relationship (mutual interde-
pendence) between business actors and policy-makers (see Bell and Hindmoor, 2015,
2017; Emmenegger, 2015).
The most substantial empirical findings in this strand of literature can be sum-
marised as follows. First, Woll (2014) elucidates that bank bailouts were most profitable
for financial institutions when they were not actively involved in the respective legisla-
tive process, i.e. when they were collectively inactive. In a later article, Woll (2016) also
compares national bank rescues and finds that structural power is, in fact, more helpful
to explain variation in bailouts than direct lobbying by financial interests. In terms
of scope conditions to business power, Culpepper (2011) made a compelling argument
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that business firms are less successful in influencing policies, the more the public cares
about an issue (the more salient an issues is). Hacker and Pierson (2002), investigating
the formation of the American welfare state, contend that business power is restricted
by more centralised political power and by the strength of state capacities, in general.
Next, Culpepper and Reinke (2014) find out that structural business is stronger if busi-
ness has an outside option which is also reflected in the article by Emmenegger (2015)
who analyses the regulation of tax evasion by US citizens. Emmenegger (2015) con-
cludes that the structural power of the US state increases substantially when business
needs access to the US financial system (i.e. when business has no outside option).
In addition, scrutinising tax policies in Latin America, Fairfield (2015a,b) asserts that
business firms are most successful in attaining their goals when they have both, a high
degree of structural as well as instrumental power. Last studying Brexit, James and
Quaglia (2019) discern important scope conditions for structural business power: (1)
political statecraft (where the government may downgrade business concerns); (2) the
reconfiguration of institutional structures (that might restrict the influence of busi-
ness); and (3) collective action problems (i.e. heterogeneous business interests) (see
also Thompson, 2019).
Methodologically, recent research did almost exclusively draw on single (see Bell and
Hindmoor, 2014; Fairfield, 2015b; James and Quaglia, 2019) or comparative case studies
where the case selection creates variation in the expected outcome to draw conclusions
about the structural (and mutually reinforcing instrumental) power of business (see
Culpepper and Reinke, 2014; Woll, 2016). While the literature still lacks large-N
studies analysing structural business power on a broader basis, research by Wineco↵
(2015) and Young (2015) points to possibilities of how large-N studies might be realised:
Wineco↵ (2015) introduces network analysis (with weighted and directed networks) as
a new method to the study of structural business power, while Young (2015) proposes
a new concept of “structural prominence” to quantitatively measure the structural
standing of individual business firms.12
1.1.3 The Influence of Lobbying on Policy-Making
Compared to the analysis of structural business power, scholarly attention to the instru-
mental means of business to influence the process of policy-making – most prominently
12Accorindg to Young (2015), structural prominence is a concept similar to the operationalisation of
power in policy network studies – it describes the power position of an actor in relation to other
actors.
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business lobbying – has never really wavered.13 Yet, next to the theoretical considera-
tions of power as such, one of the key problems in the respective literature has always
been to provide tangible empirical evidence for the influence of lobbying on legislators.
As Lowery (2013, p. 1) puts it, “like the now successful hunt for the Higgs Boson [...]
we all look for it, but rarely find evidence of it.” In fact, studies on the influence of
organised interests often bring about mixed results or null findings (see Baumgartner
and Leech, 1998; Burstein and Linton, 2002; Du¨r, 2008b,a; Klu¨ver, 2013; Lowery, 2013;
Smith, 1995).
What is more, the most prominent findings in the literature studying both the US
as well as the EU as institutional constraints to lobbying success, point in opposite
directions. For the US, Kolmann (1998) finds that lobbying vis-a`-vis public opinion
has little e↵ect, Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987) conclude that lobbying via media
advocacy often works against your own interests and Smith (2000) actually postulates
that business influence is lowest when the interests of business are united. Moreover,
Gray et al. (2004) find that the diversity and the absolute number of interest groups
lobbying have almost no e↵ect on policy liberalism as well as on the adaptation of
favourable health care policies (Gray, Lowery and Godwin, 2007a,b). In their large-N
study on lobbying in the US, Baumgartner et al. (2009) show that most lobbyists do
not even succeed in getting relevant issues on the agenda in the first place. In contrast,
Webb Yackee and Webb Yackee (2006) argue that considerable bias exists towards
business interests in US legislative processes, Gilens and Page (2014) demonstrate
that economic elites and organised interests representing business have a considerable
independent impact on US government policies while average citizens and citizen groups
have little or no independent influence, and McKay (2018) provides substantial evidence
for direct lobbying influence on legislative amendments in the US. The literature on
lobbying in the EU, in comparison, is equally divided in its findings. On the one
hand, Du¨r and Mateo (2014) investigate the case of the EU Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement and show that its was actually citizen groups and not business actors that
were able to attain their preferences during the policy-making process. This finding
is supported by the large-N study on business success in influencing EU legislation by
Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall (2015), who demonstrate that business actors are, in
fact, less successful compared to citizen groups more often than not. In addition, Junk
(2019) finds non-significant e↵ects for the share of business organisations in advocacy
coalitions and their success in attaining their preferences in EU politics. On the other
hand, Klu¨ver (2013) also analyses a large quantity of EU legislations and argues that
13One exception is a brief period in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the discussion mostly centred
around the previously discussed structural power of business (see Hacker and Pierson, 2002).
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business interests can be more successful than other interests when they supply more
information, have higher economic power, or have more citizen support. Bunea (2013)
supports her argument and finds that business actors are more successful than other
interest groups in influencing environmental policies in the EU.
Why is the literature so inconclusive? Three main reasons for the contradictory
findings can be specified: first, as previously discussed, the confusion about the defini-
tion of power might “crippl[e] empirical research on interest group power and influence”
(Du¨r, 2008a). A lack of a clear definition in the respective literature leads to di↵erent
scholars using di↵erent conceptualisations of power and hence to results that cannot
directly be compared. Next and linked to the first problem, there still exist consid-
erable di↵erences and di culties in measuring lobbying success. While recent years
brought about some methodological improvements especially with regard to measuring
interest group preference attainment (e.g. Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Junk,
2019), major di culties remain in uncovering the mostly latent influence of lobbying
organisations (see Du¨r, 2008b; Klu¨ver, 2013).14 Third and last, lobbying success is
not a phenomenon that should be observed in isolation but largely depends on other
factors such as interest group resources and type, institutional constraints, issue char-
acteristics, lobbying strategies as well as coalition size and composition (Du¨r, 2008a;
Klu¨ver, 2013; Lowery, 2013). The most relevant theoretical considerations and empir-
ical findings on determinants for and constraints of business success are summarised
below.
To start with, interest group resources are generally considered to be an impor-
tant factor determining the capacity to influence policy-making (Gerber, 1999; Hall
and Deardor↵, 2006; Klu¨ver, 2013). Baumgartner et al. (2009) as well as Mahoney
(2008), however, do not find a clear relationship between interest group resources and
lobbying success (see also Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Burstein and Linton, 2002;
Mahoney, 2007a). What is more, while Coen and Dannreuther (2003), Eising (2007,
2009) and Klu¨ver (2010) argue that, in the EU, resource endowment has a positive
impact on interest group access to EU institutions, Du¨r and De Bie`vre (2007) posit
that institutional access cannot be directly linked to influence.
More specifically, the investigation of campaign contributions on voting behaviour in
US Congress has been a long lasting endeavour for American interest group scholars (for
extended literature reviews see Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; de Figueiredo and Kelle-
her Richter, 2014 or Smith, 1995). However, scholars mostly do not find a significant
14For a more thorough discussion of problems in measuring lobbying influence see the subsequent
chapter on the methodology used in this dissertation.
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correlation between monetary resources and policy outcomes (see Baumgartner et al.,
2009). While there is some supportive evidence that the size of campaign contributions
can, in fact, have an impact on policy outcomes (see Esterling, 2007; Hall and Way-
man, 1990; Langbein, 1986; McKay, 2018; Roscoe and Jenkins, 2005; Wawro, 2001),
many scholars assert that this is not the case (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Burstein
and Linton, 2002; Hojnacki and Kimball, 2001; McKay, 2012; Stratmann, 2005; Wright,
1990). These contradicting claims can mostly be attributed to di↵erences in issue char-
acteristics that moderate the relative e↵ect of campaign contributions (Fellowes and
Wolf, 2004; Witko, 2006). More generally, Klu¨ver (2013, pp. 205-206) illustrates the
association between economic power and the success of lobbying coalitions “during the
policy formulation and the decision-making stage of the European legislative process.”
Nevertheless, her findings do not only apply to business organisations as such but to
all types of interest groups.
Next to monetary resources, information and knowledge are discussed as impor-
tant moderators of interest group success in influencing legislative processes (Austen-
Smith, 1993; Bernhagen and Bra¨uninger, 2005; Bernhagen, 2007; Crombez, 2002; Hall
and Deardor↵, 2006; Hansen, 1991). Since policy-makers are always in demand of
policy-specific information, interest groups with the capacity to provide it might have
increased chances in influencing the content of the respective policy. Nevertheless, their
success also depends on political demand (Kohler-Koch, 1994, p. 170). Especially in
recent large-N studies of interest group influence on EU policy-making, the empirical
findings seem very straightforward: Klu¨ver (2013) demonstrates that next to economic
power and citizen support, information supply is a central factor in determining lob-
bying success and Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall (2015) find that technical knowledge
about an issue has a significantly positive e↵ect on interest group success. Once again,
the benefits of information exchange with politicians are not confined solely to business
actors. According to Beyers (2008), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can be
equally proficient in supplying relevant information to legislators.
Do business organisations have a general advantage in lobbying, or, more concretely,
does group type matter as such? Olson (1965) already pointed out that business
interests find it easier to organise as they represent primarily economic interests of a
small, concentrated group of actors. Di↵use interests such as NGOs or citizen groups,
in comparison, should be less influential as they should find it more di cult to mobilise
resources from their members (Du¨r and De Bie`vre, 2007; Schneider and Baltz, 2003).
These assumptions are supported by Bunea (2013) who finds that main business actors
(i.e. concentrated interests) were, in fact, more successful in preference attainment in
EU environmental legislation compared to di↵use interests. In contrast, both Pollack
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(1997) as well as Warleigh (2000) illustrate cases where di↵use interests were capable of
exerting a considerable amount of influence and Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall (2015)
show that, for a large number of EU legislations, business interests were less successful
in preference attainment compared to citizen groups (see also Du¨r and Mateo, 2014).
In the studies by Klu¨ver (2013) as well as Mahoney (2008), group type does not matter
for lobbying success.
Another important constraint of lobbying activities by business actors are political
institutions (Kitschelt, 1986; Mahoney, 2004, 2007a; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Naoi
and Krauss, 2009; North, 1990). Since lobbying has to be understood as an exchange
relationship between decision-makers and interest groups, specific institutional arrange-
ments can determine which actors can access the policy-making process (see Immergut,
1992; Mahoney, 2004) and how the supply and demand of goods is organised (Bouwen,
2002; Hall and Deardor↵, 2006; Michalowitz, 2004; Pappi and Henning, 1999). More
specifically, Mahoney (2007a) stresses the importance of policy-makers’ accountability
for lobbying success, Naoi and Krauss (2009) illustrate that the electoral system can
determine who gets lobbied in the first place (politicians vs. bureaucrats) and Kitschelt
(1986) argues that the degree of interest group mobilisation depends on domestic op-
portunity structures. For the case of the EU, Marshall (2010) investigates how the
institutional structure of the European Parliament shapes interest group strategies.15
Lobbying strategies can constitute another factor determining interest group suc-
cess in influencing policy-making processes. When lobbying on a policy issue, actors
can choose between “inside strategies” by establishing direct contacts with decision-
makers to exchange information and “outside lobbying”, by utilising demonstrations
or protests to put decision-makers under pressure by increasing the awareness of the
general public (see Beyers, 2004, 2008; Kolmann, 1998). In terms of lobbying success,
the literature, again, provides contradicting results: on the one hand, Beyers (2004)
and Chalmers (2013) find that outside strategies are positively related to access to EU
institutions, Mahoney (2007a, 2008) on the other hand argues that outside lobbying
actually decreases the influence of interest groups. Interestingly, most interest groups
use both outside as well as inside lobbying strategies (see Binderkrantz, 2005). An-
other important strategical consideration is whom to lobby: according to Binderkrantz
and Krøyer (2012), groups pursuing general interests mainly lobby parliaments and
the media, while groups with technically sophisticated goals lobby bureaucrats more
intensively (see also Naoi and Krauss, 2009). Last, interest groups who employ collec-
15Marshall (2010) highlights the importance of an informal and influential committee elite and of the
open amendment phase. For a general comparison of lobbying in the political systems of the EU
and the US, respectively, see Mahoney (2007a) and Mahoney (2008).
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tive compared to individual framing can be more successful in EU policy-making (Junk
and Rasmussen, 2019).
Whether an issue is of regulatory, distributive or re-distributive kind (see Lowi, 1964,
1972) might also play a role in determining the lobbying success of interest groups.
According to Du¨r (2008a), distributive policies lead to benefits that are concentrated
on a specific group as well as dispersed costs. This, in turn, would enable concentrated
interests to win over di↵use interests. Interest group influence on re-distributive policies
should be comparatively small as they produce di↵use costs and benefits (see Du¨r,
2008a and also Du¨r and De Bie`vre, 2007). However, there is still no systematic evidence
on this assumption. The role of salience, on the other hand, which decreases the
likelihood of interest groups and most importantly business actors to influence policy-
making processes, is undisputed among interest groups scholars: business groups are
less successful in achieving favourable policy outcomes on highly salient issues both
when lobbying individually (Culpepper, 2011; Klu¨ver, 2011; Mahoney, 2007a, 2008)
as well as collectively (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Junk, 2019).16 In addition
to salience, the degree of conflict on an issue (Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015;
Mahoney, 2007a, 2008; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015) as well as the scope of a
policy (Mahoney, 2007a, 2008) can moderate (mostly decrease) the success of interest
groups in EU policy-making. According to Beyers (2008), Greenwood (2003), Smith
(2000) and Woll (2007), business interests are most successful on technical issues.
Last, interest group coalitions can be a major advantage for business actors and other
interest groups to get what they want. While the importance of advocacy coalitions
has long been discussed by political science scholars (see e.g. Sabatier, 1987, 1988),
most research sought to explain coalition formation rather then their success in influ-
encing policy-making (Gray and Lowery, 1998; Hojnacki, 1997, 1998; Holyoke, 2009;
Hula, 1999; Mahoney, 2007b; Pijnenburg, 1998; Salisbury et al., 1987). The analysis
of coalition success was taken up only recently. Most studies agree on the importance
of coalition size: the more members join a coalition and lobby for the same policy
outcome, the more successful is their endeavour (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klu¨ver,
2011, 2013; Leech et al., 2005; Nelson and Yackee, 2012; Rasmussen, Ma¨der and Reher,
2019). In addition to group size, Nelson and Yackee (2012) stress the importance of
group consensus and group composition that condition coalition success in influenc-
ing regulations on the federal level in the US. Analysing the interaction of coalition
homogeneity with issue salience, Junk (2019) finds that while homogeneous coalitions
16See Warntjen (2012) for a more detailed discussion on the di↵erent kinds of salience in EU politics,
and Keller (2018) for a case where business actors intentionally caused “noisy politics” to successfully
influence policy-making.
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are more successful on general issues, their influence decreases as policies become more
salient. Diverse coalitions, in turn, are more successful on highly salient issues. More
recently, interest group scholars started to notice the importance of so-called “strange
bedfellow” coalitions, i.e. coalitions of actors that typically would not work together
(Junk, 2019). Strange bedfellow coalitions were analysed both in the political system
of the US (Holyoke, 2009; Phinney, 2017) as well as the EU (Beyers and De Bruycker,
2018; Mahoney, 2007a). Scholars generally agree that coalitions consisting of di↵erent
types of interest groups can be very successful in influencing policy-making since they
can reach a large number of legislators through informational and strategical diversity
(Phinney, 2017) and through signalling a potentially broad support among diverse ac-
tors in the electorate (Mahoney, 2007a). Again, interacting with issue salience, strange
bedfellow coalitions occur more frequently on highly salient issues (see Beyers and De
Bruycker, 2018; Phinney, 2017) and are more successful on salient issues (Junk, 2019).17
1.1.4 Conceptualising Power in Policy Networks
In addition to the literature on business power and interest group lobbying, policy
networks scholars use concepts of power to explain the formation of networks (e.g.
advocacy coalitions) and their influence on policy processes (Choi and Robertson, 2014;
Gerber, Henry and Lubell, 2013; Ingold and Leifeld, 2016; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney,
2017; Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger, 1998; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012; Zafonte and Sabatier,
1998). In this strand of literature, the perceived power of an actor plays a crucial role
in determining its position in a policy network. Drawing on the “positional method”
developed by Mills (1956), actors are deemed to be powerful or influential if others
rate them as being influential. Powerful actors, in turn, tend to be seen as attractive
partners for collaboration as they appear as promising in terms of overall policy impact
in their respective network (see Fischer and Sciarini, 2016; Henry, 2011; Leifeld and
Schneider, 2012). According to Ingold and Leifeld (2016), there are two main factors
determining whether an actor is perceived as influential by other actors: (1) their
institutional role and (2) their structural position in a network. Similarly, Huxham
and Beech (2008) di↵erentiate between varying levels of informal and formal power that
are based on the structural position (e.g. formal authority) of an actor as well as its
resources (e.g. information or economic power) (see also Huxham and Vangen, 2005).
The need for information, in particular, is regarded as a central component giving
17In addition, Phinney (2017) posits that strange bedfellow coalitions can be observed more frequently
on policy debates with a strong opposition and when the outcome of and the support for a policy
proposal is uncertain. Both assumptions, however, still lack empirical support.
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powerful actors a favourable position within a network, as smaller and less resourceful
actors might turn towards those powerful actors to profit from their resources (Calanni
et al., 2015; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017).
Empirically, Henry (2011) investigates the explanatory power of both Resource De-
pendency Theory (RDT), which suggests that power-seeking and perceived power are
the most important drivers of network formation, as well as the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF), which argues that shared policy-relevant beliefs are central to this
process.18 He finds that belief similarity is more important in explaining the endoge-
nous formation of policy networks compared to factors related to the power of an actor.
Nevertheless, he argues that power-seeking may still be important in driving collab-
oration between ideologically similar actors (Henry, 2011). In line with this finding,
Ingold and Fischer (2014) find a negatively significant e↵ect for network ties of pow-
erful actors in Swiss climate policy networks. They do, however, find that powerful
actors “are active and keen to engage in collaboration relations with others” during the
decision-making phase (Ingold and Fischer, 2014, p. 96). In a later study, Ingold, Fis-
cher and Cairney (2017, p. 457) confirm that powerful actors “seem to act as opinion
leaders” in two out of the three cases under investigation. This sentiment is also shared
by Calanni et al. (2015) who find that trust and power resources provide better expla-
nations of policy networks in the US compared to shared policy beliefs. Fischer and
Sciarini (2016) demonstrate that both perceived power as well as preference similarity
can e↵ectively lead to policy collaboration.
1.2 Methodological Approaches
As the analysis of business relations vis-a`-vis the state still lacks large-N, empirical
investigations, this chapter discusses the diversified methodological approaches used in
this dissertation. Each of the individual papers were designed to tackle a particular
methodological challenge and to theoretically improve the respective literature.19
One key aspect in the first paper of this dissertation on lobbying and the regulation
of the audit market in the European Union (see chapter 2) are innovations in opera-
tionalisation. First, following scholars who argue that EU policy proposals consist of
many sub-issues that do not necessarily closely relate to one another (see Bunea and
Ibenskas, 2015), I make a case for measuring lobbying success on those sub-issues rather
than on a whole legislation as a single unit. Compared to contemporary literature
18For a more detailed review on the ACF framework, see chapter 3.
19For an overview of the theoretical innovations generated in this dissertation see chapter 1.3.
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that approximates actor preferences for whole policy proposals (see Du¨r, Bernhagen
and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013), this approach of measuring lobbying success o↵ers
much more precision. In addition, coming back to Dahl’s (1959) question on what
distinctions should be made between business actors, I argue that business should not
be studied as a homogeneous entity, which is generally done in the respective literature
(see Pagliari and Young, 2014; Vogel, 1987). I propose that the case under investigation
requires the di↵erentiation between large firms SMEs. Descriptive statistics reveal that
both types of business actors did, in fact, formalise di↵erent preferences regarding most
of the issues discussed in the legislation on audit market regulation. To account for the
data structure given by the di↵erentiation between sub-issues and di↵erent types of in-
terest groups, interest group-issue dyads are used as unit of analysis and mixed-e↵ects
regression models are calculated (specifying random e↵ects both at the issue as well as
the interest group level) to estimate interest group success in preference attainment.
In terms of power conceptualisation, this paper investigates the so-called “first face of
power” in measuring who wins and who loses in the policy-making process.
The second paper on the formation of interest group coalitions during the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme regulation (see chapter 3) introduces methods of natural language
processing (NLP) to identify actors’ policy core beliefs. More specifically, following
Garrett and Jansa (2015) and Linder et al. (2018), cosine similarity algorithms on
pre-processed text vectors are utilised to calculate the distances of policy belief for all
possible combinations of interest groups (modelled as dyads). In a second step, a newly
introduced approach to analyse network structures is used to detect factors leading to
di↵erent types of interest group coalitions — additive and multiplicative e↵ects models
(AME) (see Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019). Despite their advantages in modelling
statistical dependencies, network models are still only rarely used in research studying
interest group coalitions and business power (see Culpepper, 2015) but are state of the
art in policy networks studies (see Cranmer et al., 2017; Heany, 2014; Robins, Lewis and
Wang, 2012; Scott, 2016; Ward and Sacks, 2011). As I believe that network approaches
can be very beneficial for the analysis of lobbying and business power, its usefulness is
demonstrated in this analysis. Given the theoretical considerations on the relationship
of policy core beliefs as a mediator between the organisational a liation of interest
groups and their propensity to form ally networks, the network approach is combined
with statistical mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Imai et al., 2011). In
addition, as policy core beliefs are also measured with methods of quantitative text
analysis (i.e. cosine similarity scores), this paper innovates the current methodological
status quo in combining network science with text analysis. Last, similar to the pre-
vious article, we also di↵erentiate between business interests and distinguish between
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the preferences of energy-intensive industries as well as energy producers within the
encompassing classification of business actors.
In the last paper of this dissertation (see chapter 4), the focus on business power
shifts from the supranational to the local level: analysing which factors determine the
use of risky financial innovations by English municipalities over time, event history
analysis (EHA) models are calculated. More specifically, since assumptions about the
e↵ects of time on the baseline hazard rate (i.e. the probability rate of event occurrence)
cannot be made, Cox proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates are
used (see Allison, 2014). The additional implementation of time-interactions (Licht,
2011) and the introduction of interaction e↵ects between local finance power and the
population size of the respective municipalities allows for a unique angle of analysing
business power on the local level over time. Lastly, this study is among the first to
quantitatively investigate the role of the local political economy on the di↵usion of
financialisation as such and to directly measure the structural and instrumental power
of the financial sector on the local level, more specifically.
In sum, all papers comprised in this dissertation employ di↵erent quantitative meth-
ods and innovative operationalisations to shed light on the relationship between busi-
ness and the state from di↵erent points of view. This not only advances the respective
theoretical literature by providing relevant insights and theoretical improvements (see
the next chapter providing an overview of the included studies) but also enables other
researchers to employ and improve the respective methods and, hence, further the
scientific knowledge on business-state relations.
1.3 Overview of the Included Studies
As the previous chapter first and foremost discussed methodological aspects of the dis-
tinct studies included in this dissertation, this chapter intends to give a brief overview
on the theoretical framework and the empirical results of each study. While this chapter
will discuss the implications of each paper’s results in isolation, the subsequent chapter
will discuss the combined relevance of the findings generated by this dissertation and
its broader implications.
1.3.1 Chapter 2
Chapter 2 presents the first paper of this dissertation entitled “Regulating the audit
market in the European Union: who dominates, who loses?”. Empirically, this paper
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investigates one of the key questions raised in this thesis: how successful are business
interests in getting what they want? More specifically, I analyse the regulatory pro-
cesses surrounding the audit market in the European Union in 2010 in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis. As this legislative process can be characterised as a typical
case of financial market regulation after the financial crisis – similar to the regulation
of credit rating agencies or hedge funds (see Dorn, 2012 and Moschella, 2011) – it
has relevant implications for the broader literature on interest group influence in EU
policy-making (e.g. Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013).20
Theoretically, I contribute to the literature on interest group influence in the EU
(Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014; Du¨r, 2008a; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015;
Klu¨ver, 2013) that typically estimates the success of business and non-business ac-
tors in influencing policy-outcomes. I challenge this rough classification and argue that
business interests cannot be assumed to be homogeneous in the case under investiga-
tion. I build on recent studies that make a case for di↵erentiating between business
interests as such (Pagliari and Young, 2014) or, more specifically, the interests of large
business corporations on the one hand and SMEs on the other hand (see Keller, 2018).
Following Hansen and Mitchell (2000), Drope and Hansen (2006) and Klu¨ver (2013),
I hypothesise that large business firms should be most successful in attaining their
preferences during the EU market regulation compared to other types of actors as they
have considerable advantages in terms of economic power, interest group concentration
and political activity.
Next, I assume that in relation to other interest groups, the success of large firms
should be reinforced within larger interest group coalitions (see Bernhagen, Du¨r and
Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013) and that large firms should be less successful, the more
salient the policy issue they intend to influence (Culpepper, 2011; Mahoney, 2007a).
Given the previously discussed distinction between the di↵erent sub-issues of a whole
EU legislative proposal (see discussion on page 17), I expect di↵erences in the size of
issue-specific coalitions as well as the public salience of these sub-issues.
The descriptive analysis indicates that the theoretical di↵erentiation between large
firms and SMEs makes sense, as large firms, on average, tend to favour the status
quo while SMEs prioritise a more regulated market. The results of the mixed-e↵ects
regression make it clear that a general statement regarding the success of large firms in
attaining their preferences is di cult to make: their success depends heavily on issue
20In addition, the EU Commission initiated a so-called consultation procedure to gather information
from a wide range of a↵ected stakeholders. As consultation procedures are indicative of a broader
relevance and salience of the respective legislation, the EU audit market regulation can be compared
to legislative proposals that are typically investigated in the respective literature (e.g. Klu¨ver, 2013).
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salience and the size of issue-specific coalitions. Relative to other interest groups, large
firms tend to be more successful in larger coalitions but higher issue salience signifi-
cantly decreases their success. Hence, this chapter makes a theoretical contribution to
the literature by highlighting the contextual nature of interest group success and the
importance of issue characteristics. Moreover, I make a case for paying closer attention
to the heterogeneity of business interests. In fact, assuming homogeneous business
interests might be one of the reasons of the contradictory findings in the literature on
interest group lobbying in the EU.
1.3.2 Chapter 3
This chapter features the second paper of this dissertation with the title “United in
Disagreement: Analysing Policy Networks in EU Policy-making”. Moving away from
the direct assessment of interest group success, this paper focuses on the process of
coalition formation in EU politics. As it has been previously established that larger
coalitions are an important contributing factor to interest group success in influencing
policy-making processes, this paper investigates the conditions for advocacy coalition
formation. More specifically, we are interested in so-called “strange bedfellow coali-
tions”, i.e. coalitions between actors that typically would not work together. Given
that previous literature has identified strange bedfellow coalitions to be very e↵ective
in influencing policy-makers (see Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Junk, 2019; Mahoney,
2007b), we scrutinise their emergence during the regulation of the EU ETS.21
Chapter 3, as described above, features methodological innovations in combining
state of the art network science approaches with text analysis techniques, which are
utilised to test the validity and the scope of theoretical assumptions developed within
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The ACF was originally developed to study
policy change (Sabatier, 1987, 1988; Weible and Sabatier, 2005) but can also be used
to investigate coalition formation in local and national policy subsystems (see Berardo
and Scholz, 2010; Feiock et al., 2014; Ingold, 2011; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017)
as well as the EU (Rozbicka, 2013). We apply the framework to explain interest group
coalition formation during the regulation of the EU ETS. The goal of this chapter is
two-fold: (1) to test the basic ACF assumption that interest groups with the same
organisational type are more likely to share similar policy core beliefs and hence are
more likely to engage in advocacy coalition formation and (2) to test whether the ACF
can also be applied to strange bedfellow coalitions.
21For a more detailed description of the EU ETS see chapter 3.3.
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To advance the respective theoretical literature, we test three hypotheses: first, we
build on the ACF and its basic assumption that actors with similar policy core beliefs
(i.e. normative assumptions about the design of a specific policy subsystem) are more
likely to engage in coalition formation (see Gerber, Henry and Lubell, 2013; Heikkila,
2016; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017). While shared organisational a liations (e.g.
two NGOs) are often used as a proxy for shared policy core beliefs (see Heikkila, 2016;
Ingold and Fischer, 2014), this relationship is rarely tested directly. We specify this
assumed relationship in our first hypothesis and test it using a mediation analysis
setup. Second, we apply the same logic to strange bedfellow coalitions. However, we
do not expect the assumptions of the ACF to hold in this case and assume that strange
bedfellow coalitions can emerge without the foundation of shared policy core beliefs.
Third and last, as we do not expect the ACF framework to be useful for explaining
strange bedfellow coalitions, we scrutinise the conditions under which such coalitions
are more likely to emerge. Building on the existing literature that identified issue
salience as a major contributing factor to the formation of strange bedfellow coalitions
(Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Junk, 2019; Phinney, 2017), we assume the level of
conflict to be another important condition: issues with low levels of inter-group conflict
increase the likelihood of strange bedfellow coalitions.
Our results indicate that policy core beliefs are, in fact, a strong mediator for net-
work formation between actors of the same type. Using AME models, we demonstrate
that within-group network ties between energy-intensive industries (business actors)
and NGOs are more likely when they have homogeneous beliefs. We also show that
strange bedfellow coalitions between both types of actors do only occur on issues with
low levels of conflict and that these coalitions are not based on shared policy core beliefs.
In addition, we compare the explanatory capacity of power concepts as put forward by
Resource Dependence Theory (see Calanni et al., 2015) with the assumptions of the
ACF. It shows that powerful actors are actually less successful in creating network ties
compared to the average interest group. Hence, we demonstrate that shared beliefs
might actually be more important in coalition formation compared to being perceived
as powerful by other actors.
1.3.3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 introduces the last paper comprised in this dissertation entitled “The Polit-
ical Economy of Local Government Financialisation and the Role of Policy Di↵usion”.
In contrast to the focus on the EU in the preceding papers, this study analyses the role
of business power in driving processes of financialisation at the local level in England.
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More generally, we investigate the factors contributing to state financialisation at the
sub-national level. As the use of derivatives is an indicator for financialisation, we
analyse the use of risk-prone market loans – so called “lender option borrower option”
(Lobo) loans – by local governments using a comprehensive, large-N panel data set.
Since this is one of the first quantitative studies investigating local government
financialisation, we test a broad range of indicators to better understand why public
authorities use derivatives. First, building on the well-established literature of partisan
politics (see Bra¨uninger, 2005; Cusack, 1997; Cusack and Beramendi, 2006; Hibbs,
1977), we examine the party composition in local governments. We assume that the
left-leaning Labour Party has a greater incentive to use complex financial instruments
to follow its voters’ demand for service provision and infrastructure financing (Blom-
Hansen, Monkerud and Sorensen, 2006; Boyne et al., 2012; Tickell, 1998). In addition,
the well-documented “pro-finance, pro-innovation bent” by New Labour (Fuller, 2016,
91) leads to our first hypothesis: local governments with a Labour majority are more
likely to use Lobo loans.
Next, we assume that the level of public debt (see Fastenrath, Orban and Tram-
pusch, 2018; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Lagna, 2015) as well as a
higher degree of economic deprivation (Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Strickland, 2013)
increase the likelihood of local governments to use Lobo loans. As described above,
we also consider the power of the local financial sector to be an important driver of
financialisation processes. Since financial sector institutions are key actors in facili-
tating the use of derivatives, we argue that a stronger financial sector increases the
likelihood of revolving doors (see Sbragia, 1986) and the number and intensity of in-
teractions between local o cials and financial sector personnel. Given that structural
and instrumental power can work mutually reinforcing (Fairfield, 2015b; Hindmoor and
McGeechan, 2013; James and Quaglia, 2019), we assume that local governments use
Lobo loans more frequently where the overall power of the financial sector is strong.
In addition, considering the potential asymmetries in expertise between the financial
sector and public o cials (see Culpepper, 2011, 178), we also consider the conditional
e↵ect of local government size, i.e. that the power of the financial sector is stronger
vis-a`-vis smaller local governments with less financial expertise (see also Tickell, 1998;
Weber and O’Neill-Kohl, 2013).
Last, we scrutinise patterns of geographical dependencies as put forward by scholars
of policy di↵usion (Berry and Berry, 1990; Gilardi, 2016; Graham, Shipan and Volden,
2013; Shipan and Volden, 2008). As information regarding the use and the potential
advantages of Lobo loans is likely to di↵use across regional communication networks,
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we hypothesise that the use of Lobo loans in a local government is positively related
to the percentage of bordering municipalities that have previously used a similar kind
of loan.
First descriptive statistics provide evidence in favour of our partisan politics hypoth-
esis (local government with a Labour majority did, in fact, issue the highest number
of Lobo loans) as well as the di↵usion assumption. Mapping the use of derivatives
by English local authorities reveals distinct geographical clusters of neighbouring local
governments using Lobo loans. Our event history analysis confirms those intuitions:
we find a significantly positive association between a Labour majority as well as the
previous Lobo use by neighbouring local authorities and increasing levels of financial-
isation. Due to violations of statistical assumptions, the indicators for public debt as
well as economic deprivation had to be interacted with time. Interestingly, the results
show that while public debt decreases the likelihood of Lobo use in the early years of
the di↵usion process but increases it in its later stages, the e↵ect works the other way
round for economic deprivation.22 Last, the impact of financial sector power on local
government financialisation is also more complicated than anticipated. A stronger fi-
nancial sector actually decreases the likelihood of Lobo use in smaller local authorities
and has a statistically significant positive e↵ect only for very large municipalities. This
e↵ect might be explained by the fact that larger local governments get lobbied more
frequently (see Sørensen, 1998) or that the phenomenon of public-private revolving
doors might be more pronounced in larger municipalities (Sbragia, 1986).23 Because
of these e↵ects, this paper provides crucial insights into the role of business power,
party politics and fiscal and economic conditions in the di↵usion dynamics of local
government financialisation and provides ample avenues for further research.
1.4 Relevance and Broader Implications
This dissertation is guided by a general interest in the organisation of business interests
and their power and success in achieving optimal outcomes in policy-making processes.
The theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions speak to various litera-
tures. Hence, I briefly discuss the most important implications of this thesis as well as
their overall relevance in this section.
One of the main results of this dissertation is that business interests should not be
studied as a homogeneous unit. Challenging contemporary quantitative research on
22For a more detailed discussion of this e↵ect see chapter 4.6
23Again, for a more extensive discussion of this e↵ect see chapter 4.6
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interest group lobbying that usually treats business actors as uniformly lobbying for
the same policy outcome (see Baumgartner et al., 2009; Du¨r and Mateo, 2014; Du¨r,
Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2009, 2013), the findings in both chapter 2 and
chapter 3 indicate that it makes sense to contextually di↵erentiate between di↵erent
kinds of business actors. The research design in chapter 4 also takes this fact into
account and only includes the relevant power of the financial sector into account, rather
than using all business actors. Even though it is understandable that large-N studies
of lobbying success and coalition formation attempt to utilise the broadest possible
classification of interest group types, the results of this thesis suggest that the strongest
conflict often occurs in-between di↵erent types of business: chapter 2 indicates that
the preferences of large corporations (who favour the status quo) can be very di↵erent
from those of SMEs (who prefer a more regulated market) and chapter 3 reveals a
cleavage between the energy intensive industry on the one hand and energy producers
(who even occasionally join forces with NGOs) on the other hand. Hence, in line with
previous research that stresses the importance of preference plurality among business
actors (see Keller, 2018; Pagliari and Young, 2014), I make a case for paying more
careful attention to the distribution of preferences among business actors. In the end,
the inaccurate measurement of business preferences might contribute to contradictory
findings in the respective literature.
Another main result which is featured in all chapters of this dissertation is the
highly contextual nature of business success in influencing policy processes. While
researchers try to make their findings as general as possible, the literature review as
well the findings in this dissertation make it clear that it is incredibly di cult to
generalise across a wider range of cases. The findings in chapter 2 and chapter 4
point to the importance of contextual factors that constrain the success of business
actors in attaining their preferences. Chapter 2 investigates issue characteristics and
illustrates the importance of issue salience as well as coalition size in moderating the
chances of various actors to get what they want: while large firms are more successful
on issues with lower salience, SMEs and public authorities are more influential on
highly salient issues. In contrast, a higher number of coalition partners increases the
likelihood of preference attainment for large firms vis-a`-vis public authorities but not
compared to SMEs. Likewise, chapter 4 demonstrates the moderating e↵ect of the
financial expertise of the respective local government (measured with population size
as a proxy) on financial sector power and the likelihood of using financial innovations
by local authorities. Interestingly, higher financial sector power actually decreases the
use of financial derivatives in smaller governments and increases it only in very large
local governments. In sum, the success of business actors in attaining their preferences
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is highly contextual and further research is necessary to aquire more robust and more
generalisable findings.
The previous paragraph implicates another important finding of this dissertation
that echoes previous studies on interest group influence in policy-making processes
(see Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Du¨r and Mateo, 2014; Junk, 2019; Pollack,
1997; Warleigh, 2000): large business organisations do not always win and, in fact,
often have considerable di culties and constraints in attaining their preferences and in
creating large coalitions of actors lobbying for the same outcome. Hence, the results of
this thesis counter the often repeated arguments of a bias towards business interests in
legislative processes (Scharpf, 2002; Schneider and Baltz, 2003; Streeck and Schmitter,
1991). Similarly, chapter 3 illustrates that powerful actors, as such, are not particu-
larly successful in mobilising larger coalitions and chapter 2 demonstrates that even if
large firms are a member of larger lobbying coalitions, they are not more successful in
attaining their preferences compared to SMEs. These findings support research that
stresses the opportunities less powerful actors (e.g. NGOs or citizen groups) have in
the institutional context of the European Union (Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015;
Geddes, 2000). While business actors mostly prefer the status quo and the status quo
is the “dominant output of political struggles” in the United States (Du¨r, Bernhagen
and Marshall, 2015, 975; Baumgartner et al., 2009), business actors have a much harder
time in attaining their preferences in the EU. Again, future research is necessary to
further our understanding of business power and success in influencing policy-making
processes.
One area of future research that is also a caveat of this dissertation is the fact that
business actors can exert their influence in various stages of the legislative process. Es-
pecially the agenda-setting stage might be one of the most important arenas for business
influence (see Lowery, 2013). Since the analyses in chapter 2 and 3 focus exclusively
on the decision-making phase of the policy cycle, a more encompassing research design
that incorporates all stages of the policy-making process could provide pivotal insights
to the study of business power and success. While the analysis of business power in
fostering local government financialisation in chapter 4 is agnostic to the policy cycle
and uses a very general proxy that should capture business influence as such, the mea-
sure and the research design prohibits concrete inferences about the causal mechanism.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, all papers included in this dissertation provide im-
portant insights into the role of business actors in political decision-making processes
and improve the theoretical literature in its cumulative e↵ort to better understand
the relationship between business actors vis-a`-vis the state and in finding generalisable
insights.
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1.5 Publication Status of the Articles
1. Mertens, Armin (2018) “Regulating the audit market in the European Union: who
dominates, who loses?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 26(12), pp. 1818-
1835.
The first article with the title “Regulating the audit market in the European Union:
who dominates, who loses?” (see Chapter 2) is a single-authored paper and has been
published by the Journal of European Public Policy online first on December 4, 2018
and in print on November 6, 2019. It has been presented at the 29th SASE Annual
Meeting in Lyon, France on July 1, 2017 and at the Cologne Center for Comparative
Politics (CCCP) research seminar, Cologne on May 29, 2017.
2. Mertens, Armin and Dennis Abel (2019) “United in disagreement: Analysing policy
networks in EU policy-making”. Under review: Policy Studies Journal.
The second article entitled “United in disagreement: Analysing policy networks in EU
policy-making” (see Chapter 3) is co-authored work together with Dennis Abel and
has been submitted to Policy Studies Journal. As of November 27, 2019, the article
is still under review. Both authors contributed equally to the study. The paper has
been presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions in Mons, Belgium on April 10, 2019 and at
the International PhD Workshop on Advances in Comparative Politics at the CCCP,
Cologne on September 24, 2019.
3. Mertens, Armin, Christine Trampusch, Florian Fastenrath and Rebecca Wangemann
(2019) “The Political Economy of Local Goverment Finacialisation and the Role
of Policy Di↵usion”, Regulation & Governance, online first: https://doi.org/10.
1111/rego.12285.
The third article with the title “The Political Economy of Local Government Financial-
isation and the Role of Policy Di↵usion” (see Chapter 4) is co-authored work together
with Christine Trampusch, Florian Fastenrath and Rebecca Wangemann. The article
has been published by Regulation & Governance online first on October 10, 2019. I
have been the lead author of this article and contributed to all stages of the research
process. As such, together with Christine Trampusch and Florian Fastenrath, I con-
tributed to the framing of the article, the literature review and the development of
the theoretical argument. Furthermore, I collected the relevant data together with Re-
becca Wangemann (who also conducted the expert interviews) and was responsible for
carrying out the statistical analysis. The paper has been presented at the 25th Council
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for European Studies Conference on March 29, 2018 in Chicago, US and the Futures
of Finance and Society Conference on December 6, 2018 in Edinburgh, UK.24
Notes
For the sake of uniformity, the entire document follows British English grammar rules.
Punctuation and orthography might di↵er in the original publications due to respective
journal guidelines. In a similar manner, citations, annotations, and references to the
supplementary material were adjusted uniformly in style and format.
24See the 2018 journal impact factors (JIF), 5-year journal impact factors (5-Year JIF) and h-indices
of the relevant journals below:
JIF 5-Year JIF h-index
Journal of European Public Policy 3.457 3.974 92
Policy Studies Journal 3.917 4.758 57
Regulation & Governance 2.792 4.193 35
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TWO
REGULATING THE AUDIT MARKET IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: WHO DOMINATES, WHO LOSES?
Abstract
This paper examines the role of interest groups in the regulation of the European au-
dit market, clarifying patterns of business influence in European Union policy-making.
Building on recent innovations in measuring policy preferences, the conditions are anal-
ysed under which interest groups were most successful in attaining their preferences
during the policy-making process. Existing methods for measuring interest group in-
fluence are refined by disaggregating the unit of analysis from the level of a unitary
policy dimension to distinct issues featured in a single legislation and by di↵erentiating
between large firms and SMEs rather than assuming homogeneous business interests.
The results indicate that issue dynamics are central factors in determining interest
group success: while larger coalitions seem to be more advantageous to large firms
compared to SMEs and public authorities, high issue salience decreases the success of
large business.
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2.1 Introduction
While the e↵ects of the global financial crisis were still unravelling in 2008, various
actors were quickly identified as main culprits of the developments: the blame was
essentially put on credit rating agencies, banks, hedge funds and financial regulators.
Despite being frequently indicted after major corporate failures, the audit profession,
by comparison, managed to almost entirely avoid public scrutiny (Humphrey et al.,
2011). This situation changed drastically, however, when the European Commission
issued a Green Paper in October 2010 to address the role of auditors in the making
of the financial crisis. The draft proposal questioned the behaviour of audit firms and
suggested radical reforms of the audit market (Commission, 2010).
But despite the Commission’s high ambitions, the European Union (EU) audit mar-
ket legislation of 2014 left most observers unsatisfied. While proponents of the new rules
postulated a weakened dominance by the big audit firms, a consensus emerged among
critical journalists, politicians and academics alike that the final legislation failed to
e↵ectively regulate the market (Gros and Worret, 2016). Most observers agreed that
this outcome resembled a clear example of the lobbying power of influential financial
market actors. Given that a large number of interest groups were trying to influence
European decision-makers, this paper investigates which interest groups – and under
which conditions – were most successful in attaining their preferences during the reg-
ulation of the EU audit market.
The theoretical literature on business interests in EU policy-making, in general,
contains di↵erent perceptions on the predominance of business interests. While some
scholars argue that business interest groups are more influential than other types of
actors in the EU (Du¨r and De Bie`vre, 2007; Klu¨ver, 2013) or even postulate an “insti-
tutional bias” in favour of market-friendly legislation (Scharpf, 2002), other researchers
claim that citizen groups are, in fact, not systematically underprivileged (Du¨r and Ma-
teo, 2014; Geddes, 2000). Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall (2015) even find that business
actors are less successful than other interest groups in shaping EU policy-making.
Considering the deviating results in determining the success of business interests in
EU legislative processes, this paper contributes to the respective literature by analysing
specific issues within a single EU legislation rather than whole legislative acts. In recent
studies that aimed at uncovering the success of interest group influence on EU policy-
making, actors’ preferences were approximated for whole legislative proposals (e.g.
Klu¨ver, 2013; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015). However, following Bunea and
Ibenskas (2015, p. 433) who find that previous research identified “between 14 and 24
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issues per policy proposal”, it can be argued that interest groups may have very di↵erent
preferences on specific issues within single legislative proposals. Moreover, in line with
Pagliari and Young (2014), business actors are not assumed to have homogeneous
interests. Given the disparity in economic power and lobbying activities (Drope and
Hansen, 2006) large firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) are treated
as di↵erent interest group types in the analysis.
The results indicate that large firms and SMEs do, in fact, have di↵erent preferences
regarding the EU audit market regulation and that issue characteristics are important
drivers of interest group success in preference attainment. While more sizeable coali-
tions seem to be advantageous for large firms compared to SMEs and public author-
ities, increasing issue salience diminishes the influence of the most powerful business
groups. Conclusively, this paper provides important insights into the political process
and power relationships that preclude the creation of regulatory arrangements in audit
and accounting markets, as well as processes of EU policy-making, in general.
The article is structured as follows: the subsequent section briefly elaborates on the
EU audit market and its regulation. After theoretical considerations, o cial comment
letters to the Commission’s Green Paper are analysed to determine actors’ policy pref-
erences for each issue. A measure of success will be estimated when comparing the final
legislative outcome with the preference of each actor. The formulated hypotheses are
tested in a mixed-e↵ect ordered logistic regression analysis to determine which group
of actors (and under which conditions) was most successful in shaping the audit reform
according to its preferences. The final section discusses the results.
2.2 The EU Audit Market Regulation
The Green Paper “Audit policy: Lessons from the Crisis” was issued by the Com-
mission on October 13, 2010 as a direct response to the alleged role of auditors in
the developments of the global financial crisis. According to the Commission (2010,
p. 3), the role of auditors has been largely underexplored compared to other essential
financial market actors (i.e. banks, hedge funds, rating agencies and central banks).
The delayed investigation on the auditing and accounting profession is surprising, given
their pivotal role in the functioning of modern capital markets and economies: auditors
secure the accuracy and transparency of an organisation’s financial statements, giving
investors the possibility to make informed decisions in capital allocation. Hence, audi-
tors are supposed to decrease the information asymmetry and agency conflicts between
an organisation’s executives and its investors to prevent frauds and deliberate misin-
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formation (Abad, Sa´nchez-Ballesta and Yagu¨e, 2017). In the Commission’s (2010, p.
3) point of view, this function was not adequately executed by the audit profession
before and during the financial crisis.
Consequently, the Commission drove the Green Paper on audit policy forward to
fundamentally address a large variety of problems, many of which were already dis-
cussed in the preceding decades. These issues included the potential role of auditors
in ensuring the reliability of information in the field of “Corporate Social and Envi-
ronmental Responsibility” (CSR) or the supranational supervision of auditors on EU
level. Other policy proposals, however, were far more fundamental: first, the Commis-
sion stated that the mechanism of intra-organisational appointment and remuneration
of auditors was likely to weaken auditor independence and hence proposed the ap-
pointment of auditors by a third party. Second, to tackle the high levels of market
concentration with a de-facto oligopoly by the “Big Four” audit firms (Ernst and
Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), mandatory joint audits were
suggested – an audit would have to be performed by at least two firms including at
least one smaller firm. Lastly, the Commission criticised the simultaneous provision of
audit and non-audit services (e.g. advisory tasks) by statutory audit firms. Tackling
allegations of a lack of auditor independence, the Commission discussed the prohibition
of non-audit services for statutory audit firms and even considered the creation of ’pure
audit firms’, e↵ectively breaking up multi-billion-dollar enterprises (Commission, 2010,
pp. 9-10).
Given the importance and the scope of the proposed regulation, it is not surprising
that a large number of stakeholders participated in the public consultation that opened
on October 13, 2010 and ended on December 8, 2010. In total, 701 submissions were
received by the Commission. The most important groups of stakeholders were large or-
ganisations (mostly banks and corporations), SMEs, audit firms (the Big Four, medium
sized and many smaller audit firms), and public authorities (i.e. national governments
and public institutions).
After taking the submissions into account, it took three years until an agreement
was reached between the EU Member States and the European Parliament. In the end,
the proposed regulations were split in an amending Directive and a new Regulation
published on May 27, 2014.1 The final legislative outcome was partially consistent with
the policy proposals set out in the Green Paper. Some proposals, however, have been
1Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014, O cial Journal
of the European Union, L 158/196, Vol. 57, 27.05.2014; Regulation (EU) 537/2014 of the European
Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014, O cial Journal of the European Union, L 158/77, Vol
57, 27.05.2014.
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largely moderated or were dropped entirely.2
2.3 Interest Group Preference Attainment: Who
Prevails and Why?
The notion of interest group influence on EU policy-making has received consider-
able attention from political science scholars (see Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014; Du¨r,
2008b). While interest groups from di↵erent sectors should, in principle, have equal op-
portunities of representation and influence through di↵erent institutional access points,
Klu¨ver (2013) postulates a bias in favour of business associations and individual compa-
nies in the EU policy-making process. She further concludes that certain interest group
characteristics – the provision of policy-relevant information, the degree of economic
power, and the number of citizens represented – have a systemic positive e↵ect on the
groups’ ability to influence EU policy-making. Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall (2015),
on the other hand, find that business actors are on the losing end of the policy-making
process more often than not. Hence, the literature on business group influence in the
EU is rather undecided in its conclusions.
However, the respective literature on interest group influence in the EU generally
assumes unified business interests across the complete range of policy issues (see Bern-
hagen, Du¨r and Marshall, 2015; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013).
While this assumption may be useful when studying a large number of policy propos-
als, it does not hold for the given case. In fact, several proposals were intended to
strengthen and safeguard the interests of SMEs, which were, according to the Commis-
sion, heavily disadvantaged in the accounting and audit market (Commission, 2010).
Large firms, by comparison, were the regulators’ clear target and thus predominantly
lobbied against the proposed provisions. The notion of a necessary distinction between
large firms and SMEs is also supported by Keller (2018), who discusses di↵erent pref-
erences and lobbying strategies for SMEs and large firms in the process of regulating
the European banking sector after the financial crisis. For the issue domain of finan-
cial market regulation, in particular, Pagliari and Young (2014) criticise the general
tendency by scholars to assume preference homogeneity across financial market actors.
They argue that interest group plurality within the group of all business actors is not
only prevalent when scrutinising financial services regulation but also matters for pol-
icy outcomes (Pagliari and Young, 2014, p. 599). Hence, it is crucial to pay careful
2For a complete description of the proposals that have been adopted, moderated or discarded see
Tables SM1.6 and SM1.7 in the supplementary material.
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attention to the specific actor configurations in the process of regulating the European
audit market.
The relevant actors in audit and accounting regulation are prominently discussed
in the accounting literature. Cooper and Robson (2006) argue that the multinational
service and audit firms are the major actors in shaping global regulations. In addition,
Humphrey, Loft and Woods (2009) delineate the audit profession’s capacity to shape
a desired policy consensus among other influential financial market actors. Since the
biggest audit firms audit the vast majority of the world’s largest companies, they
have direct channels for communication and influence. Given the benefits that large
companies gain from their involvement with those firms (tax and advisory functions)
as well as the firms’ ability to mobilise large policy coalitions Humphrey, Loft and
Woods (2009) it is very likely that most large companies and business associations
would oppose the Commission’s regulatory attempts. In the context of the European
Union, however, other influential actors (i.e. the EUs’ major institutions) might be able
to defy the profession’s influence. The case of the Commission’s attempt to regulate
the audit market thus provides an opportunity to test the abiding claim of business
interest group success – the audit profession and its alliance with other influential
financial market actors – in EU policy-making.
Considering the literature on interest group lobbying in the EU (e.g. Klu¨ver, 2013)
and business interest representation (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Drope and Hansen,
2006), it can be assumed that large enterprises were most influential during the regu-
latory process of the EU audit market. According to Klu¨ver (2013, p. 216), business
interests would “have a good chance to influence policy-making in the European Union
if they dispose of a high degree of economic power and provide a lot of information”.
This notion is supported by Hansen and Mitchell (2000) who argue that the larger the
size of a firm, the larger its amount of political activity, as well as Drope and Hansen
(2006) who illustrate that large firms have considerable advantages in terms of lobbying
activity, revenue, concentration, and visibility compared to randomly sampled groups
of all business actors.
In addition, the literature on interest group representation in the EU (see Berkhout,
2015; Lowery, Poppelaars and Berkhout, 2008; Messer, Berkhout and Lowery, 2011)
suggests that higher economic resources of an interest group type increase the density
of the involved interest organisations. Interest group density can broadly be defined
as the number of organisations representing interests before the relevant legislator in
relation to the total number of organisations (see Gray and Lowery, 1994, p. 6). Given
that less than one per cent of all firms in the EU can be classified as large firms while
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the overwhelming majority are SMEs, the relative number of large firms disclosing
their preferences during the audit market regulation and hence the density of large
firms is exceptionally high (see Table SM1.2 in the supplementary material). Since
higher interest group density, in turn, can increase political influence (see Berkhout,
2015; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Messer, Berkhout and Lowery, 2011), it can be
assumed that large firms are most successful in attaining their preference compared to
other interest groups.
H1: Large enterprises were most successful in attaining their preferences during the
EU audit market regulation.
However, the size of an interest group coalition may moderate a single group’s success
in attaining its preferences. An interest group coalition is defined as a group of actors
who share the same policy goal and hence lobby for the same policy outcome (Baum-
gartner et al., 2009, p. 6; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015, pp. 964-965). These
coalitions can di↵er between distinct policy issues since the “preferences of interest
groups concerning specific policy issues determine whether they pull decision-makers
in the same direction” (Klu¨ver, 2013, p. 55). Hence, coalitions are assumed to be
volatile and based on issue-specific preferences rather than formal, long-term relations.
It is furthermore argued that these issues are not limited to whole legislations but also
di↵er within those legislations. Previous research suggests that larger coalitions are
more successful than smaller coalitions since they provide more information and have
higher relative economic power (Bernhagen, Du¨r and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013).
While scholars generally assume that coalition size increases the likelihood of successful
preference attainment equally for all types of interest groups (see Du¨r, Bernhagen and
Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013) following the theoretical considerations of hypothesis
H1, large firms should, on average, be more successful in attaining their preferences
in larger coalitions compared to other interest groups since the advantages of single
interest groups (i.e. higher economic power, information supply, political activity, and
visibility) should also increase in interest group coalitions. Hence, larger interest group
coalitions are not assumed to be equally beneficial to all types of groups.
H2: In relation to other interest groups, large enterprises are more successful in at-
taining their preferences within larger interest group coalitions.
Lastly, the salience of an issue might constitute another moderating factor for successful
preference attainment. Salience is broadly defined as the importance of an issue to
the average voter, relative to other political issues (e.g. Warntjen, 2012, p. 169).
According to Culpepper (2011, p. 177), “the more the public cares about an issue, the
less managerial organisations will be able to exercise disproportionate influence over the
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rules governing that issue”. When issue salience is high, policy-makers will more likely
develop their own, alternative sources of information, which makes them less dependent
on managerial organisations (Culpepper, 2011, p. 178). Additionally, highly salient
issues force legislators to take public opinion into consideration and, in turn, listen to
multiple advocates (Mahoney, 2007a, p. 40). This decreases policy-makers’ dependence
on large business actors as main source for policy relevant information, which undercuts
“one great advantage of managers under low salience politics” (Culpepper, 2011, p.
179). Hence, the success of large firms should decrease as issue salience increases.
H3: Large enterprises are less successful in attaining their preferences, the higher the
salience of an issue.
2.4 Data and Methods
2.4.1 Case Selection
In recent analyses of lobbying in the European Union, scholars mostly resorted to large-
N studies analysing the success of interest groups across many legislative proposals. In
contrast, this paper intentionally introduces a research design with only one legislation
(N=1) that allows breaking up a proposal in its smaller parts (issues). Hence, a much
greater level of detail is provided compared to large-N studies, facilitating possibilities
for a more precise measurement of interest group success and for the analysis of concrete
issue characteristics within one policy proposal.
In terms of generalisation, the case of the regulation of the European audit market
can be described as a typical case of financial market regulation after the financial crisis.
It can be compared to other regulatory initiatives formulated in response to the crisis
like the regulations of credit rating agencies (Dorn, 2012) or hedge funds (Moschella,
2011). Next to the fact that the EU attempted to overcome crisis-induced pressures by
readjusting the capacities of financial market actors, regulators were confronted with
oligarchical market structures and the sensitive matter of regulating entities critical
for the functioning of financial markets as such. Furthermore, the legislation on audit
market regulation includes a consultation procedure that is only initiated by the Euro-
pean Commission for proposals that are highly relevant for di↵erent stakeholders and
are large in scope. Thus, it can be compared to the proposals analysed in the main-
stream interest group literature (Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013)
that also resort to legislative procedures with preceding public consultations and is
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representative for EU legislative procedures as such.3
2.4.2 Measuring Success
Various improvements were made in recent years to enhance the measurement of in-
terest group success in lobbying EU legislations.4 A major approach that developed in
the respective literature assesses the degree of interest groups’ preference attainment
(Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Bernhagen, 2012). In its most simple form, the
approach models the preferences of the involved actors on a pre-defined policy scale
and compares the final policy outcome with these preferences to “draw conclusions
about the winners and losers of the decision-making process” (Klu¨ver, 2013, p. 62).
Accordingly, to estimate actor preferences, a scale of agreement with the Commission
proposal is constructed (similar to Baumgartner et al., 2009; Bernhagen, 2012). Interest
groups’ preferences are acquired from comment letters that were sent in response to
the Commission’s Green Paper. These so-called “open public consultations” where
interest groups can give written input on pending proposals, directives, as well as
green and white papers provide a rich data source that has been used by scholars ever
more frequently in recent years (Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013;
Klu¨ver and Mahoney, 2015). In total, 837 documents were uploaded to the European
Commission’s consultation website. Since this data includes cover letters, duplicates
(with di↵erent languages), as well as one identical position paper handed in individually
by 212 German SMEs, the final number of distinct interest group comment letters is
reduced to N = 402.5 For every interest group it is coded whether they prefer the
status quo, are neutral, or support the proposed regulation. It is coded “1” when
the actor fully opposes the proposed regulation (and hence prefers the status quo),
“2” if the regulation is partially opposed (qualified opposition), “3” when the actor is
neutral (undecided, or has no specific preference), “4” when there is partial agreement
(agreement with qualifications), and “5” when the regulation is fully supported.
This method allows for the measurement of actors’ preferences for each of the distinct
issues in the Commission proposal. The final success score for each actor on each single
issue is attained when comparing the actor’s preference with the final policy outcome.
3The number of interest group submissions during the consultation period of the EU audit market
regulation (N = 402) is comparably high. In her analysis, Klu¨ver (2013, pp. 105-106) reports an
average number of 87 submissions per policy proposal. Hence, the proposal as a whole can be seen
as rather salient.
4For excellent summaries and discussions of the most important studies on the subject see Du¨r (2008b)
and Klu¨ver (2013).
5For a detailed description of the elimination process see Table SM1.1 in the supplementary material.
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Similar to Bernhagen (2012) and Baumgartner et al. (2009), scores of success are
coded as “1” if the preferred legislative outcome of the actor can be found in the final
legislation and “0.5” if their preferences were partially attained (if only some of their
preferences can be found in the final legislative document). If the final outcome is
not compatible with an actor’s preferences, it is coded as “0”.6 As an example, actors
who vehemently opposed the introduction of auditor appointment by a third party in
the consultation process will receive a score of “1”, since the proposal was discarded
during the legislative process and did not make it into the final legislation. Considering
validation of the coded dataset, a random sample of all interest groups and issues were
re-coded by another coder (correlation = 0.91). Additionally, the coded results were
cross-checked with the results by Gros and Worret (2016), who analysed a subset of
issues of the same legislation and with the data gathered by the Commission to evaluate
the comment letters.
2.4.3 Independent and Control Variables
This paper distinguishes between four types of interest groups: large firms, SMEs,
public authorities (national governments and public institutions) and others (including
academics, individuals, and citizen groups). The di↵erentiation between large enter-
prises and SMEs will be made according to EU recommendation 2003/361 that defines
an SME as having a sta↵ headcount of < 250 and an annual turnover of  50 million
US$. If both criteria are met, the actor is coded as an SME, else it is considered a
large firm, given that it has been classified as a company. Since there are also many
associations lobbying the legislation, they are coded as an SME when their members
are solely SMEs or when they explicitly claim to solely represent the interests of SMEs
in their comment letters and vice versa for large enterprises. If no criteria are met, they
are coded as “other”. The variable “coalition size” is operationalised as the number
of actors within the same positional group as the actor. In line with Baumgartner
et al. (2009, p. 6) and Klu¨ver (2013), interest group coalitions are defined as “a set
of actors who share the same policy goal”. Hence, this study focuses on issue-specific
rather than formal, long-term coalitions. Lastly, “salience” is measured as the number
of interest group positions submitted per issue. In line with Klu¨ver (2013) as well as
Mahoney (2007a) it is assumed that the more salient an issue, the more actors are
active on this issue and the more attentive is the general public. Since the impact
of each actor involved in the policy-debate on increasing public visibility of an issue
6The success scores and the coding decisions for each issue are shown in Table SM1.7 in the supple-
mentary material.
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is expected to decrease as the number of actors increases (see Klu¨ver, 2013, p. 120),
salience is operationalised as the logarithm of the number of actors who responded to
each issue.7
For control variables, the “level of conflict” is operationalised as the standard devi-
ation of interest group positions for each issue. It is included in the analysis because a
higher degree of conflict between interest group coalitions might influence the respective
rates of success (see Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013). Furthermore,
“information supply” is measured as the number of words used on each issue by the
respective actors. While this measure only captures the quantity of information rather
than its quality, there is “no objective measure that one can rely on in order to mea-
sure the quality of information” that is not inherently subjective (Klu¨ver, 2013, pp.
106-107). Hence, it has to be resorted to information quantity as a proxy. The variable
“number of responses” is included since there is a large variance in the number of is-
sues that interest groups were active on and it may de- or increase their overall success
rate whether they were active on only 2 issues or on 25. Lastly, “EU-level” interest
groups (compared to national groups) are included as control, since interest groups
active on EU-level might be more networked and hence more e cient in influencing
EU policy-makers (see Binderkrantz and Rasmussen, 2015). The variable is coded as
“1” if the interest group is organised at the European level and “0” if it is domestically
organised.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Results
When examining the preferences of di↵erent interest group types, a clear variation can
be observed between large firms and SMEs as well as public authorities (see Figure
2.1). As expected, large firms, on average, oppose the Commission’s proposals (mean
preference of 2.33), while public authorities (3.2) and SMEs (3.3) are slightly in favour
7The operationalisation of salience has provoked an extensive scholarly debate during the last decade
(see Warntjen, 2012). While expert interviews ought to provide the “most fine-grained and least
ambiguous” measure of salience, they are rather costly (Warntjen, 2012, p. 180). Nevertheless,
operationalisations based on the number of actors responding to each legislative proposal (Klu¨ver,
2013) or media coverage (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Warntjen, 2012) can be seen as viable alternatives
and are inexpensive in nature. While there was only a small number of citizen groups active during
the EU legislative process, there was still considerable news coverage. Issues covered in newspaper
articles correlate highly with the number of actors lobbying on the respective issues. Since the number
of responding actors gives a more nuanced picture of the remaining issues, however, it is used in this
paper’s analysis.
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Figure 2.1: Mean interest group preference by group type
LE = large enterprises; SME = small and medium sized enterprises; public = public authorities; Other = other interest
group types.
of more regulation. Other interest groups (including academics, individuals and NGOs)
have a rather neutral position which might be explained with group heterogeneity. Most
importantly, however, there is a large discrepancy between large firms and SMEs.
In addition, di↵erent preferences are not only prevalent between distinct types of
interest groups but also between di↵erent issues featured in the Commission proposal.
In fact, the distribution of preferences varies greatly in between the issues (see Figure
SM1.1 in the supplementary material). The number of issues and the variance in actor
preferences across those issues support the critique by Bunea and Ibenskas (2015, p.
433) regarding the use of single policy dimensions for the measurement of interest
group preferences and success. Given the complexity of the regulation and the number
of distinct policy issues, it is highly unlikely that it can be narrowed down to only one
dimension of conflict. Hence, the measure of success proposed above o↵ers much more
precision than approximating the rate of success for a whole legislation on a single
dimension of conflict.
2.5.2 Multivariable Analysis
To analyse patterns of interest group success, di↵erently specified mixed-e↵ect ordered
logistic regression models are computed. Since interest group-issue dyads are used as
units of analysis (where individual interest groups and issues are treated as levels of
analysis) observations cannot be assumed to be independent of each other. Hence,
hierarchical models with random e↵ects at the interest group as well as the issue level
are estimated.
The results of the main analysis are reported in Table 2.1 . Four di↵erent models
are calculated to test the formulated hypotheses. Model 1 – the base model – con-
tains the di↵erent types of interest groups, all control variables and the variables for
salience and coalition size. Since interaction e↵ects are included in models 2, 3, and 4,
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Table 2.1: Mixed-e↵ects ordered logistic regression models (base group: SME)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IG: Large firms  0.15 0.25 0.48⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
IG: Public authorities 0.07 0.37⇤⇤ 0.04 0.28
(0.08) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19)
IG: Other  0.04 0.16 0.25⇤ 0.33⇤
(0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
Coalition size 5.79⇤⇤⇤ 6.58⇤⇤⇤ 5.96⇤⇤⇤ 6.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.36) (0.18) (0.38)
Salience  2.06⇤⇤⇤  2.04⇤⇤⇤  1.51⇤  1.62⇤⇤
(0.75) (0.75) (0.79) (0.79)
Large firms x Coalition size —  1.23⇤⇤⇤ —  0.24
(0.42) (0.49)
Public authorities x Coalition size —  1.00⇤⇤ —  1.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.42) (0.45)
Other x Coalition size —  0.70⇤ — -0.40
(0.40) (0.42)
Large firms x Salience — —  1.44⇤⇤⇤  1.48⇤⇤⇤
(0.33) (0.39)
Public authorities x Salience — — 0.06 0.32
(0.33) (0.34)
Other x Salience — —  0.71⇤⇤  0.63⇤
(0.30) (0.32)
Conflict 1.91⇤⇤ 1.90⇤⇤⇤ 1.99⇤⇤⇤ 1.97⇤⇤⇤
(0.85) (0.84) (0.85) (0.85)
Number of responses  0.08  0.09  0.13  0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Information supply  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45)
EU-level 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 2.30⇤⇤⇤ 2.52⇤⇤⇤ 2.58⇤⇤⇤ 2.66⇤⇤⇤
(0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)
Constant 2 3.27⇤⇤⇤ 3.49⇤⇤⇤ 3.55⇤⇤⇤ 3.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)
Log likelihood  5305.43  5300.71  5289.57  5285.50
AIC 10636.86 10633.43 10611.13 10609.01
Observations 6116 6116 6116 6116
n Interest groups 402 402 402 402
n Issues 25 25 25 25
Variance (Interest groups) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance (Issues) 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01; ⇤⇤p < 0.05; ⇤p < 0.01.
IG = Interest group. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal e↵ects of large firms on success by coalition size
95% confidence intervals in shaded grey. Plots based on models including both interaction e↵ects (coalition size and
salience).
respectively, model 1 serves as a baseline for model comparison and to assess in how
far the introduction of interaction terms changes the remaining coe cients. To test
hypotheses 2 and 3, model 2 includes the interaction term between interest group type
and coalition size, while model 3 accounts for the interaction between group type and
issue salience. Model 4 contains both interaction terms to check the robustness of the
results.
In model 1, the coe cient of large firms is negative albeit statistically insignificant.
While the e↵ect size is substantively di↵erent to the coe cient of public authorities,
there is no clear evidence that large enterprises are, in fact, least successful in attaining
their preferences during the EU audit market regulation. Compared to public authori-
ties directly (see model 1 in Table SM1.8 in the supplementary material) the coe cient
is actually significantly (p < 0.01) negative. When looking at models 2-4, however, it
becomes clear that the success of large firms actually varies with di↵erent values of
coalition size and issue salience and hence cannot be estimated by looking at model 1
in isolation.
Considering the moderating variables coalition size and salience, both variables are
statistically significant and robust across all four models: while coalition size has a
large positive e↵ect on interest group success in preference attainment (p < 0.01 in
model 4), salience, by comparison, seems to reduce interest groups’ chances at success-
fully achieving their desired policy outcomes (p < 0.05 in model 4). In model 2, the
interaction e↵ect between interest group type and coalition size is introduced. The co-
e cient for large firms vis-a`-vis SMEs is significantly negative. Since the interpretation
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Figure 2.3: Marginal e↵ects of large firms on success by salience
95% confidence intervals in shaded grey. Plots based on models including both interaction e↵ects (coalition size and
salience).
of interaction e↵ects solely with regression output is not feasible since the conditional
e↵ect should be observed on the marginal e↵ect of every observed value of Z (see Berry,
Golder and Milton, 2012; Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006), the marginal e↵ects of
large firms on success by coalition size are plotted in Figure 2.2, both in comparison to
SMEs (left) as well as to public authorities (right). Considering the relative success in
preference attainment compared to SMEs, large firms are significantly more successful
up to a coalition size of 91 interest groups (71.7 per cent of the data). While the mag-
nitude of the e↵ect decreases across the entire range values of coalition size, it stays
positive. Compared to public authorities (Figure 2.2 on the right), the e↵ect of large
firms on success in preference attainment increases with higher values of coalition size
and is significant for almost all sizes of interest group coalitions: the e↵ect is signifi-
cantly positive for interest group coalitions larger than 28 members, which represents
89.1 per cent of the data. Hence, with respect to hypothesis 2, there is some supporting
evidence that the assumed advantages of large firms increase in larger interest group
coalitions.
The hypothesised interaction e↵ect of salience and interest group type on success is
included in models 3 and 4, respectively. Compared to SMEs as well as public authori-
ties, the coe cients for large enterprises are significantly negative in both models. The
e↵ects are plotted in Figure 2.3. In contrast to the e↵ect of coalition size, a much clearer
picture emerges for issue salience: large firms are less successful in preference attain-
ment on highly salient issues. Compared to SMEs, the e↵ect is actually significantly
positive for issues with very low salience but turns significantly negative for issues with
43
higher salience scores (22.2 per cent of the data). In relation to public authorities,
large enterprises are less successful in the majority of the issues with moderate to high
salience (66.3 per cent of the data). Hence, the results o↵er supportive evidence for
hypothesis 3 and the theoretical claims by Culpepper (2011) that the more salient an
issue, the less successful are business actors lobbying against it.
Considering hypothesis 1 which postulated a general tendency of large firms to be
more successful in attaining their preferences during the regulation of the EU audit
market due to advantages in economic power and information supply (Klu¨ver, 2013;
Drope and Hansen, 2006), political and lobbying activities (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000)
as well as interest group density (Berkhout, 2015; Messer, Berkhout and Lowery, 2011),
it becomes clear that a broader statement is di cult to make: the success of di↵erent
interest groups depends heavily on issue salience and the size of issue-specific interest
group coalitions. While larger coalitions do, on average, increase the probability of
successful preference attainment for all interest groups, large firms tend to be more
successful in larger coalitions relative to other interest groups. However, compared to
SMEs, the positive e↵ect disappears for medium to large interest group coalitions. The
moderating e↵ect of salience, in comparison, is much clearer. In line with Culpepper
(2011), the empirical findings indicate that large firms are significantly less successful
on issues with high salience.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of the results, first, the analysis was re-run with an alternative
specification of success. The dependent variable of interest group success in preference
attainment was coded as “1” if the preference (based on a scale with five categories)
matches the final outcome, and “0.5” if it partially matches the outcome. However, the
score of “0.5” was given based on a qualitative assessment of which adjacent preference
is closer to the final outcome. As an example, if the final policy outcome was coded
as “4”, interest groups with the same preference score received a success score of “1”,
but only groups with a preference score of “5” or “3” received a score of “0.5”. Hence,
to account for possible ramifications of this coding choice, the analysis was re-run
with partial preference attainment coded as “0.5“ for both adjacent preferences. The
results are almost identical (see Table SM1.9 in the supplementary material). Second,
to account for the choice of the statistical model, the full model with both interaction
e↵ects was also run using linear mixed-e↵ects models with both coding variants for
success and a generalised linear mixed-e↵ects model (where success was coded as “1”
where it was previously coded as “1” or “0.5” and “0” where it was previously “0”).
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The results are very similar to the models used in the main analysis (see Table SM1.10
in the supplementary material).
2.6 Discussion
The findings of this study have various implications for the theoretical literature on
business lobbying in the EU. Concerning the overarching claim of highly successful
lobbying e↵orts of business actors, this study, first, shows that a di↵erentiation between
large firms and SMEs is viable if not necessary. While scholars studying interest-group
lobbying in the EU tend to assume homogeneous business interests in order to make
more general claims (see Bernhagen, Du¨r and Marshall, 2015; Du¨r, Bernhagen and
Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013) the distribution of preferences in the analysis and the
di↵erent patterns of success illustrate that there can be huge di↵erences between large
firms and SMEs that cannot be neglected.
Considering the success of large firms in attaining their preferences during the leg-
islative process, the results of the analysis convey a mixed picture. Most importantly,
a general statement about the success of specific interest groups across all issues is
di cult to make: interest group success in preference attainment depends heavily on
issue salience and the size of issue-specific policy coalitions. As assumed in the theory
section, large firms seem to be more successful in larger interest group coalitions com-
pared to SMEs and public authorities. This finding has important implications for the
respective literature on interest group lobbying during EU policy-making which gener-
ally assumes that coalition size is equally beneficial to all interest groups. However, the
advantages of large enterprises (see Klu¨ver, 2013; Drope and Hansen, 2006) seem to
increase in more sizeable interest group coalitions. Nevertheless, compared to SMEs,
the positive e↵ect of coalition size for large firms on success becomes insignificant for
very large interest group coalitions (see Figure 2.2). This might imply that coalition
size can function as a “catch-up mechanism” for SMEs when they manage to mobilise
very large alliances of actors lobbying for the same outcome. It also has to be noted
that the e↵ect is less pronounced in the full model including the interaction e↵ect of
interest group type and salience. Hence, further research should investigate possible
(three-way) interactions between interest group type, coalition size, and salience since
it is plausible that the size of interest group coalitions varies on issues with high and
low salience. Lastly, it might also be worthwhile for further research to analyse how
the homogeneity of interest groups (see Baumgartner et al., 2009) a↵ects the groups’
success in preference attainment and hence pay more careful attention to the actual
45
internal composition of interest group coalitions.
The e↵ect of issue salience, by comparison, is very pronounced and robust across all
models. In line with the theoretical assumptions by Culpepper (2011) and Mahoney
(2007a) it can be observed that large companies are least successful on issues with
the highest salience. This has important implications not only for the literature on
auditing and accounting that postulates the dominance of large accounting firms and
corporations on regulatory matters (Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey, 2015), but also
for scholars investigating the influence of interest groups on EU policy-making (Bunea
and Baumgartner, 2014; Du¨r, 2008b; Du¨r, Bernhagen and Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver,
2013).
In addition to the theoretical implications, this study also makes a strong case for
refining the measurement of interest group success. Taking the critique by Bunea and
Ibenskas (2015) seriously, a reduction of a complex legislation to only one dimension
of conflict is questionable given the number of actual issues within those legislations.
The method proposed in this paper – to estimate the success of actors on each issue
featured in a specific legislation – o↵ers much more precision compared to studies that
approximate the success for whole legislations. Further research should extend the
analysis to a larger number of legislations while keeping the same level of precision.
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THREE
UNITED IN DISAGREEMENT: ANALYSING POLICY
NETWORKS IN EU POLICY-MAKING
(co-authored with Dennis Abel)
Abstract
Shared belief systems are generally assumed to forge policy networks. Based on a
novel inferential network approach in combination with mediation analysis, this study
investigates the role of belief systems as a link between organisational a liation and
policy networks in the European Union. In order to measure the intervening e↵ect
of belief systems, automated text analysis is used. Our results suggest that shared
belief systems are a strong mediator for members of the same organisational type. In
addition, “strange bedfellow” networks between NGOs and businesses do, in fact, lack
belief congruence and emerge on issues with low potential for inter-group conflict. This
paper makes a contribution to our understanding of advocacy coalition formation and
adds to the emerging line of research which combines quantitative text with inferential
network analysis.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the role of belief systems as a link between shared organisational
a liations and policy networks in the European Union. In the theoretical literature,
it is generally assumed that similarities in belief systems are the foundation of policy
networks: if actors share similar normative assumptions about the design of a policy
subsystem, they are more likely to engage in coordinated e↵orts to ensure that these
are echoed in public policies (Sabatier, 1988; Weible and Sabatier, 2005). Moreover,
belief systems are considered to be homogeneous among members of the same organisa-
tional type which, in turn, foster the formation of policy networks (Berardo and Scholz,
2010; Feiock et al., 2014; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017). Numerous studies on en-
vironmental policy, in particular, have analysed a typical business-NGO cleavage of
conflicting preferences between economic competitiveness and stricter regulation (In-
gold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017; Ingold and Fischer, 2014; Ingold, 2011). Research on
interest group coalitions concerned with European Union (EU) policy-making, however,
also stresses the importance of so-called “strange bedfellow” coalitions – i.e. coalitions
of actors who typically would not work together (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Junk,
2019; Phinney, 2017). We argue that it is crucial to understand the emergence of these
unconventional but potentially very successful coalition types (see Junk, 2019). By
definition, these cross-type networks do not rely on shared beliefs. Empirical evidence
on this assumption, however, is rare.1 Based on a novel inferential network approach –
a so-called additive and multiplicative e↵ects (AME) model (Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward,
2019) – in combination with mediation analysis, we study how shared policy core beliefs
mediate preference congruence between various combinations of actor types. Hence,
we test whether the assumptions of the ACF also hold for the case of strange bedfellow
coalitions in EU politics.
To understand the role of shared beliefs in the formation of policy networks, we anal-
yse a consultation on the EU’s flagship climate policy, the “European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme” (EU ETS). EU consultations are important forms of “informational
lobbying” (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). In the context of EU politics, this is partic-
ularly relevant for advocacy groups as in “Brussels, the key to successful lobbying is
not political patronage or campaign contributions, but the provision of information”
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003, p. 170) or as Chalmers (2011) puts it, information is the
currency for lobbying in the EU. Since the inception of the EU ETS in 2005, this policy
1Also note the study by Weible and Sabatier (2005) who investigate the formation of di↵erent types of
policy networks. They find that policy core beliefs can, in fact, “overlook alliances within advocacy
coalitions and some cross-coalition interactions” (Weible and Sabatier, 2005, p. 182).
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instrument was characterised by a typical business-NGO cleavage. Previous research
has shown, however, that this issue area is also shaped by a within-business cleavage
between energy producers and energy-intensive industries due to di↵erentiated reg-
ulatory standards (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson, 2019; Jevnaker and Wettestad,
2017). The likely emergence of strange bedfellow constellations between energy pro-
ducers and NGOs makes this policy area an ideal case for studying the mediating role
of policy beliefs on network formation.
In practice, identifying actor’s belief systems is often costly since it involves the
use of questionnaires, in-depth interviews or hand-coding of written statements using
content analysis. Many studies rely on closed multiple choice questions (Calanni et al.,
2015; Heany and Leifeld, 2018; Ingold and Fischer, 2014; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney,
2017; Weible and Sabatier, 2009). This study, in contrast, uses automated text analysis
in order to measure similarities in belief systems. Analysing responses to the EU public
consultation with the use of text similarity scores, we employ a simple alternative to
hand-coding that has already been successfully implemented in the literature on text
reuse in US legislative politics (Linder et al., 2018; Wilkerson, Smith and Stramp,
2015).
Our results suggest that shared belief systems are a strong mediator for network for-
mation among members of the same type of organisation. We show that environmental
NGOs and energy-intensive industries form separate networks based on homogeneous
belief systems despite their beliefs often being diametrically opposed. In addition, our
results reveal a strange bedfellow network between NGOs and energy producers on is-
sues with low potential for inter-group conflict. The mediation analysis indicates that
these ally networks do, in fact, lack belief congruence. In summary, this paper advances
our understanding of the formation of advocacy coalitions in EU policy-making and
follows recent calls to identify the settings in which coalitions form around shared pol-
icy core beliefs (Weible et al., 2019, p. 20). Methodologically, it adds to the emerging
line of research which combines quantitative text and inferential network analysis in
social science (Bail, 2016; Rule, Cointet and Bearman, 2015).
The paper is structured as follows. The subsequent section outlines our theoretical
expectations about the relationship between belief systems and the formation of policy
networks. Next, we briefly describe our case – the EU ETS and consultation process
on carbon leakage provisions. In the section on our estimation strategy, we explain
the measurement of networks based on additive and multiplicative e↵ects models, our
data, as well as our algorithm for the quantitative text analysis. Our main results
and a discussion of the findings are presented in the subsequent sections. Lastly, we
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conclude and discuss avenues for further research.
3.2 Policy Networks and Shared Belief Systems
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) is a major approach to conceptualising cleav-
ages between interest groups and analysing their e↵orts to influence policy-making
(Sabatier, 1988, 2007). The e↵ect of belief systems on coalition formation is an in-
tegral part of the ACF. The ACF, as well as policy network studies more generally,
assume that similar policy beliefs are more likely to increase interaction in advocacy
coalitions — policy beliefs provide the “glue” for the structure of advocacy coalitions
(Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2004; Weible, 2005). In contrast to direct policy pref-
erences, policy beliefs constitute normative assumptions how a policy subsystem should
work, in general, rather than specific preferences for political decisions.2
Actors who share the same policy beliefs see the challenges in a policy subsystem
through the same lens. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) argue that this belief sim-
ilarity is a major driver of the coordination of action in order to translate beliefs into
policy. This translation of shared policy beliefs into joint preferences, i.e. instrumen-
tal decisions, is a crucial step in the ACF framework (Bouwen, 1993; Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
Moreover, Weible and Sabatier (2005) di↵erentiate between di↵erent types of ad-
vocacy networks: in contrast to coordination and advice/information networks, ally
networks are the loosest form of coalitions which do not necessitate direct interaction.
Two actors who see each other as allies because they work towards the same policy
goal, might never exchange information or coordinate their actions. The defining el-
ement of ally networks are shared policy preferences. The authors argue that policy
beliefs strongly predict ally networks since those who share common normative values
and problem definitions see the world through the same lens. Several studies show that
ally networks are formed by those who share common policy core beliefs in a policy
subsystem (Salisbury et al., 1987; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). Because functional in-
2The ACF describes a three-tiered structure in beliefs: deep core beliefs which cut through most policy
subsystems and involve general normative assumptions about human nature and fundamental values,
policy core beliefs, which constitute applications of deep core beliefs to specific policy subsystems, and
secondary aspects which are relatively narrow in scope and address detailed questions of instrument
choice and calibration thereof. While it makes sense to conceptually distinguish between di↵erences
in beliefs, they are often hard to disentangle in practice. This study focuses on the general impact
of belief systems on ally networks and therefore does not di↵erentiate between the individual layers.
Empirically, however, it does discriminate between normative policy beliefs and “instrumental” policy
preferences. Throughout the paper, we use the term “policy beliefs” in order to emphasise the focus
on policy core beliefs but taking into account potential spill-overs from the other two layers.
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terdependence and resource dependency is missing, Weible and Sabatier (2005) argue
that this form of coalition is the most homogeneous. Their results indicate that policy
core beliefs are a good predictor for ally networks and that ally networks, as such,
represent a good proxy for advocacy coalitions in the absence of information on actual
coordination.
How can we conceptualise ally networks which deviate from the idea of shared pol-
icy beliefs? While the policy network literature primarily focuses on belief homophily,
recent literature on interest group coalitions in the US (Holyoke, 2009; Phinney, 2017)
and the EU (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson, 2019;
Junk, 2019; Mahoney, 2007b) explicitly discusses the existence of so called strange
bedfellow coalitions, i.e. preference alignment and coalition formation between actors
who typically do not work together. By definition, these coalitions are composed of
actors with di↵erent policy beliefs and a higher degree of ideological distance than tra-
ditional coalitions (see Junk, 2019, p. 4; Holyoke, 2009). The ACF, in contrast, defines
coalitions as a “set of actors who share a belief in the first stage” (Ingold and Fischer,
2014, p. 89), which basically dismisses the conceptual possibility of coalitions without
a shared belief system. Instead of conceptualising these networks as coalitions, they
are seen as cross-coalition interaction (Weible, 2005). This divergent understanding
of coalition formation could be explained by the ACF’s inflexibility to account for –
in the case of the EU very relevant – ad hoc coalitions (Pijnenburg, 1998). Warleigh
(2000) has discussed this discrepancy in one of the earliest applications of the ACF to
EU politics, stressing issue-specific coalition formation. Although any deviations from
“monolithic” coalitions so far are undertheorised, the problem has been recognised in
the ACF literature. In a recent ACF “stocktaking”, Weible, Sabatier and McQueen
(2009, p. 130) stress that “the coalition concept should not lead researchers to as-
sume homogeneity among group members either in beliefs or in coordination patterns”
and encourage studies of sub-coalitions and “defections”. Yet again, this perspective
highlights a pre-determined perspective on coalitions.
While strange bedfellow coalition networks can be mostly observed in rare cases
and for issues that enjoy high salience among the general public (see Beyers and De
Bruycker, 2018), they can have a large influence on policy outcomes (Junk, 2019).
According to Phinney (2017), diverse coalitions can reach a larger number of legislators
through their informational and tactical diversity. In addition, Mahoney (2007b, p.
375) stresses the importance of strange bedfellow coalitions in signalling to “elected
policy-makers that a large majority of the electorate will likely support” the legislation
under consideration. Given that strange bedfellow coalitions were previously observed
between business and the environmental community in the US (Mahoney, 2007b) as
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well as in previous phases of the EU ETS negotiations (see Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and
Benson, 2019; Jevnaker and Wettestad, 2017), in particular, we theorise about the
relationship between policy beliefs and the emergence of ally networks, as well as the
occurrence of strange bedfellow networks, in the following sections.
3.2.1 Belief Homophily and Ally Networks
First, policy network scholars strongly agree on the importance of homophily, i.e. that
two actors who have similar core beliefs are more likely to share the same policy pref-
erences (Gerber, Henry and Lubell, 2013; Heikkila, 2016; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney,
2017). As described above, this research is strongly influenced by the ACF which ar-
gues that actors are more likely to accept information that aligns with their pre-existing
beliefs (see Sabatier, 1987; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Policy beliefs, in partic-
ular, are the foundation of forming coalitions and establishing alliances. Several studies
have demonstrated a strong association between belief or ideological congruence and
network ties (see Henry et al., 2014; Ingold and Fischer, 2014; Ingold, Fischer and
Cairney, 2017; Weible, 2005). More specifically, the underlying causal mechanism im-
plies that similar types of actors share the same beliefs (ideological homophily) that, in
turn, influence their preferences for specific policy outcomes. Since similar individuals
should be equally a↵ected by new legislation they “see the policy problem through the
same lens” and “tend to develop a common understanding of the problem” (Ingold,
Fischer and Cairney, 2017, p. 447, Berardo and Scholz, 2010, Feiock et al., 2014).
Hence, policy preferences can be linked to shared organisational a liations (Heikkila,
2016).
We illustrate the hypothesised link with a shared organisational type (type match),
policy beliefs and a strong likelihood for forming ally networks in Figure 3.1. Whereas
the research on policy networks focuses mostly on local or national policy subsystems,
similar notions of organisational preference alignment can also be found in the literature
on interest groups in the EU (see Coen and Richardson, 2009; Du¨r, Bernhagen and
Marshall, 2015; Klu¨ver, 2013). Business groups in many EU policy fields “tend to
support the status quo with no or only very low regulatory standards at the EU level”,
while non-business groups (NGOs), by comparison, “often seek policy change with
the aim of harmonising regulatory standards across Europe” (Du¨r, Bernhagen and
Marshall, 2015, p. 957). With respect to environmental policies in particular, Ingold,
Fischer and Cairney (2017, p. 447) argue that “issues of environmental and energy
policy [...] mostly pitch actors with right-wing and economy-friendly core beliefs against
left-wing environmental actors”. Hence, we expect actors of the same organisational
type to share similar policy beliefs and, in turn, agree on specific policy designs within
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the EU ETS regulation:
H1: The likelihood of ally networks between two actors of the same organisational type
is mediated by shared policy beliefs.
3.2.2 Ally Networks Between Strange Bedfellows
While scholars studying policy networks generally assume that the policy goals of busi-
nesses and NGOs are diametrically opposed (see Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Christenson,
2015; Ingold and Fischer, 2014), recent literature on interest group lobbying in the US
(Holyoke, 2009; Phinney, 2017) and the EU (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018; Fitch-Roy,
Fairbrass and Benson, 2019; Junk, 2019; Mahoney, 2007b) suggests that strange bedfel-
low arrangements have to be considered when analszing the formation of ally networks.
As mentioned above, strange bedfellows are defined as actors with di↵erent organisa-
tional a liations (e.g. businesses or NGOs) who typically would not work together but
still share the same policy preference or lobby for the same outcome. Hence, strange
bedfellow networks can be described as ally networks that exist without the foundation
of shared policy beliefs (see Figure 3.2). Scrutinising the compatibility between the
ACF and studies on EU policy-making, in particular, Rozbicka (2013, p. 849) argues
that the ACF “can be considered one of the most promising frameworks to explain the
EU policy processes”, but does not consider that in the fast-moving political system of
the EU, “actors are building coalitions based not only on their beliefs but also shared
interests and owing to their interdependencies”. More generally, this claim is also sub-
stantiated by Weible and Sabatier (2005), who find that the ACF tends to overlook
some alliances and cross-coalition interactions.
We formalise our theoretical assumptions on the missing link between shared policy
beliefs and the emergence of strange bedfellow networks in hypothesis 2:
H2: The occurrence of strange bedfellow networks is una↵ected by the absence of shared
policy beliefs.
Policy beliefs
Type match Ally network
Figure 3.1: Belief systems as mediators of ally network formation
53
When do ally networks between strange bedfellows emerge, in general? Although ev-
idence is still rare, previous research has shown that issue characteristics can be a
central factor in determining the likelihood of policy networks between strange bedfel-
lows. According to Phinney (2017) as well as Beyers and De Bruycker (2018), strange
bedfellow coalitions, while being comparably rare, tend to develop more frequently
when the policy under consideration is highly salient to organisations, to the general
public and in the media. Moreover, Junk (2019) finds that strange bedfellow coalitions
are actually more successful in attaining their preferences on issues with high advocacy
salience. In addition to salience, we introduce another contextual factor that helps to
explain the emerge of strange bedfellow networks – the level of inter-group conflict of
an issue. Weible and Sabatier (2005, p. 184) argue that interactions between di↵erent
groups become increasingly less likely with higher levels of conflict on a specific policy.
The ACF describes variations in levels of conflict on the basis of di↵erences in policy
subsystem characteristics (Weible, Sabatier and McQueen, 2009). Whereas adversarial
policy subsystems are characterised by competitive coalitions with polarised beliefs and
fewer cross-coalition interactions, collaborative subsystems allow stronger levels of be-
lief convergence across coalitions. That is why we propose that policy types and their
potential for inter-group conflict can be crucial for the formation of strange bedfellow
coalitions. We argue, however, that variation in levels of conflict is not just possible
on the sub-system level but also on the sub-issue level.
What drives these levels of conflict? We assume that high stakes and zero-sum games
are major drivers for inter-group conflict. Hence, we follow Lowi (1972, 1964) in his
classic typology of policies. In general, environmental policy is traditionally classified
as a form of regulation. Regulation can, however, entail re-distributive e↵ects. Since
policies with re-distributive e↵ects determine clear winners and losers, they can be
regarded as generating more inter-group conflict than issues of a more technical and
administrative nature. Thus, we assume that strange bedfellow networks are less likely
on re-distributive policies.
Our theoretical assumptions on strange bedfellow networks lead us to the following
Policy beliefs
Strange bedfellows Ally network
Figure 3.2: Strange bedfellows and ally networks
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hypothesis:
H3: A strange bedfellow network is most likely on issues with low inter-group conflict.
3.3 The EU ETS and Carbon Leakage
Given the variety of participants in the legislative process and the typical power dis-
crepancies between influential businesses and NGOs, EU consultations on climate and
environmental policies are regularly selected as the best cases for studying policy net-
works (Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017; Ingold and Fischer, 2014) as well as interest
group influence on EU policy-making (Klu¨ver, 2013).
We have selected the “EU ETS post-2020 carbon leakage provisions” as our case
study because it captures opinions on a specific problem – carbon leakage – within
Europe’s “flagship” climate policy, the emissions trading scheme.3 The consultation
ran from May 8, 2014 until July 31, 2014 and was open to responses from all stakeholder
groups as well as private citizens. The aim of the consultation was to gather opinions
on various options for a system to avoid carbon leakage after 2020.
Within the realm of environmental regulation, climate change mitigation and the
EU ETS, in particular, are characterised by a typical business-NGO cleavage of con-
flicting priorities between stricter regulation and economic competitiveness. Since the
adoption of the EU ETS, the development of the system has also been characterised
by a within-business cleavage mainly involving the two major greenhouse gas (GHG)
emitting sectors in the EU: energy production and energy-intensive industries.4 This
cleavage primarily emerged over provisions for carbon leakage.
The consultation was conducted during the negotiations for the post-2020 reform
phase, potentially adjusting the standards for free allowances of energy-intensive in-
dustries. The results were fed into further work on the 2030 climate and energy policy
framework regarding the determination of post-2020 rules on free allocation and carbon
3See https://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/articles/0023 en (accessed May 2, 2019). The EU ETS
was established in 2005 as a cap-and-trade-system for greenhouse gases (GHG) in the European
Union, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein in order to fulfil the EU’s mandatory GHG reduction
target under the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast to direct taxation, the EU ETS creates a market
for emission certificates in order to internalise the external e↵ects of GHG emissions. Polluters
are required to buy the appropriate amount of certificates to cover their emissions levels. Excess
certificates can be traded between participants.
4See Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson (2019) for an account on one of the most prominent strange
bedfellow coalition between business actors and environmental advocacy groups – the “Friends of
ETS” – during the “rescue mission” in 2013-2014. The coalition dissolved after 2014.
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leakage provisions in the EU ETS.5
We selected the EU ETS reform of carbon leakage as a typical case for the occurrence
of strange bedfellow coalitions. In general, the carbon leakage reform was highly salient
among many stakeholders from di↵erent organisational types. Compared with the
average EU consultation which features fewer than 100 interest group submissions (see
Klu¨ver, 2013, pp. 105-106), the survey of carbon leakage and the EU ETS received 382.
Hence, in line with Phinney (2017) and Beyers and De Bruycker (2018) who expects a
higher likelihood of strange bedfellow coalitions on more salient legislation, we assume
the EU ETS reform to be a typical case for it.
In addition, empirical studies on di↵erent aspects of EU ETS reform illustrate the
high propensity for strange bedfellow arrangements between NGOs and energy pro-
ducers. According to Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson (2019, pp. 8-9), the EU ETS
reform project as a whole “reflects years of entrenched division” between energy in-
tensive industries on the one hand, and energy producers of electricity, wind, or gas
on the other. Thus, in line with scholars who stress the importance of accounting for
di↵erent types of business interests in contrast to describing business interests as ho-
mogeneous (see Mertens, 2019), policy core beliefs can be assumed to diverge strongly
between energy producers and energy intensive industries. While the producers gen-
erally support the mechanisms of the EU ETS, the intensive industries attempt to be
“treated as a special case [...] by raising concerns about “carbon leakage”, a postulated
race-to-the-bottom process by which industry leaves the EU seeking lower regulatory
costs” (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson, 2019, pp. 8-9; see also Jevnaker and Wettes-
tad, 2017). Environmental advocacy groups are in favour of climate change mitigation
measures but mostly lobby for stricter regulation with respect to target sectors, alloca-
tion modalities and ambitiousness of the EU ETS. Prior research has shown that some
energy producers and NGOs have formed coalitions during critical phases of the EU
ETS development to overcome the resistance of the manufacturing sector (Markussen
and Tinggaard Svendsen, 2005; Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson, 2019). This evidence
and the general distribution of preferences among stakeholders for the EU ETS re-
form indicate that an ally network of strange bedfellows is most likely between energy
producers and NGOs.
Lastly, zooming into the single sub-issues within the consultation, we can detect
varying potentials for inter-group conflict. Environmental policy, in general, is tradi-
5As part of this framework and with some adjustments, it was decided to continue the free allocation
of emission allowances until 2030. Sectors at the highest risk will receive 100% free allocations until
2030, less exposed sectors will undergo a gradual decrease of free allocation from 30% to 0% between
2026 and 2030.
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tionally classified as a form of regulation. However, the EU ETS entails re-distributional
elements by creating a market for carbon emissions. Adjustments to the allocation rules
for the certificates create winners and losers. In our analysis, we di↵erentiate sub-issues
with re-distributional e↵ects from questions of a more general regulatory nature. Link-
ing back to our theoretical assumptions, we assume that re-distributive e↵ects create
higher potentials for inter-group conflict. Research on the EU ETS reform periods has
shown that issues related to scope and allocation rules generated the strongest conflict.
In contrast, issues of a technical and administrative nature, like links to other policy
instruments and compliance rules, were less controversial (Markussen and Tinggaard
Svendsen, 2005).
3.4 Estimation Strategy
3.4.1 Modelling Ally Networks
As shared preferences regarding the EU ETS might be purely coincidental but might
also be caused by coordination or information exchange, network ties cannot be credibly
assumed to be independent. Since conditional independence of participating pairs
(dyads) is one of the core assumptions of standard regression techniques, using these
models would lead to biased estimates (Robins, Lewis and Wang, 2012). Network
approaches mitigate this problem of interdependence. Network analysis has a long
tradition in political science (Ward and Sacks, 2011) and o↵ers descriptive as well as
inferential approaches.
Classical inferential network approaches were developed for binary edges which in-
dicate whether two actors share a social relationship or not. Recent methodological
developments on valued networks, however, also allow the application of inferential
network approaches on weighted edges (Cranmer et al., 2017; Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward,
2019). The implementation of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) for count
values is well established in the literature (see Scott, 2016). Network approaches for
real-data values on a continuous scale, however, are still being developed. To address
the problem of real-valued edges, we run recently developed “additive and multiplica-
tive e↵ects models” (AME) (Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019). Compared with its two
most popular alternative approaches in modelling network dependencies – the latent
space model (LSM) and the ERGM – AME models allow a computationally e cient
estimation of networks with binary, ordinal as well as continuous edges. In addition,
coe cients can be interpreted with greater ease and researchers are enabled to “fo-
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cus on examining theories that may only be relevant in the monadic or dyadic level”
(Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019, p. 209).6
When modelling dyadic data, AME models, first, assume that all data are generated
from a probability distribution: yij ⇠ P (Y |✓ij), with a probability density or mass
function such as binomial, Poisson, or normal. Dependencies in the data are addressed
with the assumption of conditional independence of the presence or absence of a tie
between two actors and all other ties, given the parameters ✓ij and the set of nodal and
dyadic covariates xij. Given a set of n actors, {i,j,k} resulting in n⇤(n 1) observations,
the joint density function over all dyads can be constructed as follows:
P (yij, yik, ...ykj|✓ij, ✓ik, ..., ✓kj) = P (yij|✓ik)P (yij|✓ij)...P (yij|✓kj)
P (Y |✓) =
n⇤(n 1)Y
↵=1
P (y↵|✓↵)
(3.1)
Moreover, AME models consist of additive and multiplicative parts. First- and second-
order dependencies are modelled with additive e↵ects introduced by Warner and Stoto
(1979). More specifically, the variance of observations in an adjacency matrix is de-
composed in heterogeneity across row means and along column means, in correlation
between row and column means, and in correlation within dyads (for more details see
Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019, p. 211). Third-order dependencies (i.e. dependencies
between triads), in comparison, are introduced using a latent variable framework – the
latent factor model (LFM). The AME approach thus considers the following regression
model:
yij = g(✓ij)
✓ij =  
TXij + eij
eij = ai + bj + ✏ij + ↵(ui,vj),
where ↵(ui,vj) = u
T
i Dvj =
X
k2K
dkuikvjk
(3.2)
where eij represents residual variation that can be decomposed into sender (row) e↵ects
(ai), a receiver (column) e↵ect (bj), and a within-dyad e↵ect (✏ij). This variation is
added to a typical GLM framework:  TXij + ai + bj + ✏ij. Lastly, the multiplicative
component ↵(ui,vj) introduces ui = {ui,1...ui,K} as a vector of unobserved character-
istics describing behaviour in a network. The similarity of ui ⇡ uj indicates “how
6Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward (2019) also demonstrate that AME models outperform both ERGM as well
as LSM models in out-of-sample predictions.
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stochastically equivalent a pair of actors are and the eigenvalue determines whether
the network exhibits positive or negative homophily” (Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019,
p. 213).
Given the model specified above, a general model estimated in our analysis is spec-
ified in equation 3:
yij =  
T
d xdij +  
T
r xi + ai + aj + u
T
i ^vj + ✏ij (3.3)
Here,  Td xdij is a vector of characteristics of dyad {i,j} and  Tr xi describes the nodal
covariates of node i as a sender. Since our network is un-directed, the model can be
expressed as the natural simplification in equation 3. In contrast to the asymmetric
variant, the term uTi ^vj represents any residuals low-rank patternsM in the symmetric
socio-matrix Y (Ho↵, 2008).
In order to capture the intervening e↵ect of belief system similarities between actor
type combinations, we employ a mediation setup (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Imai et al.,
2011; Shrout and Bolger, 2002). This approach allows the decomposition of associations
between three variables into individual components, hypothesising that X has an e↵ect
on Y through M. The total e↵ect of X on Y (c) is decomposed into paths a and b as
well as c’ which represents the direct e↵ect of X and Y excluding any intervening e↵ect
of M (see Figure 3.3). The mediation e↵ect (paths a and b) is called the indirect e↵ect
and represents the proportion of the association between X and Y which is mediated
by M.
Baron and Kenny (1986) propose a four step approach for the analysis of mediator
e↵ects. The first model is specified with X predicting Y in order to test for the total
e↵ect c. The second model captures path a by X predicting M. Path b is measured
in the third model with M predicting Y and the fourth model contains both X and
M predicting Y. The first three steps are relevant in order to establish a relationship
among the existing variables. If these associations are significant, the results from the
full model support a mediation e↵ect if path b (the e↵ect of M on Y) remains significant
after controlling for X. An insignificant e↵ect of X would signal a full mediation of M,
whereas partial mediation exists if X remains significant.7
7In order to make causal claims, mediation analysis usually involves the calculation of the substantial
size of the indirect e↵ect and testing its significance through either bootstrapping or parametric re-
sampling (see Imai et al., 2011). There are, however, methodological as well as technical limitations
for computing-intensive network models. Hence, we restrict our study to an analysis of associations
without making causal claims.
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Figure 3.3: Path models showing a total e↵ect of X on Y (above) and the mediated e↵ect
through M (below).
3.4.2 Data
Our main dependent variable (DV) indicates ties in ally networks regarding a spe-
cific policy issue. Assuming that “identifying someone as an ally could mean that
both entities serendipitously end up on the same side of a political conflict repeatedly
over time” (Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998), we assume shared policy preferences to be
a suitable proxy for network ties. In order to measure these links, we have created
association matrices between all respondents in the dataset. For each of the 19 sub-
issues featured in the consultation, all those involved were asked whether they agreed
or disagreed with the respective issue.8 The structure of the questions di↵ered slightly
depending on the issue: while some questions could simply be answered with “yes”,
“no”, or “no preference”, other questions featured five-point-Likert scales ranging from
“completely agree” to “completely disagree”. Given our aim of constructing a network
solely consisting of shared preferences, however, this particularity of the data did not
cause a problem. We conceptualised the cross-product between actors’ responses as
a measure of preference alignment. Hence, we used these data to create networks of
shared preferences on policy issues with values of “1” if there was agreement on the
same preference and of “0” if there were di↵erent preferences or neutral positions. In
a further step, we created a valued network for both issues with regulatory as well as
re-distributive e↵ects containing the respective sub-issues (see Table SM2.12 and Table
SM2.13 in section SM2.3 in the supplementary material) counting the number of times
each combination of participants expressed a shared preference.
8For a general overview of all 19 sub-issues see Table SM2.12 and Table SM2.13 in section SM2.3
in the supplementary material. Note that we have excluded questions 8, 9, 10 and 19 from the
analysis. These questions either did not fit into the regulatory / re-distributive classification or had
little variation in responses.
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Shared policy beliefs are specified as the mediator variable. As previously discussed,
the variable is specified as DV in model 2 and as independent variable (IV) in models
3 and 4. In order to measure similarities in beliefs, we take into account text entries
from the consultation. Due to the fact that participants were asked to justify their
direct preference in much greater detail, these entries represent profound accounts of
their policy beliefs.9 When participating in the consultation process, actors translate
their policy beliefs into policy frames or even full policy narratives in order to influence
the legislative process 10. The survey o↵ers the possibility of feeding in their ideas on
policy issues and providing information in the form of ideal legislation. Shanahan, Jones
and McBeth (2011, p. 536) apply this discursive element to the ACF, arguing that
stakeholders “use words, images, and symbols to strategically craft policy narratives
to resonate with the public, relevant stakeholders, and governmental decision makers,
with the aim of producing a winning coalition.” We assume that stakeholders with
similar policy beliefs use similar words to transport their policy frames and narratives.
In order to measure this similarity, we employ automated text analysis.
As a first step, a text corpus was created and the sub-issues were assigned to the
respective levels of potential conflict (low vs. high).11 Next, document frequency
matrices were created. Pre-processing included the removal of stop-words, punctuation
and numbers. In addition, the terms were stemmed. Terms which occurred only
once throughout the whole issue were removed as well. The two corpora provided the
basis for the calculation of similarity between the texts. In order to cluster the texts,
we follow Garrett and Jansa (2015) and Linder et al. (2018) and compute distances
between the text entries based on a cosine similarity algorithm.12 The features of the
text (words) form a vector for each document and these vectors are evaluated with
respect to their distance. Cosine similarity is based on the size of the angle between
the vectors. The formula for documents A and B, where j indexes their features and
y represents the values, is written as:
yA · yB
||yA||||yB|| (3.4)
9See Table SM2.3 for exemplary questions and answers. It shows that direct policy preferences can
align between actors although their policy beliefs may be vastly di↵erent.
10See Shanahan, Jones and McBeth (2011) for a conceptual perspective on linking policy narratives
with the ACF.
11Most text entries were submitted in English. For those which were written in any other language
Google translator was used.
12While text scaling algorithms (e.g. Klu¨ver, 2009) could provide an alternative way of estimating
actors’ beliefs, the data at hand is inherently multi-dimensional. Since text scaling techniques require
the data to be one dimensional, we utilise text similarity algorithms as a more suitable means of
measurement.
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The dot product in the numerator equals
P
j yAjyBj. ||yA|| in the denominator is the
vector norm of features vector y for document A. Hence, ||yA|| =
qP
j y
2
Aj. Because
of this vector-based approach, a major advantage of the cosine distance measure is
that it is insensitive to unequal document lengths. The standardised indicator varies
between 0 (no similarity) and 1 (same text).
As independent variables, we created the covariates “type”, “country”, and “leader”.
For the type variable, the following levels were specified: “Business: energy producer”,
“Business: energy-intensive”, “Business: other”,“Business: association” and “NGO”.
All types were coded according to the self-identification of each interest group. How-
ever, we re-coded the business variable to account for the di↵erences between energy
producers and energy-intensive industries that were previously defined as a major cleav-
age potentially influencing the respective preferences. Some firms are active in more
than one industry: in these instances we have coded them according to their main
field of activity. Given that business associations which exclusively represent one of
the two groups should, in principle, request the same policy outcome, we also coded
those associations as either energy suppliers or energy-intensive industries. All remain-
ing businesses that could not be assigned to any of the two groups were classified as
“Business: other”. We have also included a group of general business associations
which represent firms from a large spectrum of sectors and industries. Next, we cre-
ated association matrices for our type-match and type-mix assumptions based on this
variable.13 In the case of type-matches, these matrices record a “1” if both actors
are from the same type, otherwise“0”. For the node-mixes possibly indicating strange
bedfellow combinations, we created several matrices containing a “1” if the relevant
node-mix was present (e.g. one is an energy producing business firm and the other an
NGO) and a “0”, if they di↵ered.
The “country” covariate describes the country of origin. In line with Ingold, Fis-
cher and Cairney (2017, p. 448), we assume that belonging to the same level of a
political system “fosters a common understanding of the problem, collective action,
and joint learning processes” (see also Berardo and Scholz, 2010; Lubell, Feiock and
Ramirez De La Cruz, 2009). This common understanding of policy problems as well
as the legal specificities of a certain level in the decision-making process may lead to
policy agreement. In the context of the European Union, arguably the most important
institutional divide exists between the political systems of the di↵erent EU member
states. Hence, we control for the country of origin of each of them. The variable is first
13The type mixes include the hypothesised strange bedfellow relationship between “Business: energy
producer” and “NGO”. In addition, we added the mixes for “Business: energy producer – Business:
energy-intensive” and “Business: energy-intensive – NGO” as controls.
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coded as a factor with the respective countries as levels. Next, an association matrix
is created that is coded as “1” when both actors originate from the same country and
as “0” when they do not.
Lastly, the variable “leader” is included as nodal attribute. The general position
and the perceived power of an interest group could convince others to adopt the same
preferences. Especially in situations where new issues are discussed, decision-makers
need information (Leach et al., 2014) and might refer to others who are perceived
as having greater expertise, more resources and more influence (Ingold, Fischer and
Cairney, 2017; Ingold and Fischer, 2014). Furthermore, according to Calanni et al.
(2015), power is a central factor in shaping relations within policy networks. Those who
are perceived as powerful and influential can be role models for others. Since smaller
and less resourceful ones might turn towards these leaders to gather information and
profit from their resources we control for the e↵ect of policy leadership in all of our
models. The variable is coded as “1” when an actor can be characterised as a policy
leader and “0” when not. Since we assume that policy leaders in EU environmental
and climate policies are active in a large variety of di↵erent consultations, we identify
leaders by calculating the ratio of EU consultations where each group participated to
a total number consultations in the area of climate and environmental policies14. The
top 10% of all interest group are selected as leaders.15
3.5 Analysis
3.5.1 Results
The results of the AME models are shown in Table 3.1 and 3.2.16 While table 3.1
displays the coe cients for all models calculated for policy issues with low levels of
inter-group conflict, Table 3.2 shows the results for higher conflict issues with re-
distributional e↵ects. The di↵erent models in both tables were specified within a
14We have selected 26 consultations which were conducted between 2013 and 2018 and which represent
a large majority of all EU public consultations on climate and environmental issues in that time
period.
15Given that the group of leaders contains influential NGOs like Greenpeace and WWF as well as
influential business associations (e.g. FuelsEurope, the European Steel Association or European
Aluminium) and large businesses (e.g. Vattenfall, BASF and IKEA), we believe that this measure
is a valid proxy for influential participants that are able to shape preferences in EU policy-making.
16All models were estimated using an MCMC algorithm (see Minhas, Ho↵ and Ward, 2019) and
converged after 100,000 iterations. See section SM2.1 in the supplementary material for the trace
plots of all AME models reported in Table 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table 3.1: AME results for ally networks on policies with low potential for inter-group
conflict (standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Nodematch
Business: energy intensive 0.763⇤⇤⇤ 0.027⇤⇤⇤
—
0.524⇤⇤⇤
(0.051) (0.002) (0.057)
Business: energy producer 0.017 0.005
—
 0.096
(0.121) (0.004) (0.124)
Business: other 0.583⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
—
0.500⇤
(0.217) (0.008) (0.219)
Business association 0.036 0.007
—
0.125
(0.136) (0.005) (0.136)
NGO 1.283⇤⇤⇤ 0.049⇤⇤⇤
—
1.086⇤⇤⇤
(0.216) (0.008) (0.223)
Nodemix
Business: energy producer — NGO 0.362⇤⇤⇤  0.002
—
0.305⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.004) (0.120)
Business: energy intensive — NGO  0.439⇤⇤⇤  0.005⇤⇤
—
 0.527⇤⇤⇤
(0.078) (0.003) (0.084)
Business: energy producer —  0.388⇤⇤⇤  0.002
—
 0.461⇤⇤⇤
business: energy intensive (0.062) (0.002) (0.0.066)
Mediator
Belief
— —
4.106⇤⇤⇤ 3.964⇤⇤⇤
(0.067) (0.069)
Controls
Country 0.087⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤ 0.043⇤
(0.017) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001)
Policy leader  0.373⇤⇤ 0.029  1.225⇤⇤⇤  1.240⇤⇤⇤
(0.153) (0.020) (0.215) (0.214)
Intercept
—
0.409⇤⇤⇤
— —
(0.013)
Nissues 7 7 7 7
Nactors 339 339 339 339
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
mediation analysis framework: model 1 includes the main model without the medi-
ator, in model 2 the same coe cients are regressed on the mediator (policy beliefs),
model 3 includes only the mediator as well as the control variables as covariates to
predict shared network ties and model 4 – the full model – includes all variables as well
as the mediator as covariates (see section SM2.2 in the supplementary material for a
detailed specification of all models).
Considering hypothesis 1 on the link between shared organisational a liations, pol-
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Table 3.2: AME results for ally networks on policy issues with high potential for inter-group
conflict (standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Nodematch
Business: energy intensive 0.245⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤
—
 0.049
(0.051) (0.002) (0.051)
Business: energy producer  0.009 0.021⇤⇤⇤
—
 0.165
(0.095) 0.007 (0.094)
Business: other 0.898⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤
—
0.791⇤⇤⇤
(0.171) (0.006) (0.171)
Business association 0.260⇤⇤ 0.005
—
0.438⇤⇤⇤
(0.121) (0.005) (0.125)
NGO 3.908⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤
—
3.753⇤⇤⇤
(0.225) (0.008) (0.231)
Nodemix
Business: energy producer — NGO  0.156 0.016⇤⇤⇤
—
 0.225⇤
(0.101) (0.004) (0.104)
Business: energy intensive — NGO  0.006  0.000
—
0.097
(0.075)  (0.003) (0.079)
Business: energy producer —  0.312⇤⇤⇤  0.001
—
0.441⇤⇤⇤
business: energy intensive (0.055) (0.002) (0.057)
Mediator
Belief
— —
4.488⇤⇤⇤ 4.441⇤⇤⇤
(0.081) (0.083)
Controls
Country 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.144⇤⇤⇤ 0.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.001) (0.016) (0.016)
Policy leader  0.271 0.046  1.323⇤⇤⇤  1.266⇤⇤⇤
(0.0174) (0.022) (0.244) (0.232)
Intercept
—
0.412⇤⇤⇤
— —
(0.015)
Nissues 12 12 12 12
Nactors 350 350 350 350
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
icy beliefs and the likelihood of ties in any ally network, the results of the AME models
o↵er important insights: first, significant e↵ects for node-matches (matches between
the type / organisational a liations of a facilitator) and the likelihood of a network tie
can be observed for most types. In line with the assumption of increased chances of
preference alignment between facilitators of the same type, we observe a substantive
and significant increase in the probability of a network tie between dyads of energy in-
tensive businesses, other business actors and NGOs (see model 1 in both Table 3.1 and
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Table 3.2). While we observe a significantly positive e↵ect for business associations in
model 1 of Table 3.2, there is no significant e↵ect for matches between energy produc-
ers in both models, indicating a more heterogeneous distribution of preferences within
this group. Secondly, looking at models 2-4 in both Table 3.1 and 3.2, the assumed
mediation e↵ect seems to hold. There is a significantly positive increase in shared
policy core beliefs between energy intensive industries, other business and NGOs (as
well as between energy producers in model 2 in Table 3.2). The strong positive e↵ect
of policy core beliefs, with p < 0.001 in models 3 and 4 in both tables, o↵ers support
for the theoretical accounts of a mediation e↵ect. Since all other coe cients decrease
after the introduction of the mediator in model 4 (in both Table 3.1 and 3.2), we pro-
vide tentative evidence for the assumed relationship between shared policy beliefs as a
mediator of network ties of the same type.
Next, we look at H3 assuming that strange bedfellow networks are most likely on
issues with low inter-group conflict. Here, we have to compare the results of model
1 in both Table 3.1 and 3.2. In line with our expectations, we do, in fact, observe
a significantly positive e↵ect (a coe cient of 0.362 with p < 0.001) between shared
preferences of energy producers and NGOs on policy proposals with a low propensity
to generating conflict. On issues with re-distributive e↵ects that can be characterised
by high amounts of inter-group conflict, in comparison, the e↵ect is negative and non-
significant ( 0.156 in model 1 in Table 3.2). Hence, the level of conflict is relevant for
the understanding of the emergence of strange bedfellow networks. The positive e↵ect
is also underlined by the other mixes between energy intensive industries and NGOs
and energy producers, respectively, that were introduced as controls. Both mixes are
significantly negative (see model 1 in Table 3.1) which indicates that their preferences,
as expected, go in opposite directions.
Hypothesis 2 postulated the absence of a mediation e↵ect of shared policy beliefs
in strange bedfellow networks. Since these occurred solely for issues with low levels of
inter-group conflict, we look only at the results presented in Table 3.1. As previously
discussed, the main coe cient for the energy producer–NGO dyad is significantly pos-
itive in model 1. Hence, the likelihood of a tie increases if one of those involved is an
energy producer and the other an NGO. When looking at model 2, however, we see
that the same relationship does not exist for policy beliefs. In fact, the coe cient is
negative ( 0.002) and non-significant. In the mediation analysis framework, this is a
strong indicator in favour of hypothesis 2 — ally networks of strange bedfellows can
work without shared policy beliefs.
Lastly, the control variable “country”, indicating level homophily between actors
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with the same country of origin, is positive and significant in all four models (both
in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). In contrast to our expectations, being a policy leader,
however, does not seem to increase the likelihood of a network tie with another one.
The e↵ect is significantly negative in most of the models specified in the analysis.
The supplementary material to this paper includes several robustness checks (see
Table SM2.14, SM2.15, and SM2.16 in section SM2.4). Some of those consulted have
submitted identical written statements. This clearly indicates a formalised coordination
between them which could potentially bias our results. In order to control for this e↵ect,
we ran all models on a subset excluding duplicate text entries. The results support
our previous findings. In order to validate our automated text analysis, we employed
the Smith-Waterman local alignment algorithm as an alternative measure (Wilkerson,
Smith and Stramp, 2015). The results based on this belief similarity measure do not
deviate from our main findings.
3.5.2 Discussion
Hypothesis 1 states that the likelihood of ally networks between actors of the same
organisational type is mediated by shared policy beliefs. The results of our network
analysis support this assumption. Both in low- and high-conflict situations, energy-
intensive industries, NGOs and other business groups form type-related ally networks
which are linked by a shared belief system. This is not surprising as energy-intensive
industries and environmental advocacy groups, in particular, formed opposing ends in
many instances of the EU ETS reform since its inception. This finding is supported
by the fact that the e↵ects of mixed types for these two groups are either missing or
significantly negative and mediated by divergences in belief systems.
The results can be substantiated with a discussion of exemplary submissions: one
issue in the policy proposal discussed whether the EU ETS helps the EU industry
to become more energy e cient and thus more competitive.17 A large proportion of
the energy-intensive firms responded with “no” and primarily argued that the current
system reduces the competitiveness of the sector due to high energy costs and short
time frames for adapting to more energy e cient ways of production. With respect
to deep core beliefs, it becomes clear that a market-based system was favoured but
that interventions by national and EU regulators have weakened this aim. Powerful
environmental NGOs like Greenpeace, WWF and the Climate Action Network Europe,
17For the full questions and answers discussed in this section see Table SM2.11 in section SM2.3 in
the supplementary material.
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on the other hand, answered “yes” to the question.18 They argue that the EU ETS,
in principal, can deliver improvements in energy e ciency and competitiveness if com-
bined with complementary measures. Nevertheless, they emphasise design flaws like a
CO2-price-depressing surplus of allowances and “generous” free allocation to industry
which undermined the e↵ectiveness of the EU ETS. Hence, there is supporting evidence
that these two groups are the strongest opponents of carbon leakage provisions of the
EU ETS and that this opposition emanates from homogeneous belief systems.
The results for energy producers and business associations appear to be much more
vague with respect to the alignment of preferences within each type. This is not sur-
prising as these are more heterogeneous groups. Catch-all business associations might
advance much more general policy preferences in order to represent a wide range of
their members. In addition, this category captures labour unions as well as federations
of employers which might add to a divergence in beliefs and preferences. The cate-
gory of energy producers represents both the “incumbent” production system based
on fossil fuels as well as the renewable energy sector. It is highly likely that this dif-
ference creates another cleavage as stricter regulation of CO2 emissions enhances the
competitiveness of low-carbon production sources. In addition to the ambitiousness of
climate action, the question of technology-neutrality sparks conflict between these two
subgroups (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass and Benson, 2019).
With respect to previous literature, our results largely confirm the assumed rela-
tionship between organisational a liation, policy beliefs and the likelihood of network
ties (see Henry et al., 2014; Ingold, Fischer and Cairney, 2017; Ingold and Fischer,
2014; Weible and Sabatier, 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). Hence, theoretical as-
sumptions drawn from the ACF also hold in the case of the political system of the
EU.
What role do other mechanisms except policy belief similarity play for ally net-
work formation? The literature primarily discusses resource dependence and functional
interdependence as alternative drivers. Since ally networks do not require direct in-
teractions, Weible and Sabatier (2005, p. 184) argue that they should be minimally
a↵ected by these two mechanisms. Following Weible (2005), the leadership variable
in our analysis could be described as an indicator of resource dependence. Smaller
actors turn towards these leaders for access, information and coordination. The e↵ect
of leadership, however, is negative or insignificant in most model specifications. It in-
dicates that resource dependence is not a driver of the network formation in our case
18It should be noted though that this is not a unanimous vote among the environmental community.
In fact a slight majority of NGOs stated “no”.
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and confirms the assumption postulated by Weible (2005), that ally networks do not
necessarily depend on this mechanism.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with the emergence of strange bedfellow networks
and the role of shared beliefs as an intervening variable for these cross-type networks.
The results support the assumption that strange bedfellows are especially likely in low-
conflict situations (H3). In contrast, situations where the stakes are high might lead to
a rallying around the flag, where actors from the same organisational type pool their
positions in order to increase the gains. With respect to the role of belief systems as
mediators (H2), we conclude that ally networks between strange bedfellows lack this
intervening e↵ect.
Referring to our previous example about the e↵ectiveness of the EU ETS, the ma-
jority of energy companies agreed that the EU ETS helps the industry to become more
energy e cient. In accordance with energy-intensive firms, they argue that a market-
based instrument is the most cost-e cient tool but also stress that the EU ETS fulfils
this criterion. In addition, some emphasise that additional regulation would be detri-
mental to the e↵ectiveness of the EU ETS.19 Hence, the case exemplifies overlapping
policy preferences between energy companies and NGOs in the absence of similarities
in belief systems: with respect to policy beliefs, it becomes clear that although both
agree on the necessity of the EU ETS, energy companies strongly emphasise the role of
market-based instruments. With respect to this deep core belief, energy producers and
energy-intensive industries are much closer to each other than energy producers and
major environmental NGOs. NGOs’ references to complementary measures such as an
energy savings target – i.e. an explicit command-and-control-approach which would
be refused by many energy producers as “double regulation” – hints at divergences in
deep core beliefs which also translate into diverging policy core beliefs.
Our findings with regard to strange bedfellow networks have several implications
for the theoretical literature on policy networks as well as the literature on strange
bedfellow coalitions in the EU. First, analysing the formation of strange bedfellow
networks, we contribute to the vast literature about policy networks that mostly focuses
on type and belief homogeneity to explain network arrangements (see Ingold, Fischer
and Cairney, 2017; Ingold and Fischer, 2014). While there are some notable exceptions
(see Weible and Sabatier, 2005; Weible, 2005), the ACF would not define interactions
among strange bedfellows as coalitions, as such, for the lack of common belief systems.
However, in the case of the EU ETS, coherence in preferences between businesses
(energy producers) and NGOs is of crucial importance for understanding the underlying
19See section SM2.3 in the supplementary material for direct statements of examplary organisations.
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policy network. Although both groups have fundamental di↵erences in their policy
beliefs, they still lobby for the same specific policy outcomes. Following Rozbicka
(2013), we find that the ACF has particular shortcomings in understanding strange
bedfellow arrangements in the political system of the EU.
Finally, we demonstrate the importance of contextual factors for determining ally
networks. Following the suggestion by Weible and Sabatier (2005, p. 195) of focusing
on the e↵ects of contextual factors on policy network structures, we demonstrate that
in addition to the salience of a policy proposal (see Beyers and De Bruycker, 2018;
Phinney, 2017), the level of conflict potential can be an important factor in the for-
mation of strange bedfellow networks. Identifying contextual factors that influence the
formation of policy networks is important, as they specify the conditions under which
advocacy coalitions can emerge without shared policy beliefs.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has investigated the role of belief systems as links between shared organi-
sational a liations and ally networks in EU policy-making. Our results suggest that
shared belief systems are a strong mediator for network formation among actors of the
same organisational type. We show that environmental NGOs and energy-intensive in-
dustries form ally networks based on homogeneous belief systems and that their beliefs
are often diametrically opposed. In addition, our results reveal a strange bedfellow
network between NGOs and energy producers on issues with low conflict potential be-
tween groups. The mediation analysis also indicates a lack in belief congruence between
strange bedfellows.
The application of the advocacy coalition framework on EU multi-level politics is a
novel and promising endeavour. Rozbicka (2013) has highlighted important advantages
of the ACF for the analysis of the complex political system of the EU. Firstly, it
takes the policy process seriously and is suitable for a large number of participants in
complex multi-level interactions. Secondly, it provides a di↵erentiated perspective on
policy change, linking the persistence of policy core beliefs with barriers to major policy
change (Nedergaard, 2008). Thirdly, it provides an explicit focus on policy subsystems,
potential spill-over e↵ects (Feindt, 2010) and a conceptualisation of the developmental
stage of the subsystem, taking into account temporal factors (Szarka, 2010). Hence,
major theoretical assumptions drawn from the ACF also hold in the case of the political
system of the EU.
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Considering the fact that lobbying in the European Union is strongly based on
information-provision (Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011) where relationships
are much more tentative (Pijnenburg, 1998; Warleigh, 2000), this study reveals possi-
bilities for further development of the ACF in the context of EU politics. Shanahan,
Jones and McBeth (2011) have highlighted the theoretical under-specification of the
discursive element in the ACF. Since strange bedfellow constellations are a particular
challenge for the ACF, further research is necessary on the e↵ect of diverging belief
systems within strange bedfellow networks.
Next, our results underline the necessity for a clear conceptual distinction between
belief systems and actual policy preferences. Whereas the belief system represents the
normative foundation for political action, tangible policy preferences can be influenced
by other factors than just beliefs. Actors might formulate policy preferences which do
not represent their beliefs due to structural interdependence or resource dependence.
Interestingly, since preference congruence and the e↵ect of belief systems on network
ties, in general, di↵er between di↵erent organisational types, future research could
more thoroughly investigate whether similarities in belief systems are more important
for some groups than for others. In order to forge coalitions, actors might be forced to
trade o↵ some goals as a quid pro quo to push through at least part of their agenda. The
interplay between this strategic behaviour, policy core beliefs and preference formation
warrants further research.
Last, this study focused on non-formalised ally networks. Conceptually, these al-
lies represent a first step towards coordinated action and formalised coalitions (Weible
et al., 2019, p. 15). Further research is needed on more organised forms of networks in
order to draw a more nuanced picture of these constellations. It is particularly inter-
esting to investigate drivers and barriers for the translation of “strange” ally networks
into “strange” coordination networks. In addition, the temporal variation of coalition
decline and growth becomes increasingly relevant for the ACF literature (Schmidt,
Schmid and Sewerin, 2019). The time dimension seems to be extremely relevant for
strange bedfellows. In particular, it is up for discussion if strange bedfellows are just
short-term “coalitions of convenience” or if they are capable to be transformed and
stabilised into stable arrangements over time (Weible et al., 2019).
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FOUR
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCIALISATION AND THE ROLE OF POLICY
DIFFUSION
(co-authored with Christine Trampusch, Florian Fastenrath and Rebecca
Wangemann)
Abstract
By analysing why English local governments have made extensive use of long-term
market loans with embedded derivatives, this paper seeks to contribute to the grow-
ing literature on local government financialisation. Using an original, large-N panel
dataset for the period from 1998 to 2014, we show that the configuration of the local
political economy is an important driver of financialisation processes: a Labour Party
majority, as well as fiscal and economic stress make it more likely that councils adopt
risky financial instruments. Since the use of financial innovations has also di↵used
geographically, policy di↵usion impacts local governments as well. Highlighting the
conditional e↵ect of finance sector power which only increases the use of financial inno-
vations in very large councils as well as the temporal dimension of fiscal and economic
stress we create ample avenues for further research.
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4.1 Introduction
Since 1998 almost 50 per cent of English local governments borrowed through so called
“lender option borrower option” (Lobo) loans with embedded derivatives, essentially
betting on rising long-term interest rates. When interest rates were unexpectedly
falling to a historic low, however, councils were confronted with massive losses of tax-
payer money and subsequently faced public outrage, central government inquiries and
law suits that are currently being filed (Financial Times, 2016; Guardian, 2016, 2019).
Consequently, the puzzle is why public o cials used risk-prone market loans and not the
more conservative option of Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) loans with fixed rates
and higher planning security.1 Hence, this paper investigates which factors increased
the likelihood of local governments taking out Lobo loans. More generally, as the
use of derivatives indicates local government financialisation, we ask: what drives the
financialisation of the state at the subnational level?
In political science, the phenomenon of financialisation has received ever growing
attention during the last decade (e.g. Mandelkern, 2016; Maxfield, Kindred Wineco↵
and Young, 2017; Rommerskirchen, 2015; Van der Zwan, 2014; Witko, 2016). Broadly
defined as the “increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors
and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies”
(Epstein, 2005, p. 3), scholars have focused mainly on the economy as a whole, corpo-
rations and households. The financialisation of states, by comparison, is less researched
(Hendrikse and Lagna, 2018; Karwowski and Centurion-Vicencio, 2018; Van der Zwan,
2014). Only very recently have scholars started to conceptualise and describe the pro-
cess on the national (Fastenrath, Schwan and Trampusch, 2017; Lagna, 2016; Tram-
pusch, 2019) and the subnational level (Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch, 2018; Hen-
drikse, 2015; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2016; Lagna, 2015; Pacewicz,
2013). In the studies on (local) state financialisation, the adoption of derivatives-based
financial innovations by public o cials has been identified as a crucial dimension of
the process.
Despite the achievements of the previous studies, three major gaps still exist: first,
the role of party politics remains largely unclear as Witko (2016, p. 349) highlights for
the financialisation literature in general. Second, due to the dominance of case study
research, we still lack a systematic quantitative analysis di↵erentiating and testing
crucial local political economic factors that may drive financialisation such as finan-
1The PWLB is a government institution issuing loans to local authorities with an interest rate linked to
the UK gilt yield. Traditionally, these constituted the main borrowing source for local governments.
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cial industry power and fiscal or economic stress. In fact, previous descriptive case
studies on single municipalities in the U.S. or Germany have demonstrated the major
importance of financial industry interests and economic and fiscal stress in driving the
process (Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch, 2018; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Kirk-
patrick, 2016; Pacewicz, 2013; Weber, 2010), but have not systematically quantified the
e↵ects of these di↵erent aspects of the local political economy across cases. Third, con-
sidering the literature on the di↵usion of financial innovations (e.g. Akhavein, Frame
and White, 2005; Molyneux and Shamroukh, 1996; Tufano, 2003) and policies (Berry
and Berry, 1990; Gilardi, 2016; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Volden, 2006) we know that
new financial products or policies are not adopted in a vacuum. Public o cials are
influenced by policy decisions in other governments which previous case studies on the
use of derivatives by local governments in Germany have also indicated (Fastenrath,
Orban and Trampusch, 2018; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Hendrikse, 2015).
In order to fill these gaps, based on a newly constructed comprehensive panel dataset
including all 353 local governments in England for the period 1998 to 2014, we test
both internal (i.e. the e↵ect of the local political economy) as well as external (policy
di↵usion) influences on local government financialisation across cases and time. To this
end, we collected data for 5,648 unit-year observations with a wide range of variables
and ran event history models to understand the dynamic evolution of financialisation.
Furthermore, to improve our understanding of the dynamics of local authorities’ debt
policies and interpret our statistical findings, we conducted expert interviews with rep-
resentatives of investment banks, treasury management advisers and local authorities.2
Our results indicate that partisan politics did play an important role in facilitat-
ing the use of financialised borrowing instruments in English councils, highlighting the
importance of Labour-dominated councils in driving local government financialisation.
Next, our results illustrate that both fiscal and economic stress are crucial for under-
standing financialisation processes, however, we find that both interact di↵erently with
time. Against our expectations, finance power is actually negatively associated with
the use of derivatives in smaller councils and only becomes significantly positive for
very large local governments. These complex conditional e↵ects imply that further
case study research is indispensable to investigate the causal processes of these local
political economic impacts. Last, our analysis shows that financial innovations di↵use
geographically across English local governments.
There are several reasons why the recent spread of Lobo loans among English lo-
2See Table SM3.24 in the supplementary material for an overview of the interviews we conducted and
the abbreviations used in this article.
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cal authorities is a useful case for generating theoretical contributions: On the one
hand, together with the US, the UK counts as a benchmark for other countries not
only with regard to the power of its financial industry (Culpepper and Reinke, 2014;
Bell and Hindmoor, 2017) but also regarding its degree of economic financialisation
(Maxfield, Kindred Wineco↵ and Young, 2017). It remains unclear whether the UK
also constitutes a reference category with respect to state financialisation; additionally,
English local governments have a tradition of capital market funding because of lo-
cal authorities’ strategy to circumvent central controls through private funding in the
money and capital market (Sbragia, 1986). This historical trajectory leads us to expect
that internal political-economic factors, such as the power and interests of finance, are
important drivers of Lobo borrowing. On the other hand, Lobo loans are complex
financial instruments whose outcomes are highly sensitive to shifts in market rates and
cannot be calculated in advance. According to Makse and Volden (2011, p. 109) and
Karch et al. (2016, p. 89), complex policies are less likely to be adopted or di↵use
across geographical units due to uncertainty about their potential costs and benefits.
Thus, any finding of significant e↵ects of policy di↵usion on the use of Lobos would
indicate that understanding the process of state financialisation requires the study of
external factors.
The paper is structured as follows: after we describe the structure of Lobo loans
and their use by English authorities, we explain our theoretical framework in the third
section. The fourth section presents the data and method, followed by our results. In
section six we conclude and present the implications for further research.
4.2 The Structure and Use of Lobo Loans
Until the end of the 1990s, English municipalities possessed little autonomy in their
financial policies as local government investments required central government approval
and borrowing limits were set. This changed in the early 2000s, with the push by New
Labour to modernise local government finance. Most prominently, the Local Growth
Agenda (2003) initiated a great devolutionary reform aimed at giving local o cials
more freedom in their financing decisions. Equipped with newly gained financial powers
and pressured by the central government’s austerity policy, municipalities increasingly
financed their borrowing through the use of Lobo loans (INT 1, 2, 4).
In more detail, Lobo loans can be described as complex financial borrowing instru-
ments containing embedded derivatives, issued with an average lifespan of 40 to 70
years. Therein, the lending bank has the option to adjust the interest rate charged at
predetermined intervals (e.g. 6-monthly, annually or on a 5-year basis). If the bank
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Figure 4.1: Number of Lobo loans taken up by English local governments
(a) Total number of Lobo loans sold to English local governments by year and bank (b) cumulative number of Lobo
loans taken up.
changes the interest rate, the borrower has to accept it or repay the loan in full at
current market rates. However, if the borrower chooses to repay the loan early, there
is an additional penalty specified in the loan contract (CIPFA 2015). Another crucial
aspect of the structure of most Lobo loans is the often very low starting interest rate –
a so-called “teaser rate”. These low rates (set for the starting period of 1 or 2 years) are
typically well below the standard PWLB interest rates and generate cheaper income
on a short-term basis.
Most significantly, Lobo and PWLB loans di↵er in their degree of embedded risk.
In taking out Lobo loans, local authorities were betting on long-term interest rate
development. Only if base interest rates rose would local governments have been better
o↵ than with standard PWLB loans. However, since interest rates instead have fallen to
historic lows, many local authorities now face much higher repayment costs (due to the
embedded derivatives) than they would have done with public loans (Financial Times,
2016; Guardian, 2016; INT 3). Combined with the lender option to increase interest
rates periodically and high exit fees, the embedded risk (reinforced by the derivative)
in the loan structure is much higher than in standard fixed rate PWLB loans (INT 4).
In sum, Lobo loans represent a highly financialised way of borrowing due to embedded
derivatives - i.e. the banks’ option to convert fixed into floating interest rates.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of Lobo loans taken out by English local authorities
from 1998 to 2014, both in total (4.1a) as well as cumulatively (4.1b). Of 353 local
authorities in England, 155 took out Lobo loans at least once, making a net worth of
£10.6bn.3 It is important to note that it were not domestic but foreign banks who
3Calculation by the authors using our dataset including all 353 local authorities in England.
77
started selling Lobo loans in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while domestic banks only
started to catch up by 2005. The fact that foreign banks also outperformed domestic
banks in the total volume of loans made with local governments indicates the global
dimension of local government financialisation in England. While Lobo loans were
increasingly taken up by local governments prior to 2007, the sharp decrease in new
loan contracts after 2007 can best be explained by the turbulence at the beginning
financial crisis and the corresponding drop in interest rates. As interest rates were
expected to continually decrease, Lobo loans were no longer attractive neither for local
governments nor for banks. Since no new Lobo loans were taken up after 2014 we can
observe the entire process of di↵usion.
4.3 The Financialisation of Local Governments
As we suspect that the financialisation of local governments is driven by the config-
uration of the local political economy as well as public o cials’ orientation towards
policy-making in other local governments, we refer to the established literature on
business power and partisan politics in general as well as in state financialisation, sup-
plemented with the literature on the di↵usion of policies and financial innovations.
4.3.1 Partisan Politics
In accordance with classical partisan politics models we argue that the setup of the
local political landscape can be of major importance for explaining variation in the
use of financial innovations by English local governments. Building on the seminal
work by Hibbs (1977), it could be assumed that the partisan composition of local
governments influences economic policy since parties cater to the interests of their
particular electoral constituencies. As several studies for the central government level
have shown, the influence of di↵erent party ideologies – along the left-right scale – play
a crucial role on policy decisions in the high priority field of economic (fiscal and tax)
policy (Bra¨uninger, 2005; Cusack, 1997, 1999; Cusack and Beramendi, 2006). While
a consensus emerged in the 1990s that the partisan e↵ects became less pronounced,
there exists a growing literature that shows that parties matter for economic and fiscal
policy making on the subnational level (Blom-Hansen, Monkerud and Sorensen, 2006;
Boyne et al., 2012; Kleider, Ro¨th and Garritzman, 2017).
Based on these studies, we expect that the left-right composition of English local
governments translates into policy decisions on the use of financial innovations. In
line with the conventional parties’ left-right di↵erentiation, we assume that Labour-
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dominated councils have greater incentives to increase the local authorities’ revenues
because, as a left-wing party, they are more willing to follow the “voters’ demands for
service provision” (Boyne et al., 2012, pp. 642-643; see also Blom-Hansen, Monkerud
and Sorensen, 2006), even if this requires the use of complex financial instruments
(Tickell, 1998). Thus, we argue that Labour councillors have preferences for revenue
increases through financial risk-taking to secure the services level for their core voter
clientele. Accordingly, in his study on derivatives (interest rate swaps) use by English
local authorities in the 1980s, Tickell (1998) points out that it was above all Labour-
dominated local governments that attempted to circumvent fiscal austerity measures
imposed by the central government through the use of speculative financial innovations.
In this regard, it is also noteworthy that in the early 1990 when the Hammersmith-
Fulham scandal on the speculative ultra-vires use of interest-rate swaps by local au-
thorities blew up, the prominent Labour MP Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam expressed her
wish “to see legislation clarifying the legal powers of local authorities to be players in
the swaps market” (Bank of England Archive, 1990).
Our expectation to observe a Labour Party impact on financialised policy outputs
is further strengthened by the party’s transformation in the 1990s. The elected New
Labour government coming into power in 1997 not only radically restructured local
government finance but also wanted to establish a business-friendly image, even sur-
passing the e↵orts made by the preceding Conservative government (Wilks-Heeg, 2009,
p. 30). According to Fuller (2016, pp. 85-88), New Labour forcefully tried to incorpo-
rate the image of being business-friendly after its crushing defeat in the 1992 elections,
leading to a large-scale ideological transformation including the belief in limited govern-
ment, financial innovations, and the encouragement of financial risks. Public o cials
in English local councils have traditionally been prone to a strong degree of intra-party
group loyalty (Copus, 1999; Kleider, Ro¨th and Garritzman, 2017) and so we assume
that the ideological shift at the national level had a spill-over e↵ect on local o cials
within the Labour party. Due to the ”pro-finance, pro-innovation bent” of New Labour
(Fuller, 2016, p. 91), hypothesis H1 thus states:
H1: Local authorities with councils dominated by the Labour Party have a higher
propensity to use Lobo loans.
4.3.2 Fiscal and Economic Stress
In addition to partisan politics, we assume that the degree of problem pressure faced
by local o cials has an impact on the likelihood of Lobo use – regardless of the party
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with the council majority. The relationship between fiscal stress (public debt) and
the use of speculative financial innovations is well explored in the literature on state fi-
nancialisation (Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch, 2018; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014;
Kirkpatrick, 2016; Lagna, 2015). Ever increasing debt obligations – caused by declining
aid from the central government as well as tax revenues with a simultaneous increase in
the municipal tasks delegated – strengthen the incentives for local o cials to minimize
interest payments through innovative financial instruments (Hendrikse and Sidaway,
2014, p. 199; Hendrikse, 2015; Lagna, 2015; Strickland, 2013) or to shift repayment
costs into the future, as the “financial constraint is more likely to be currently bind-
ing and limit politicians’ actions” in highly indebted local governments (Pe´rignon and
Valle´e, 2017, p. 1912). For many local governments, high fiscal pressure (high levels of
indebtedness) often means that political room for manoeuvre is considerably restricted
by the following austerity measures and the resulting imperative of fiscal consolida-
tion. Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch (2018) show that municipal representatives
perceive financial innovations as a less politically costly means (no direct cuts) to re-
gain a certain financial and eventually political leeway. In their studies on derivatives
use by German and French municipalities both Trampusch and Spies (2015) as well
as Pe´rignon and Valle´e (2017) demonstrate a significant positive relationship between
the level of municipal debt and the use of innovative financial instruments. Hence, our
second hypothesis reads:
H2: The higher the level of local public debt, the higher the propensity of local councils
to use Lobo loans.
While public debt and economic deprivation might be entangled in practice, it still
makes sense to analytically di↵erentiate between fiscal and economic stress. As drivers
of local government financialization, they indicate di↵erent actors’ motivations, i.e.
whether local governments use Lobo loans as an instrument of debt or economic policy.
More specifically, while high levels of public debt might motivate politicians to use
Lobo loans for restructuring their debt portfolios and decrease their overall interest
rates, economic deprivation incentivises local authorities to borrow money at favourable
rates to invest in infrastructure projects. In general, economic deprivation describes
the general economic conditions within local governments (Bertelli and John, 2010).
According to Hendrikse and Sidaway (2014, p. 198) it was not only public debt but also
the demise of the local economy and rising levels of unemployment that exerted pressure
on local governments to find “novel ways to raise revenue”, eventually leading to the
use of derivatives. In addition, Strickland (2013: 389) describes the use derivatives
explicitly as a means of paying and investing in infrastructure to generate growth. Thus,
it can be assumed that worse economic conditions put pressure on local councillors to
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use risky financial instruments to raise additional money for investments and public
infrastructure projects to stimulate the local economy.
H3: The higher the economic deprivation in a local council, the higher the likelihood
of the respective government to adopt Lobo loans.
4.3.3 Local Finance Power
Previous research has shown that financial sector institutions are important actors
in facilitating local government financialisation (Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014; Kirk-
patrick, 2016; Pacewicz, 2013). Hence, we assume that the structural and instrumental
power of local finance industry might be an important driver of the use of Lobo loans
by local councils.4 While structural power describes the dependency of governments on
private business interests in their policy-making decisions, as business may automat-
ically or strategically threaten to withdraw investments (Culpepper, 2015; Fairfield,
2015b; Hindmoor and McGeechan, 2013; Lindblom, 1982), instrumental power com-
prises “the non-core functions of the firm on which business relies to attain a political
edge, such as campaign donations and the use of lobbying” (Culpepper, 2015, p. 396).
In our case both dimensions are relevant. While public o cials are generally aware of
the growing importance of the financial sector for generating growth and employment,
there are also numerous events (e.g. receptions and other social activities) organised
and financed by local financial market actors to which local councillors are invited, as
well as the regularly observed phenomenon of public-private “revolving doors” in local
authorities’ treasury managements. Local o cials develop the skills that enable them
to “work as private money brokers” and so the phenomenon of revolving doors, i.e.
leaving to work in the financial sector, has always existed in English local governments
(Sbragia, 1986, pp. 318-319). In addition, Schwan (2017) has documented a consider-
able variation in the strength of the financial sector within di↵erent regions in the UK.
Having more financial institutions close to the city hall doors might lead to more and
more intense interactions between finance and local authority representatives. Being
neighbours to local politicians makes it easier for bankers to advertise and supply new
financial instruments. Consequently, the stronger the local financial sector in a munic-
ipality, the more likely it is that banks will use their instrumental power to “persuade”
politicians to use Lobo loans. In accordance with recent studies on finance power, we
assume that structural and instrumental power can be mutually reinforcing (James
4Regardless of the previous di↵erentiation between domestic and foreign banks operating in a local
economy, we assume this e↵ect to be driven by the local financial sector comprising both domestic
and foreign actors as both can contribute to economic growth and employment in a local authority.
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and Quaglia, 2019; Fairfield, 2015b; Hindmoor and McGeechan, 2013). Our hypothesis
H4a proposes that the use of Lobo loans is likely to increase where the local financial
sector is strong:
H4a: The likelihood of local authorities using Lobo loans increases where the power of
the local financial sector is strong.
Furthermore, we consider that the e↵ect of finance power is conditioned by the size
of a local government. Since local governments di↵er broadly on a range of relevant
indicators like the expertise of their o cials and their level of public debt (Trampusch
and Spies, 2015) as well as their investment portfolios, development and economic
growth (Strickland, 2013), we believe that the size of a local authority is likely to
moderate the e↵ect of financial sector power. Eckersly (2016, p. 5) argues that the
“level of internal capacity” directs whether municipalities “look to private businesses to
provide them with the ‘power to’ achieve their objectives”. Especially the inability of
smaller councils to hire more qualified personnel can create an “asymmetry of expertise”
between smaller local governments and a financial counterparty (Culpepper, 2011, p.
178). This is also argued by Tickell (1998, p. 877), who states in his study on that
the use of derivatives by English local authorities is a case of “major information
asymmetries” between the selling financial institution and the buying local authority.
Since smaller councils often lack the financial expertise to understand more complex
financial instruments, financial institutions might exploit situations of even greater
information asymmetry and find it easier to sell unsound financial products. Moreover,
smaller local authorities may also more likely approach banks because they recognise
that “the use of consultants is necessary to access expert knowledge” (Weber and
O’Neill-Kohl, 2013, p. 12).
H4b: In smaller local governments, the power of the financial sector has a stronger
e↵ect on the likelihood of Lobo loans being used.
4.3.4 The Di↵usion of Policies and Financial Innovations
We assume that is it not only the local political economy but also the behaviour of
other local authorities that push local governments to take out Lobo loans by exerting
pressure to follow the trend. In line with Graham, Shipan and Volden (2013, p. 675),
we argue that “policy innovation is influenced by choices made by other governments”
and consequently use the literature on the di↵usion of policies and financial innovations
to explain the phenomenon of state financialisation better.
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Considering the characterisation of financialisation as a process that unfolds over
time (Lee et al., 2009) and its co-evolution with innovations in financial engineering
(Buenza and Stark, 2004; Pacewicz, 2013, pp. 415-416), it makes sense to analyse state
financialisation as a process of di↵usion. Innovation, in general, includes the element
of invention and the di↵usion or adoption of new products, services, or ideas (Rogers,
2003; Tufano, 2003, p. 311). While there is a large body of literature investigating
the di↵usion of financial innovations (see Akhavein, Frame and White, 2005; Molyneux
and Shamroukh, 1996; Tufano, 2003), the analysis is restricted exclusively to financial
institutions (e.g. banks or exchanges). In the present case, however, local government
o cials are pivotal in deciding which new type of loan is used by their respective
municipal government. Therefore, we resort to another sub-branch of the literature on
the di↵usion of innovation – the literature on policy di↵usion (see Berry and Berry,
1990; Gilardi, 2016; Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013; Karch et al., 2016; Maggetti
and Gilardi, 2016; Shipan and Volden, 2008).
Since a meta-analysis by Maggetti and Gilardi (2016) revealed a considerable lack
of coherence in the respective literature in measuring the di↵erent mechanisms (the
same indicators are used for di↵erent mechanisms and di↵erent indicators are used
for the same mechanism), we refrain from claiming to test for a specific mechanism of
di↵usion, but rather use geographical proximity as a general indicator thereof (Monney,
2001; Shipan and Volden, 2008). It was popularised by Berry and Berry (1990), who
argued that lottery adoptions have a higher probability in states where an immediate
neighbour (i.e. a state with a common border) have already implemented a lottery.
Some scholars argue that geographical proximity “can facilitate the development of
communication networks through which policy-relevant information spreads” (Karch
et al., 2016, p. 94; Monney, 2001). We assume that the same logic can be applied
to the di↵usion of financial innovations. In fact, there are various local authority
associations in England, where the o cials can network and exchange ideas (Rhodes,
2003, pp. 216-217). Not only do councillors and treasurers from di↵erent municipalities
exchange ideas about the use of distinct financial instruments, but association meetings
and conferences are also frequented and financed by bankers and others in the financial
market to advertise the newest product (see Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch, 2018;
Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2014). Hence, we expect that information regarding the use
of Lobo loans is likely to di↵use across regional communication networks. Accordingly,
we expect local governments to use experiences from their closest neighbours to decide
on their own policies.
H5: The likelihood that a local government will take out Lobo loans is positively related
to the percentage of bordering municipalities that have used the same kind of loan.
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4.4 Data and Method
4.4.1 Dependent Variable
For our dependent variable – the use of Lobo loans by local governments – we resorted
to the Freedom of Information Act (2000) which enables private persons to request
any information held by public authorities in the UK. Using Freedom of Information
requests, data were collected for the total number of Lobo loans taken up by each local
authority, the date the loans were signed, the loan principal, the initial interest rate
and (if applicable) the step-up rate of the loans, as well as the name of the bank that
sold the loan.5 We gathered reliable information on the use of Lobo loans for all of
the 353 local authorities. Since we run an event history analysis (EHA) with repeated
events and time-varying covariates which requires each time period for an individual
to appear as a separate observation, we collected the start and end times as well as
event occurrence (binary) for each interval (see Allison, 2014, pp. 38-41).
4.4.2 Independent Variables
Concerning the e↵ects of partisan politics, we collected data for the categorical variable
party in o ce, denoting the party with a majority in the respective local council. It
di↵erentiates between “Labour Party”, “Conservatives” and “Other”, which contains
Liberal Democrats, the Independent Party or no overall control in a local council. Data
were collected using the British Local Election Database (2015).
The variable public debt was measured as the ratio of total debt to population size.
To collect local level data on the levels of public debt, we purchased a dataset on capital
expenditure and treasury management for all local governments in the UK (CIPFA).
For the years from 2008 to 2014, we cross-checked the data with those provided by the
Department for Communities and Local Government in the UK (DCLG) to enhance
the general quality of the dataset.6
Data for economic deprivation were collected from the Economic Deprivation Index
(EDI) made available by the DCLG, comprising the two elements of income and em-
5Part of the data on the use of Lobo loans were collected by the UK public initiative “Debt Resistance”
and was graciously given to us. The rest of the data were obtained using Freedom of Information
Requests.
6Concise variable descriptions and descriptive statistics are shown in Table SM3.17 in the supplemen-
tary material.
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ployment deprivation. We use the population-weighted average ranks of the EDI to
improve comparability across units and time.7.
To test our fourth hypothesis about the e↵ect of financial sector, we calculated the
variable finance power as the share of the gross value added (GVA) of the financial
sector of the total GVA of the local economy using data from the O ce for National
Statistics (ONS), which are provided on a yearly basis for the period 1998 to 2014. The
variable is a proxy for the relative importance of the financial sector for the individual
local economy. The greater the proportion of financial sector GVA, the more important
it is for the local economy relative to other sectors and the more valuable is the sector for
incumbent politicians (through employment, taxes, etc.). For the interaction e↵ect, a
local governments’ population size was measured as the logarithm of its total population
in thousands of persons. Data were acquired from the ONS yearly population estimates.
To test hypothesis H5 we constructed a variable by counting the number of bordering
local governments which had previously (t  1) used Lobo loans in relation to the total
number of neighbouring governments. Theoretically, row-standardisation makes sense
since decision-makers on the local level have only limited resources and hence less
capacities to monitor a larger number of other local governments (Weyland, 2006).
Given their bounded rationality, we use row-standardisation to decrease the relative
influence of each unit with an increasing number of neighbouring local governments (see
Plu¨mper and Neumayer, 2010). The neighbouring units were identified using polygon
contiguities, i.e. by identifying polygons sharing boundary points as neighbours. The
necessary shape files were collected from the UK Data Service Census Data Set (2011).
As additional robustness checks we also identified second order contiguity neighbours
and used inverse distance matrices with a cut-o↵ at 80km.
4.4.3 Control Variables
We controlled for a number of variables that have been established in the literature of
state financialisation and policy di↵usion.
First, we introduced the number of previous adoptions as a control variable in ev-
ery model. According to Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998, p. 1272), it makes sense to
account for the number of previous adoptions when using repeated event models (see
next section), since the events following the first adoption cannot be considered to be
7While the previously discussed entanglement between public debt and economic deprivation also
shows in the moderate correlation coe cient of 0.546 (see Tables SM3.21 and SM3.22 in the supple-
mentary material), both variables still explain di↵erent parts of the variation in using Lobo loans
(see the results of our event history analysis in Table 4.1)
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independent of the former. This variable simply counts the number of previous event
occurrences – i.e. the number each local government used Lobo loans up to the current
year – in local governments.
Next, we controlled for the type of local government. The categorical variable di↵er-
entiates between single-tier (unitary authorities, London boroughs and metropolitan
boroughs) and two-tier authorities (shire districts). Since the di↵erent types share most
responsibilities but di↵er in certain areas of providing public services, we include the
distinction in the analysis to account for possible repercussions of type-specific e↵ects.8
To control for the e↵ect of election years we incorporated year of election in our
analysis. The literature generally assumes that politicians try to appeal to their elec-
torate by smoothing their portfolios before elections to give the illusion of economic
gains (Benton and Smith, 2017; Franzese, 2002; Tufte, 1978). As the Lobo loans’ teaser
rates indicate a short-term reduction of interest payments in the very beginning, their
use would be attractive to incumbent politicians, especially in election years. Hence,
we controlled for etelection year, coded “1” if a local election was held in the given
year and “0” if there was no election. Data were collected from the British Local Elec-
tion Database (2015) and the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
(2018).
4.4.4 Method
To analyse the use of Lobo loans over time we ran several models using EHA techniques.
EHA focuses on the distribution of events over time and is widely used in the literature
on the di↵usion of innovation (Berry and Berry, 1990; Karch et al., 2016; Shipan and
Volden, 2008), essentially estimating the “hazard-rate” of event occurrence (i.e. the
probability that a local government is at risk of taking out a Lobo loan at time t).
Since we do not have strong assumptions about the e↵ects of time on the baseline
hazard, we used Cox proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates instead
of its parametric alternatives (Allison, 2014; Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004).
Many local authorities repeatedly took up Lobo loans while others used the loans
only once or twice. Since each loan adoption can be considered to be a deliberate de-
cision (each loan adoption has to be discussed and agreed upon by the Council) rather
8For a more in-depth description of local government organisation in England see section SM2.4 and
Table SM3.23 in the supplementary material. In addition, the variable type might capture important
dynamics of central government budget cuts. While all local governments are frequently hit by budget
cuts which could increase the use of innovative financial instruments, the budgets of shire districts
are mostly reduced at higher proportions.
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than an automatic extension of existing contracts, subjects were not dropped from the
risk set after the first event has occurred. Because the observations become clustered
and hence statistically dependent when multiple events occur for the same subject,
we calculated robust standard errors within the Andersen-Gill modelling framework
(Andersen and Gill, 1982; Allison, 2014, p. 70). The Andersen-Gill model assumes
events to be independent given variance-corrected errors and the correct specification
of time-dependent covariates. Hence, all models use robust standard errors, clustered
by local authority. We corrected for non-proportional hazards with the inclusion of
time interactions for variables in violation of the proportional hazard assumption (Box-
Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004; Licht, 2011). In addition to the inclusion of the number
of previous adoptions as control variable (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998), the calculation
of robust standard errors and the inclusion of time interactions, we also calculated con-
ditional gap-time (PWP) models as suggested by Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Zorn (2002).
Last, we estimated di↵erent parametric models (Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal, log-
logistic and exponential) and models with di↵erent variable operationalisations and
specifications as robustness checks.9
Given the complex structure of English local governments, we excluded all county
councils from our main analysis, because some of the covariates would not have been
independent from each other (e.g. a county’s population size comprises the population
size of the shire districts within its boundaries). To account for the remaining di↵er-
ences between single- and two-tier local authorities, we included the type variable in
each model, to control for the variation explained simply by di↵erences in the local
governments’ structural setup.
4.5 Findings
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
We begin with a descriptive evaluation of our hypotheses. First, Figure 4.2a indicates
that, as expected, Labour did indeed take out more Lobo loans compared to all other
political parties. The biggest di↵erence between Labour and Conservative can be
observed in the early years of the di↵usion process (2000-2002). Hence, Labour not only
issued more loans in total but also started earlier, setting the trend for the local political
parties that others followed. After 2007, the numbers are essentially indistinguishable
9See Table SM3.18 and Table SM3.19 in the supplementary material. Our results remain largely the
same.
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Figure 4.2: Number of Lobo loans signed by party in o ce (1998-2014)
(a) Total number of Lobo loans signed by party in o ce; (b) total number of Lobo loans signed by party in o ce
divided by the total number of local governments where the party had the council majority. “Other” includes Liberal
Democrats and Independent candidates.
for Labour and Conservative since adoption rates decreased at the same pace for both
parties. Furthermore, Figure 4.2b shows that in relation to the total number of local
governments where the respective party had a council majority (hence, where the party
actually had the ability to take out loans), Labour issued significantly more than the
Conservative Party.10
With respect to the process of the geographical di↵usion of Lobo loans entered into
by English local governments, Figure 4.3 shows the di↵usion dynamics across space and
time. It depicts the cumulative use of Lobo loans for all 335 local governments included
in the analysis. In 1999 only 6 local governments signed Lobo loans, accounting for
fewer than 2% of all English local authorities. However, the use of Lobo loans spread
rapidly: in 2003, 67 (20%) and in 2007, 141 local authorities (42%) used them. By
2011 almost 50% of all local councils in England used the new financial product at least
once. Next to the total proportion of adoptions, Figure 4.3 gives first insights relating
to our hypothesis on the geographical di↵usion of Lobo use. At first glance, several
clusters of bordering local governments which used Lobo loans can be observed. They
include the most northerly region around Northumberland and Newcastle upon Tyne,
the western region around Liverpool and Manchester, and the area around London, as
well as several smaller clusters across the whole country. Spatial regression techniques
10Values > 1 appear since multiple loans could be taken up by a single local government in the course
of one year. Councils with no overall majority are not included.
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Figure 4.3: The geographical di↵usion of Lobo loans across English municipalities (1999-
2011)
in the subsequent chapter will show whether the observed establishment of clusters can
legitimately be described by a process of di↵usion.
4.6 Results and Discussion
Our statistical results are shown in Table 4.1. Considering hypothesis H1 assuming a
positive relationship between the Labour party being in o ce in a local government
and the use of Lobo loans, we can observe a positive and statistically significant as-
sociation of the respective coe cient. Substantively, compared to local council with a
Conservative majority (the reference group), a Labour majority increases the likelihood
of the use of Lobo loans by 66% (Model 3). Supporting the descriptive evidence of
the previous chapter, we find strong support for H1 on partisan politics and increasing
levels of local government financialisation. Hence, partisanship does (still) matter for
local governments’ debt policies. Given the core expectation of partisan theory that
di↵erent incumbent parties pursue di↵erent policies to cater to the interests of their
constituencies (see Hibbs, 1977; Schmidt, 1996, we find that party di↵erences do help
to explain the use of financial innovations in English local governments. This notion is
also supported by our interview evidence as a Labour councillor describes the notion
that Lobo loans were predominantly taken up by the Labour party as “quite logical”
given their need to finance infrastructure projects and the fact the Labour “is strong
in industrial areas [like] Manchester [or] Birmingham” (INT 4).
Next, it has to be noted that with regard to the fiscal and economic stress hy-
potheses, both variables (public debt per capita and economic deprivation) violated
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Table 4.1: Repeated event survival analysis (1998-2014)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables
Party: Labour — 0.535⇤⇤ 0.508⇤⇤
(0.212) (0.212)
Party: Other — 0.336⇤ 0.301
(0.194) (0.194)
Public debtt 1 —  0.114⇤⇤⇤  0.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.040)
Public debtt 1 * ln(t) — 0.015⇤⇤⇤ 0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005)
Deprivationt 1 — 0.146⇤⇤⇤ 0.146⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042)
Deprivationt 1 * ln(t) —  0.019⇤⇤⇤  0.019⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.005)
Finance power —  0.172  4.543⇤⇤⇤
(0.156) (1.541)
Finance power * ln population — — 0.796⇤⇤⇤
(0.279)
Neighbour — 1.052⇤⇤⇤ 1.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.402) (0.401)
Controls
Number previous adoptions 0.286⇤⇤⇤ 0.216⇤⇤⇤ 0.208⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.038) (0.039)
ln population 0.452⇤⇤⇤ 0.495⇤⇤⇤  0.044
(0.139) (0.154) (0.243)
Election year  0.024  0.070  0.067
(0.147) (0.150) (0.149)
Type of local government  2.196⇤⇤⇤  1.932⇤⇤⇤  2.146⇤⇤⇤
(0.257) (0.282) (0.289)
AIC 2646.819 2631.079 2627.145
Number of events 286 286 286
Number of observations 4211 4211 4211
PH test 0.227 0.716 0.605
Standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses. Reference group for Party: Conservative.
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
proportional hazard assumptions and had to be specified with log-time interactions
(see Licht, 2011). Accordingly, the coe cients of the main e↵ects reported in Table
4.1 show an incomplete picture and both e↵ects were plotted in Figure 4.4 for post-
estimation.
We can observe a highly significant association between public debt and the use
derivatives in both Model 2 and Model 3. While the negative direction of the coe cient
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Figure 4.4: Simulated relative hazards for the e↵ect of public debt and economic deprivation
on the use of Lobo loans
(a) Simulated relative hazards for the e↵ect of public debt on the time it takes to use Lobo loans; (b) Simulated relative
hazards for the e↵ect of economic deprivation on Lobo use over time. 95% confidence intervals in shaded grey.
in Table 1 seems to contradict our hypothesis, caused by the log-time interaction it
only shows the e↵ect for the year 1998. Looking at Figure 4.4a, it can be observed
that the association between public debt and local government financialisation is only
negative for the very early years of the di↵usion process (1998-2000). Interestingly,
the direction of the relationship changes over time and becomes significantly positive
after 2007. One possible explanation could be di↵erences in risk-seeking behaviour.
While leaders of di↵usion processes can be associated with more risk-prone behaviour,
laggards may be more risk-averse (see Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2013, pp. 698-699;
Walker, 1969). In the context at hand, local governments were potentially less focused
on reducing high levels of public debt with more lucrative borrowing instruments, but
rather sought to decrease their level of economic deprivation by making a risky move
on the financial markets in order to obtain money to invest in public infrastructure
projects.
In view of this interpretation, the coe cient of economic deprivation as reported
in Table 1 and Figure 4.4b also makes sense. In contrast to public debt per capita,
the association between economic deprivation and the use of derivatives is actually
significantly positive in the early di↵usion process (until 2004) and turns significantly
negative after 2007. Hence, we find some supportive evidence for hypothesis H3 assum-
ing a positive relationship between economic deprivation and the use of Lobo loans by
local governments. However, the association is conditioned by time. As a consequence,
it is important to account for the dynamic nature of the relationship between both fiscal
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Figure 4.5: Simulated marginal e↵ects of financial sector power on the use of Lobo loans
Marginal e↵ects of financial sector power by population size (measured as the natural logarithm). 95% confidence
intervals in shaded grey.
and economic stress with increasing levels of local government financialisation. While
early adopter local authorities are more risk-prone and driven by economic motivations
when they use Lobos, late adopters are more risk-averse and fiscally motivated.
Next, Table 4.1 shows the coe cients for the association between financial sector
strength and the use of innovative borrowing instruments by local governments. In
contrast to the positive relationship assumed in hypothesis H4a, the e↵ect is actually
negative and not statistically significant. However, given the fact that the interaction
e↵ect between financial sector power and the size of a local government (postulated in
hypotheses H4b) is significant (see Model 3 in Table 4.1), the main e↵ect cannot be
meaningfully interpreted in isolation (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006; Braumoeller,
2004). Hence, we plot the marginal e↵ect of finance power conditioned by population
size in Figure 4.5. Given our assumptions expressed in hypothesis H4a (i.e. that a
strong local financial sector increases the likelihood of using Lobo loans), the results
are very surprising: the e↵ect of local financial sector power is significantly negative for
local governments with a population size < 190, 000 and turns positive for very large
councils with more than ⇠ 570, 000 inhabitants. Hence, the e↵ect has the opposite of
the expected direction.
This conditional e↵ect could be driven by di↵erent causal processes: first, contrast-
ing our initial expectation, there could also be incentives for finance to lobby larger
local governments more frequently since “[p]olicy making in the larger municipalities
is less transparent” (Sørensen, 1998, p. 309) or because employment opportunities
are more prestigious and reinforce the revolving-door phenomenon (Sbragia, 1986, pp.
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319-319). Consequently, the e↵ect of financial sector in smaller councils could actually
be less pronounced compared to larger ones. Second, the global dimension of finan-
cialisation that was previously discussed might play a decisive role. Foreign banks
might have intentionally targeted those local governments where the domestic finan-
cial industry was less present. Given the fact it were foreign banks who started selling
Lobo loans to English municipalities in the late 1990s, the demand in issuing new Lobo
loans might actually have been substantially decreased in those smaller councils when
domestic banks started to participate in the market. Third and last, recent research
by Trampusch (2019) suggests that finance uses di↵erent channels to drive the pro-
cess of financialisation: next to the means of structural and instrumental power, state
financialisation can also be increased by financial industry experts who are already
part of the state apparatus. If this interpretation was correct, the interaction term
(power⇤size) would actually be less a proxy for the interaction between finance power
and government size but for local governments’ ability to hire financial experts from the
local labour market – it is more di cult to attract professional financial experts from
a well-developed local financial sector in small and medium sized local governments
compared to larger ones which can o↵er higher salaries and better career opportunities
in their treasury departments.
The neighbour variable (i.e. the ratio of contiguity neighbours who previously
adopted Lobos to the total number of neighbours) was introduced in Model 2 and
3, respectively, to test our assumption on the relationship between external pressure
and the use of Lobo loans. In line with our expectations, the e↵ect is significantly
positive. The coe cient of ⇠ 1.14 in Model 3 results in the interpretation that a one
unit increase in the neighbour variable would increase the likelihood of using Lobo
loans by 213%. While the e↵ect seems to be rather large, it describes the case that
all of the subject’s neighbouring local governments previously used Lobo loans. In
most cases (where only a small share of neighbours used Lobo loans) the e↵ect is much
smaller. Considering the di↵erently specified spatial weights, (see Model 1 and 2 in
Table SM3.20 in the supplementary material) the associations are still substantively
positive but only significant at p < 0.1 (second order contiguity) or p < 0.13 (inverse
distance). Hence, in line with our assumptions, local governments might actually only
look to its closest (direct) neighbours and lack the capacities to monitor the borrowing
behaviour of council that are farther away. In addition, the results of the PWP model
(Model 3 in Table SM3.20) indicate that that the pressure exerted on local governments
by its closest neighbours might only be relevant for the first adoption of Lobo loans
but loses its significance for later adoptions. Nevertheless, we find some supportive evi-
dence that geographic proximity and hence external pressure, might play an important
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role in facilitating the spread of local government financialisation. This finding is also
backed by our interviews. Smaller local authorities, in particular, compare each other
with other local councils in their area (INT 6) and once a new financial instrument
is used by these authorities and has been established, they tend to follow the trend
(INT 1, 4, 6).
The coe cients of our control variables for all models are reported in the bottom
half of Table 4.1. Several aspects are noteworthy. First, the coe cient for the number
of previous adoptions is positive and statistically significant across all models. Next to
the necessity of including the variable due to our choice of a statistical model (see Beck,
Katz and Tucker, 1998), it can also be interpreted with substantive meaning: each loan
contract that was previously signed by a local government increases the likelihood of
taking up a new loan by 23%. This might be caused by the fact that having used this
complicated borrowing instrument in the past might reduce the inhibition threshold to
use it again. Next, population size is also significantly positively associated with Lobo
use in Model 1 and Model 2. The change in direction of the coe cient in Model 3 is
caused by the introduction of the interaction e↵ect. In addition, a substantive di↵erence
can be observed between di↵erent types of local governments across all specified models.
Shire districts are far less likely to use Lobo loans than are Metropolitan Districts,
London Boroughs and Unitary Authorities. Contrary to expectations, the coe cient
for election years is actually negative and not statistically significant. This might be
caused by the fact that local governments in England adhere to di↵erent electoral
cycles. Since Shire Districts hold council elections in 3 out of 4 years, the di↵erences
in electoral systems might be captured by the type variable. The negative direction of
the e↵ect could also be caused by the relative frequency of elections compared to other
countries.
4.7 Conclusion
This article makes an original contribution to the growing literature on local govern-
ment financialisation by analysing the use of long-term market loans with embedded
derivatives for all local authorities of a country in its entirety over time. By transcend-
ing and expanding extant literature which so far has mainly produced results from
within-case analyses, our approach increases the external validity of previously found
relationships in single municipalities. Based on an extensively compiled panel dataset
of all 353 local authorities in England, our event history analysis across cases identi-
fied the configuration of the local political economy and policy di↵usion as important
94
drivers of the spread of financialisation among English local authorities. Our study
deepens the understanding of the e↵ects of internal and external influences of local
state financialisation (e↵ects of causes) and future studies should further investigate
the causes of these e↵ects, thus the underlying causal processes.
With respect to local political economy factors we find supportive evidence for the
impact of a Labour majority in local councils on the propensity to adopt financial
innovations. Given the core expectation of partisan theory that di↵erent incumbent
parties pursue di↵erent policies to cater to the interests of their constituencies, we
find that party di↵erences do help to explain the use of financial innovations in En-
glish local governments. This result provides new insights to the existing literature on
party ideology and economic and fiscal policy-making as well as the literature on local
government financialisation, in general.
Moreover, our analysis reveals that the other internal factors discussed in the previ-
ous literature, such as the degree of fiscal stress, of economic deprivation or the strength
of the local financial industry, are associated with increasing financialisation in a more
complex way than previously assumed as these are moderated by other factors. In
this sense, we were able to show that di↵erent temporal stages of the financialisation
process a↵ect the e↵ects of local indebtedness and economic deprivation on this very
process. While in the early phase (1998-2003) the probability of Lobo use correlates
with a high degree of economic deprivation and a low degree of debt, the directions of
both factors are reversed in the late phase of Lobo use (2007-2014). In addition, we
find that financial sector power is moderated by the size of a local authority’s popu-
lation. While finance power decreases the likelihood of Lobo use for small to medium
sized governments, the e↵ect is positive for very large authorities. We propose that
this unexpected conditional impact of local finance power can be driven by di↵erent
processes: larger authorities being targeted more frequently by the financial industry,
foreign banks mainly targeting local authorities with smaller domestic financial sector,
or local authorities’ ability to hire financial experts from the local financial market.
To investigate these di↵erent processes, further research should systematically com-
pare governments of di↵erent sizes, and more specifically with di↵erent institutional
capacities of their local treasuries with regard to salary structures and human resource
development. This avenue of research also indicates that financialisation studies need
to consider the literature on public administration, administrative recruitment pat-
terns and the role of professional training in public policy-making (e.g. Fourcarde,
2009; Campbell and Pedersen, 2014. In addition, an analysis explicitly di↵erentiating
between the role of domestic and foreign banks might provide interesting results.
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While we illustrate the importance of the local political economy, we also want to
highlight the relevance of external factors, i.e. the role of di↵usion (Gilardi, 2016)
for understanding financialisation of local governments as was suggested by previous
case study research (Fastenrath, Orban and Trampusch, 2018; Hendrikse and Sidaway,
2014). Our results show that geographic proximity is highly relevant for the analysis of
local borrowing through Lobo loans, which is supported by our interview material. The
substantive and significant e↵ect of geographic proximity as “catch-all” indicator for
di↵usion clearly demonstrates that di↵usion does take place, however, further research
is necessary to analyse which specific mechanism operates and how exactly it translates
into the use of financial innovations by local governments.
Whereas our quantitative analysis identified several factors that contributed to the
spread of financialised borrowing among English local governments (e↵ects of causes),
additional process tracing case study research is necessary to improve our understand-
ing of the concrete causal mechanisms that help to understand how exactly these factors
produce state financialisation in single cases (causes of e↵ects). The conditional e↵ects
clearly point to variegated paths of state financialisation and varying motivations of
local policy makers to financialise their borrowing depending on the timing of local
politicians’ motivations. Further advances could be made by more theoretical and
empirical work on the (conditional) impact of the local financial sector on public debt
policies by extending the scope of analysis to a larger sample of local governments from
di↵erent countries.
We conclude with four remarks on the generalisability of our findings. First, with
regard to partisan politics, it seems reasonable to assume that our results also apply
in other countries. Although this should be taken with caution as the English case
of New Labour is certainly to be regarded as special and not as the case of a classic
social democratic party (as seen in the partisan politics literature), individual studies
have already pointed to the crucial role of left political parties as being receptive to
voters’ demands for increasing revenues to expand public services (e.g. Boyne et al.,
2012). Moreover, as the literature on European social democratic parties’ rightward
shift during the 1990s indicates, the ideological change of the Labour Party in England
should by no means be treated as a singular phenomenon (see Allen 2009). Second, we
suppose that the dynamic e↵ects of fiscal and economic stress on local public finance
are transferable to countries with more fiscally autonomous local governments, since
such autonomy means that local governments are free to harness any form of financial
innovation to reduce local problem pressures. While in unitary states like England the
central government can have a significant influence on the fiscal position as well as on
the financialisation of its local governments, in federal states there is less involvement
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in local economic and fiscal a↵airs. Hence, we can expect that an increasing fiscal and
economic pressure will lead those more autonomous local governments to use all avail-
able creative ways to produce leeway. Third, the conditional impact of finance power
is certainly transferable to other countries, not only in England. Fourth, given that
studies on policy di↵usion focus almost exclusively on international di↵usion (Jordana,
Levi-Faur and Ferna´ndez I Mar´ın, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2005) or federal political systems
like the US (Berry and Berry, 1990; Shipan and Volden, 2008), Germany (Abel, 2019),
or Switzerland (Fu¨glister, 2012), we provide additional insights in illustrating how
policies di↵use in a non-federal (unitary) political system.
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FIVE
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
SM1 Regulating the Audit Market in the European
Union: Who Dominates, Who Loses?
SM1.1 Data Preparation
Table SM1.1: Cleansing process of interest group submissions
N
Total submissions 837
Reasons for removal
Cover letters 136
Duplicates 231
Unrelated 31
Not processable 37
Total removed 435
Final data set 402
Note: Some interest group submissions consisted of one document including the pref-
erences to the Commission proposal as well as one separate cover letter with general,
introductory remarks. The cover letters were removed from the text corpus used in
the analysis. Duplicates mostly consisted of documents with identical answers by 212
German SMEs. Since the preferences are completely identical, the documents were
aggregated to only one submission. Additionally, some documents had to be excluded
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from the analysis since they were not directly related to the concrete policy proposals.
Most of those submissions were journal articles by academics that did not relate to
the questions at hand. Lastly, a small margin of documents was not processable (e.g.
because of formatting errors).
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SM1.2 Summary Statistics
Table SM1.2: Descriptive statistics
N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Large firm 6,118 0.2 0.4 0 0 1
SME 6,118 0.18 0.38 0 0 1
Public authority 6,118 0.24 0.42 0 0 1
Other 6,118 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
Coalition size 6,118 0.35 0.24 0 0.27 1
Salience 6,118 0.41 0.3 0 0.33 1
Conflict 6,118 0.67 0.25 0 0.75 1
Number of responses 6,118 0.8 0.27 0 1 1
Information supply 6,116 0.05 0.06 0 0.04 1
EU-level 6,118 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Table SM1.3: Correlation matrix of main variables
Large firm SME Public authority Other Coalition size
Large firm 1  0.23  0.28  0.40 0.14
SME  0.23 1  0.26  0.37  0.11
Public authority  0.28  0.26 1  0.44  0.02
Other  0.40  0.37  0.44 1  0.01
Coalition size 0.14  0.11  0.02  0.01 1
Salience 0.06  0.01  0.03  0.01 0.39
Conflict  0.00 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.39
Responses  0.08  0.00 0.03 0.04  0.19
Information supply 0.04  0.12 0.00 0.06 0.01
EU-level  0.07  0.04  0.09 0.16  0.00
Table SM1.4: Correlation matrix of main variables (continued)
Salience Conflict Responses Information supply EU-level
Large firm 0.06  0.00  0.08 0.04  0.07
SME  0.01 0.01  0.00  0.12  0.04
Public authority  0.03  0.02 0.03 0.00  0.09
Other  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.16
Coalition size 0.39  0.39  0.19 0.01  0.00
Salience 1  0.22  0.28 0.16 0.00
Conflict  0.22 1 0.07 0.06  0.00
Responses  0.28 0.07 1 0.01 0.02
Information supply 0.16 0.06 0.01 1 0.05
EU-level 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.05 1
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Table SM1.5: Correlation of interest group attention across all issues
Large firms SMEs Public authorities Other
Large firms 1 0.66 0.60 0.91
SMEs 0.66 1 0.69 0.80
Public authorities 0.60 0.69 1 0.77
Other 0.91 0.80 0.77 1
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Figure SM1.1: Distribution of all actors’ preferences by policy issue
Note: For a description of the content of each issue see Table SM1.6 in section SM1.3 in the supplementary material
below.
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Figure SM1.2: Distribution of submissions by interest group type and issue
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SM1.3 Issue Description
Table SM1.6: Issue characteristics of distinct issues in the EU Green Paper on audit market
regulation
ID Description Question Conflicta Salienceb
1 Financial Health 4 0.89 0.53
2 Expectation Gap 5 0.45 0.45
3 Professional Skepticism 6 0.77 0.38
4 Negative Qualifications 7 0.83 0.30
5 Adequate Dialogue 9 0.82 0.36
6 CSR Reporting 10 0.87 0.43
7 Communication with stakeholders 11 0.64 0.41
8 ISAs 13+14 0.00 0.60
9 ISA and SMEs 15 1.00 0.25
10 Appointment of auditor 16+17 0.22 1.00
11 Mandatory rotation 18+29 0.74 0.98
12 Prohibition of non-audit services 19 0.75 0.95
13 Maximum level of fees 20 0.87 0.46
14 Transparency 21 0.87 0.13
15 Alternative financing structures 23 0.98 0.19
16 Group Auditors 24 0.64 0.25
17 EU supervision 25+26 0.30 0.41
18 Joint-Audits and Audit Consortia 28 0.91 0.84
19 Big Four bias 30 0.80 0.25
20 Contingency plans, living wills 31 0.85 0.00
21 Reverse consolidation 32 0.70 0.13
22 European market 33+34 0.63 0.36
23 Limited audit for SMEs 35+37 0.61 0.46
24 Safe harbour for SMEs 36 0.85 0.16
25 Global co-operation 38 0.01 0.03
a Calculated with the standard deviation for each issue (standardised).
b Logarithm of number of actors responding to each issue (standardised).
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Table SM1.7: Coding of success for each issue (main analysis)
Issue Success Description Legislation
1.0 0.5
Issue 1 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 2 4 3 Clarification of scope, but little information Directive
Issue 3 4 3 Included but vague Directive
Issue 4 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 5 5 4 Completely included Directive
Issue 6 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 7 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 8 4 3 Included, but still voluntary Directive
Issue 9 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 10 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 11 4 3 Included, but very long time period that Regulation
can be extended
Issue 12 4 3 Some prohibitions but no total ban Regulation
Issue 13 4 5 Maximum fee introduced, but it is rather Regulation
high (70%)
Issue 14 5 4 Completely Included Regulation
Issue 15 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 16 5 4 Completely Included Directive
Issue 17 5 4 Completely Included Regulation
Issue 18 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 19 5 4 Completely Included Directive
Issue 20 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 21 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 22 5 4 Completely Included Directive
Issue 23 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 24 1 2 Dropped x
Issue 25 3 4 Some changes, but only minor Regulation
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SM1.4 Additional Analyses
Table SM1.8: Mixed-e↵ect ordered logistic regression models (base group: public authori-
ties)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IG: Large firms  0.22⇤⇤⇤  0.12 0.40⇤⇤⇤ 0.18
(0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
IG: SME  0.07  0.37⇤⇤  0.02  0.28
(0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18)
IG: Other  0.11  0.21⇤ 0.19 0.01
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Coalition size 5.79⇤⇤⇤ 5.57⇤⇤⇤ 5.99⇤⇤⇤ 5.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.29) (0.18) (0.30)
Salience  2.10⇤⇤⇤  2.07⇤⇤⇤  1.44⇤  1.29⇤
(0.73) (0.73) (0.76) (0.75)
Large firms x Coalition —  0.22 — 1.02⇤⇤
(0.36) (0.42)
SME x Coalition — 1.00⇤⇤ — 1.14⇤⇤
(0.42) (0.45)
Other x Coalition — 0.31 — 0.74⇤⇤
(0.32) (0.35)
Large firms x Salience — —  1.59⇤⇤⇤  1.94⇤⇤⇤
(0.29) (0.34)
SME x Salience — —  0.11  0.37
(0.32) (0.33)
Other x Salience — —  0.82⇤⇤⇤  1.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.26) (0.27)
Conflict 1.89⇤⇤ 1.89⇤⇤ 1.99⇤⇤ 1.96⇤⇤
(0.84) (0.84) (0.85) (0.84)
Number of responses  0.08  0.10  0.13  0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Information supply  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45)
EU-level 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 2.23⇤⇤⇤ 2.15⇤⇤⇤ 2.55⇤⇤⇤ 2.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)
Constant 2 3.20⇤⇤⇤ 3.12⇤⇤⇤ 3.53⇤⇤⇤ 3.35⇤⇤⇤
(0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)
Log Likelihood -5305.17 -5300.46 -5286.84 -5282.22
AIC 10636.33 10632.91 10605.69 10602.44
Observations 6116 6116 6116 6116
n IG 402 402 402 402
n Issues 25 25 25 25
Variance: ID: (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance: issue: (Intercept) 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.96
IG = interest group; Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
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Table SM1.9: Mixed-e↵ect ordered logistic regression models with alternative coding of
success (base group: SME)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IG: Large firms  0.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.16 0.65⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
IG: Public authorities 0.05 0.32⇤⇤ 0.14 0.35⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
IG: Other  0.07 0.15 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16)
Coalition size 5.47⇤⇤⇤ 6.24⇤⇤⇤ 5.81⇤⇤⇤ 6.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.34) (0.17) (0.34)
Salience  1.53⇤⇤⇤  1.51⇤⇤⇤  0.60  0.64
(0.52) (0.51) (0.57) (0.57)
Large firms x Coalition —  1.18⇤⇤⇤ — 0.28
(0.39) (0.44)
Public authorities x Coalition —  0.91⇤⇤ —  0.84⇤⇤
(0.39) (0.40)
Other x Coalition —  0.74⇤⇤ —  0.36
(0.37) (0.38)
Large firms x Salience — —  2.28⇤⇤⇤  2.59⇤⇤⇤
(0.31) (0.35)
Public authorities x Salience — —  0.27  0.11
(0.30) (0.31)
Other x Salience — —  1.18⇤⇤⇤  1.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.29)
Conflict 0.92 0.91 1.06⇤ 1.05⇤
(0.59) (0.59) (0.61) (0.61)
Number of responses  0.04  0.06  0.12  0.11
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Information supply  0.47  0.47  0.43  0.44
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
EU-level 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 1.36⇤⇤⇤ 1.58⇤⇤⇤ 1.85⇤⇤⇤ 1.92⇤⇤⇤
(0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.54)
Constant 2 2.67⇤⇤⇤ 2.89⇤⇤⇤ 3.18⇤⇤⇤ 3.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.52) (0.52) (0.54) (0.54)
Log Likelihood -5691.84 -5686.87 -5654.75 -5649.45
AIC 11409.68 11405.75 11341.50 11336.90
Observations 6115 6115 6115 6115
n IG 402 402 402 402
n Issues 25 25 25 25
Variance: ID: (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance: issue: (Intercept) 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.50
IG = interest group; Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
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Table SM1.10: Main analysis with alternative statistical models (base group: SME)
Model 1a Model 2b Model 3c
(glme) (lme) (lme)
IG: Large firms 0.43⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.03) (0.03)
IG: Public authorities 0.27 0.06⇤ 0.07⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.03) (0.03)
IG: Other 0.27 0.06⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.03) (0.03)
Coalition size 4.70⇤⇤⇤ 1.04⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.38) (0.06) (0.06)
Salience  1.18⇤  0.21⇤  0.15
(0.66) (0.12) (0.09)
Large firms x Coalition  0.64  0.05  0.01
(0.50) (0.08) (0.08)
Public authorities x Coalition  1.27⇤⇤⇤  0.19⇤⇤  0.17⇤⇤
(0.46) (0.08) (0.07)
Other x Coalition  0.60  0.07  0.08
(0.43) (0.07) (0.07)
Large firms x Salience  1.02⇤⇤⇤  0.26⇤⇤⇤  0.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.39) (0.06) (0.06)
Public authorities x Salience 0.66⇤ 0.03  0.00
(0.34) (0.06) (0.05)
Other x Salience  0.37  0.12⇤⇤  0.17⇤⇤⇤
(0.32) (0.05) (0.05)
Conflict 1.02 0.23⇤ 0.08
(0.71) (0.13) (0.10)
Number of responses  0.06  0.04⇤  0.03
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Information supply 0.31  0.07  0.10
(0.47) (0.08) (0.08)
EU-level 0.09 0.02 0.01
(0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant  1.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.04 0.12
(0.63) (0.11) (0.09)
Log Likelihood -3688.34 -2971.87 -2659.52
AIC 7412.69 5981.74 5357.05
Observations 6116 6116 6115
n IG 402 402 402
n Issues 25 25 25
Variance (Interest group) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance (Issue) 0.69 0.02 0.01
Variance (Residual) — 0.15 0.14
IG = interest group; Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
a Generalised linear mixed-e↵ects model. Coding of success: 1 = previously 1 or 0.5, 0 = previously 0.
b Linear mixed-e↵ects model. Original coding of success (see discussion in paper).
c Linear mixed-e↵ects model. Alternative coding of success (see discussion in paper).
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SM2 United in Disagreement: Analysing Policy Net-
works in EU Policy-Making
SM2.1 Model Diagnostics
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Figure SM2.3: Trace plots for AME Model 1 on issues with low potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.1.
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Figure SM2.4: Trace plots for AME Model 2 on issues with low potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.1.
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Figure SM2.5: Trace plots for AME Model 3 on issues with low potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.1.
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Figure SM2.6: Trace plots for AME Model 4 on issues with low potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.1.
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Figure SM2.7: Trace plots for AME Model 1 on issues with high potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure SM2.8: Trace plots for AME Model 2 on issues with high potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.2.
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Figure SM2.9: Trace plots for AME Model 3 on issues with high potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.2.
112
Match: NGO
Match: Business association
Match: Other business
Match: Energy intensive
Match: Energy producer
Policy leader
0 500 1000 1500 2000
⌧2.0
⌧1.5
⌧1.0
⌧0.5
⌧0.4
⌧0.2
0.0
⌧0.2
⌧0.1
0.0
0.1
0.5
1.0
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5 Match: NGO
Match: Business association
Match: Other business
Match: Energy intensive
Match: Energy producer
Policy leader
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.4 0.8 1.2
⌧0.2 ⌧0.1 0.0 0.1
⌧0.4 ⌧0.2 0.0 0.2
⌧2.0 ⌧1.5 ⌧1.0 ⌧0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0
1
2
3
4
0
2
4
6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0
1
2
3
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Policy core belief
Match: Country
Energy intensive ⌧ energy producer
Energy intensive ⌧ NGO
Energy producer ⌧ NGO
0 500 1000 1500 2000
⌧0.6
⌧0.4
⌧0.2
0.0
⌧0.3
⌧0.2
⌧0.1
0.0
0.1
⌧0.6
⌧0.5
⌧0.4
⌧0.3
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
Policy core belief
Match: Country
Energy intensive ⌧ energy producer
Energy intensive ⌧ NGO
Energy producer ⌧ NGO
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
0.10 0.15 0.20
⌧0.6 ⌧0.5 ⌧0.4 ⌧0.3 ⌧0.2
⌧0.4 ⌧0.2 0.0 0.2
⌧0.50 ⌧0.25 0.00
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
2
4
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
1
2
3
4
Figure SM2.10: Trace plots for AME Model 4 on issues with high potential for inter-group
conflict shown in Table 3.2.
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SM2.2 Model Specifications
The models used in our analysis (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter 3) are specified in
equations 5-8. They correspond to models 1-4 for both issues with low and high levels
of inter-group conflict potential shown in the main analysis. In logical order, equation
5 describes model 1, equation 6 model 2, equation 7 model 3 and equation 8 model 4.
yij =  dtype combinationi,j +  dcountryi,j +  nleaderi +
ai + aj + u
T
i ^vj + ✏ij
(5.1)
beliefij =  dtype combinationi,j +  dcountryi,j +  nleaderi +
ai + aj + u
T
i ^vj + ✏ij
(5.2)
yij =  dbeliefi,j +  dcountryi,j +  nleaderi +
ai + aj + u
T
i ^vj + ✏ij
(5.3)
yij =  dtype combinationi,j +  dbeliefi,j +  dcountryi,j+
 nleaderi + ai + aj + u
T
i ^vj + ✏ij
(5.4)
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SM2.3 Survey Content
Table SM2.11: Exemplary responses by three actors to the question: ”Do you think that
the EU ETS helps the EU industry to become more energy e cient, and thus contributes to
increasing the competitiveness of European industry in the long-term?”
Actor Preference Explanation
AB Sandvik Materials
Technology
No ”The EU ETS is an extremely laborious system which was
intended to be a market system, but is changed by EU and
governmental authorities, leaving companies with high en-
ergy costs and plans for reduction of production to meet
EU emission targets. This decreases the competiveness of
the Swedish steel industry and the steel industry in Europe
as a whole. The steel industry is energy intensive and con-
stantly works to reduce energy use. Plants reducing iron
ore are not given time to develop CO2-neutral technology
and even plants which use best available technology face
danger of losing competitiveness on the world market. If
adding the insecurity of electricity supply within Europe in
the future, the conditions for development and investment
in the steel industry in Europe are very unfavorable. En-
ergy e ciency is a continuous work within energy intensive
industry.”
Statoil ASA Yes ”A market based instrument as the EU ETS is considered
the most cost e cient tool to reduce CO2 emissions. It
is crucial to avoid overlapping and double regulation that
undermines this mechanism. By improving its energy e -
ciency European industry becomes more cost e cient and
better prepared to manage even stricter climate regulations
in the future.”
Greenpeace European
Unit
Yes ”In principle the ETS can (complementary to an energy
savings target and policies) help energy e ciency and in-
crease competitiveness. However, due to a large surplus of
emissions allowances, the CO2 price in the ETS has been
too low to give a meaningful incentive to investors. The sur-
plus was created by the large inflow of international credits
(JI, CDM) and reduced industrial output as a result of
the economic downturn. The 2014 Thomson Reuters Point
Carbon Survey shows that 40% of the respondents perceive
that the ETS hasn’t caused their company to reduce any
emissions. Moreover, generous free allocation (without in-
vestment conditions attached) has prevented a clear incen-
tive for more energy e ciency. 97% of industrial emissions
qualify for the carbon leakage criteria due to imprecise se-
lection criteria and the use of a e30 carbon price assump-
tion. Furthermore, some of the sectors included in the car-
bon leakage list have passed on their carbon costs to con-
sumers (CE Delft, 2010).”
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Table SM2.12: Survey questions and policy type classification
No. Question Conflict
Potential
Q1 Do you think that EU industry is able to further reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions towards 2020 and beyond, without reducing industrial production in the
EU?
Low
Q2 Do you think that the EU ETS helps the EU industry to become more energy
e cient, and thus contributes to increasing the competitiveness of European
industry in the long-term?
Low
Q3 Do you think the EU needs to provide special (transitional) measures to sup-
port EU industry covered by the EU ETS, in order to address potential com-
petitiveness disadvantages vis-a`-vis third countries with less ambitious climate
policy?
Low
Q4 In your view, how adequate a policy instrument is free allocation and, in par-
ticular, increased free allocation for certain industrial sectors to address the
risk of carbon leakage?
High
Q5 In your view, how does free allocation impact the incentives to innovate for
reducing emissions?
High
Q6 In your view, is the administrative burden for companies to ensure the free al-
location via the implementation of the benchmarking provisions proportionate
to the objectives?
Low
Q7 What share of the post-2020 allowance budget should be dedicated to carbon
leakage and competitiveness purposes?
High
Q8 Currently the European Commission implements the NER300 programme to
provide from EU ETS specific support for large-scale demonstration of Carbon
Capture Storage (CCS) projects and innovative renewable energy. 300 million
allowances, representing ca. 2% of total phase 3 allowances, are dedicated
for this purpose. What share of the post-2020 allowance budget should be
dedicated to such innovation support?
Excluded
Q9 At the moment, EU ETS rules do not contain a specific support scheme for
industrial innovation and deployment of new low-carbon technologies (apart
from support for CCS and renewables under the NER300). Do you think there
should be such a financial support scheme?
Excluded
Q10 If innovative low carbon technologies in the industry are to be further sup-
ported, which could be possible sources of funding?
Excluded
Q11 In your view, is there a need for additional measures beyond free allocation and
EU-level innovation support to address the risk of carbon leakage for energy
intensive sectors covered by the EU ETS, post-2020?
High
Q12 Currently there are two categories for sectors in terms of exposure to the risk
of carbon leakage: sectors are either deemed to be exposed to such risk (the
sectors on the carbon leakage list) or not (sectors not on the carbon leakage
list). Should the system continue with two carbon leakage exposure groups or
is some further di↵erentiation needed?
High
Q13 Under the current system, exposure of sectors to the risk of carbon leakage is
primarily measured by the share of ’carbon costs’ in their gross value added
(GVA) and by the intensity of trade with third countries. What carbon leakage
criteria should be defined for the post-2020 period?
High
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Table SM2.13: Survey questions and policy type classification (continued)
No. Question Conflict
Potential
Q14 What thresholds should be defined for the criteria measuring the risk of carbon
leakage?
High
Q15 In the current system, there is a possibility to assess the exposure of sectors
to the risk of carbon leakage also based on qualitative criteria (abatement po-
tential, market characteristics and profit margins). Do you think that similar
qualitative criteria should be maintained to complement the quantitative cri-
teria?
High
Q16 Currently, the list of sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage is valid for
five years. What should be the validity of the list for the post-2020?
Low
Q17 Currently benchmarks are set to the average greenhouse gas emission perfor-
mance of the 10% best performing installations in the EU for a given product.
What adaptations of benchmarks for 2021 onward should be considered, if any?
High
Q18 Should the benchmarks be revised to reflect the technological state of the art? High
Q19 Currently, historical production data are used to determine the allocation due
to each installation. Operators had the possibility to choose between 2005-
2008 or 2009-2010 as basis years. Should the production data used to calculate
allocations in Phase 4 (post 2020) be updated?
Excluded
Q20 Is there a case for any deviations from general harmonised allocation rules, and
what would be the risks involved?
High
Q21 Should there be a harmonised EU-wide compensation scheme for indirect costs,
i.e. for increases in electricity costs resulting from the ETS?
High
Q22a In your view, at which stage of the innovation process is there a particular
need to strengthen the EU’s innovation support?: a) to implement a small-
scale prototype
Low
Q22b In your view, at which stage of the innovation process is there a particular need
to strengthen the EU’s innovation support?: b) at the conception stage
Low
Q22c In your view, at which stage of the innovation process is there a particular need
to strengthen the EU’s innovation support?: c) to implement a large-scale pilot
Low
Q22d In your view, at which stage of the innovation process is there a particular need
to strengthen the EU’s innovation support?: d) at the commercialisation stage
Low
Q23 Should the allowances funding low-carbon innovation support come from the
Member States’ auction budgets or from free allocation?
Low
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SM2.4 Robustness Checks
Table SM2.14: AME results for ally networks on policies with low potential for inter-group
conflict excluding all respondents with identical submissions (standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Nodematch
Business: energy intensive 0.645⇤⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤
—
0.510⇤⇤⇤
(0.051) (0.002) (0.056)
Business: energy producer  0.019 0.003
—
 0.083
(0.123) (0.005) (0.121)
Business: other 0.567⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤
—
0.525⇤
(0.213) (0.008) (0.218)
Business association 0.094 0.018⇤⇤⇤
—
0.140
(0.135) (0.005) (0.136)
NGO 1.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.045⇤⇤⇤
—
1.090⇤⇤⇤
(0.219) (0.008) (0.227)
Nodemix
Business: energy producer — NGO 0.333⇤⇤ 0.001
—
0.284⇤
(0.115) (0.004) (0.118)
Business: energy intensive — NGO  0.346⇤⇤⇤  0.012⇤⇤⇤
—
 0.422⇤⇤⇤
(0.082) (0.003) (0.083)
Business: energy producer —  0.303⇤⇤⇤ 0.000
—
 0.373⇤⇤⇤
business: energy intensive (0.063) (0.002) (0.066)
Mediator
Belief
— —
2.585⇤⇤⇤ 2.507⇤⇤⇤
(0.071) (0.073)
Controls
Country 0.071⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤ 0.042⇤
(0.019) (0.001) (0.019) (0.018)
Policy leader  0.300 0.046⇤  0.769⇤⇤⇤  0.826⇤⇤⇤
(0.160) (0.019) (0.184) (0.180)
Intercept
—
0.339⇤⇤⇤
— —
(0.014)
Nissues 7 7 7 7
Nactors 308 308 308 308
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
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Table SM2.15: AME results for ally networks on policies with high potential for inter-group
conflict excluding all respondents with identical submissions (standard errors in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Nodematch
Business: energy intensive 0.156⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤
—
0.026
(0.052) (0.002) (0.052)
Business: energy producer  0.048 0.014⇤⇤
—
 0.097
(0.102) (0.004) (0.100)
Business: other 0.849⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤
—
0.794⇤⇤⇤
(0.171) (0.007) (0.164)
Business association 0.305⇤  0.011⇤
—
0.367⇤⇤
(0.120) (0.005) (0.121)
NGO 3.833⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
—
3.670⇤⇤⇤
(0.226) (0.008) (0.222)
Nodemix
Business: energy producer — NGO  0.233⇤ 0.015⇤⇤
—
 0.281⇤⇤
(0.106) (0.004) (0.107)
Business: energy intensive — NGO  0.001 0.000
—
 0.011
(0.078) (0.003) (0.080)
Business: energy producer —  0.339⇤⇤⇤  0.002
—
 0.392⇤⇤⇤
business: energy intensive (0.057) (0.002) (0.058)
Mediator
Belief
— —
2.814⇤⇤⇤ 2.771⇤⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.066)
Controls
Country 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.167⇤⇤⇤ 0.164⇤⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.001) (0.017) (0.017)
Policy leader  0.238 0.049⇤  0.766⇤⇤⇤  0.751⇤⇤⇤
(0.174) (0.020) (0.205) (0.203)
Intercept
—
0.331⇤⇤⇤
— —
(0.014)
Nissues 12 12 12 12
Nactors 322 322 322 322
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
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Table SM2.16: AME results for ally networks using Smith-Waterman alignment scores
(standard errors in parentheses)
Low conflict High conflict
potential potential
Model 2 Model 4 Model 2 Model 4
Nodematch
Business: energy intensive 13.989⇤⇤⇤ 0.698⇤⇤⇤ 14.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤
(1.815) (0.054) (2.113) (0.055)
Business: energy producer 8.182 0.082 21.982⇤⇤ 0.011
(5.481) (0.133) (7.120) (0.107)
Business: other 83.831⇤⇤⇤ 0.700⇤⇤⇤ 81.212⇤⇤⇤ 0.858⇤⇤⇤
(10.735) (0.219) (14.031) (0.176)
Business association 16.707⇤ 0.090 22.695⇤ 0.434⇤⇤
(6.627) (0.139) (11.050) (0.127)
NGO 9.042 1.429⇤⇤⇤ 56.847⇤⇤⇤ 4.231⇤⇤⇤
(10.660) (0.229) (16.271) (0.226)
Nodemix
Business: energy producer — NGO 3.516 0.464⇤⇤⇤ 12.808  0.084
(5.458) (0.126) (7.523) (0.111)
Business: energy intensive — NGO  3.639  0.486⇤⇤⇤  7.963⇤ 0.009
3.144 (0.085) (4.042) (0.083)
Business: energy producer —  3.822  0.379⇤⇤⇤  6.852⇤  0.444⇤⇤⇤
business: energy intensive (2.446) (0.069) (2.845) (0.062)
Mediator
Belief
—
0.002⇤⇤⇤
—
0.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000)
Controls
Country 8.493⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 24.163⇤⇤⇤ 0.167⇤⇤⇤
(0.849) (0.018) (1.405) (0.017)
Policy leader  0.054  0.417⇤  0.983  0.268
(2.028) (0.167) (2.201) (0.181)
Intercept  7.127⇤⇤⇤
—
 8.875⇤⇤⇤
—
1.804 (1.938)
Nissues 7 7 12 12
Nactors 328 328 331 331
Levels of significance: ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
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SM2.5 Statistical Software
Bates, Douglas and Martin Maechler (2019). Matrix: Sparse and Dense Matrix Classes
and Methods. R package version 1.2-17 (https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=
Matrix).
Benoit Kenneth, Kohei Watanabe, Haiyan Wang, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Stefan
Mu¨ller and Akitaka Matsuo (2018). quanteda: Quantitative Analysis of Textual
Data. R package version 1.4.3 (https://cloud.r-project.org/web/packages/quanteda/
index.html).
Ho↵, Peter, Bailey Fosdick and Alex Volfovsky (2018). amen: Additive and Multi-
plicative E↵ects Models for Networks and Relational Data. R package version 1.4.3
(https://github. com/pdho↵/amen).
Lionel, Henry, Hadley Wickham (2019). purrr: Functional Programming Tools. R
package version 0.3.2 (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/purrr/index.html).
Mahmoudian, Mehrad (2018). varhandle: Functions for Robust Variable Handling. R
package version 2.0.3 (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/varhandle/index.
html).
Mullen, Lincoln (2016). textreuse: Detect Text Reuse and Document Similarity.
R package version 0.1.4 (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/textreuse/index.
html).
R Core Team (2019). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria (https://www.R-project.org).
Wickham, Hadley and Jennifer Bryan (2019). readxl: Read Excel Files. R package
version 1.3.1 (https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=readxl).
Wickham, Hadley, Romain Franc¸ois, Lionel Henry and Kirill Mu¨ller (2019). dplyr:
A Grammar of Data Manipulation. R package version 0.8.0.1 (https://CRAN.R-
project.org/ package=dplyr).
Wickham, Hadley and Lionel Henry (2019). tidyr: Easily Tidy Data with ’spread()’
and ’gather()’ Functions (https://cloud.r-project.org/web/packages/tidyr/index.
html).
121
SM3 The Political Economy of Local Government
Financialisation and the Role of Policy Di↵u-
sion
SM3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table SM3.17: Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean St. Dev.
Lobo use (total)a Variable coded = 1 if local government used Lobo loans 0.395 0.489
(constant across time). Set = 0 if no Lobos were used.
Lobo use (year)a Dependent variable set = 1 if a Lobo was taken out. 0.071 0.256
(per year). Set = 0 if no Lobos were used.
Party: Conservativesb Categorical variable of party in o ce per year. 0.499 0.490
Party: Labourb Categorical variable of party in o ce per year. 0.246 0.431
Party: Otherb Categorical variable of party in o ce per year. Including 0.069 0.255
Liberal Democrats, Independent and No overall control.
Finance Powerc Relation of gross value added (GVA) of the financial sec- 0.435 0.436
tor to the total GVA of a local authority per year.
Neighbourt 1a,c Relation of contiguity neighbours of the observation who 0.046 0.101
previously used Lobos to the total number of neighbours
(calculation of queen-style contiguities).
Public debt t 1d Total debt per year. Lagged for t 1. 5.422 6.953
Deprivation t 1f Economic deprivation score. Lagged for t 1. 1.633 0.938
Previous adoptionsa Number of previous adoptions. 0.621 1.373
Year of election t 1b Coded = 1 if an election was held in the given year. 0.438 0.496
Coded = 0 if no election was held.
ln populationc Logarithm of local authority population (in 100,000s) per 4.893 0.530
year.
Type e Categorical variable of type of local authority in each 0.632 0.482
year (rare changes due to conversion to other type).
a Constructed by the authors using data from Freedom of Information Requests.
b Constructed using data from the British Local Election Database (2015).
c Constructed by authors using data from the O ce for National Statistics.
d Constructed using data purchased by CIPFA (2018) and acquired from the DCLG (2018).
e Constructed using data by UK government (2018).
f Constructed using data from the Economic Deprivation Index (EDI) published by MHCL (2018).
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SM3.2 Additional Models
Table SM3.18: Repeated event survival analysis (alt. specifications for party variable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Independent variables
Party: Labour 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Party: Conservative  0.01⇤  0.01  0.01  0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Public debtt 1  0.11⇤⇤⇤  0.11⇤⇤⇤  0.11⇤⇤⇤  0.11⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Public debtt 1 * ln(t) 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Deprivationt 1 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Deprivationt 1 * ln(t)  0.02⇤⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Finance power  0.14  4.93⇤⇤⇤  0.16  4.37⇤⇤⇤
(0.15) (1.57) (0.16) (1.60)
Finance power * ln population — 0.87⇤⇤⇤ — 0.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.29)
Neighbour 0.97⇤⇤ 1.09⇤⇤⇤ 1.02⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Controls
Number previous adoptions 0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln population 0.49⇤⇤⇤  0.10 0.39⇤⇤  0.11
(0.16) (0.24) (0.18) (0.25)
Election year  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Type of local government  1.96⇤⇤⇤  2.18⇤⇤⇤  2.03⇤⇤⇤  2.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29)
AIC 2626.30 2621.40 2628.67 2625.27
Number of events 286 286 286 286
Number of observations 4211 4211 4211 4211
PH test 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.45
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1 Standard errors clustered by local authority in parentheses.
Operationalisation of party variable in Model 1 and 2: Relative share of council seats per party in per cent.
Operationalisation of party variable in Model 3 and 4: Absolute number of council seats per party.
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Table SM3.19: Parametric survival analysis
Weibull loglogistic exponential lognormal Gompertz
Independent variables
Party: Labour 0.36⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤ 0.29⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Party: Other 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Public debtt 1  0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.12⇤⇤⇤  0.14⇤⇤⇤  0.12⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Public debtt 1 * ln(t) 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Deprivationt 1 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Deprivationt 1 * ln(t)  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Finance power  5.17⇤⇤⇤  4.00⇤⇤  4.83⇤⇤⇤  4.51⇤⇤  5.00⇤⇤
(1.76) (1.81) (1.75) (1.79) (1.79)
Finance power * ln population 0.89⇤⇤⇤ 0.67⇤⇤ 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.77⇤⇤ 0.87⇤⇤
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Neighbour 3.26⇤⇤⇤ 3.46⇤⇤⇤ 2.63⇤⇤⇤ 3.32⇤⇤⇤ 2.71⇤⇤⇤
(0.35) (0.37) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36)
Controls
Number previous adoptions 0.42⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.41⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ln population  0.09 0.03  0.12  0.03  0.12
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Election year 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Type of local government  3.07⇤⇤⇤  2.83⇤⇤⇤  2.88⇤⇤⇤  2.93⇤⇤⇤  2.94⇤⇤⇤
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
ln Scale 5.79⇤⇤⇤ 3.83⇤⇤⇤ 6.21⇤⇤⇤ 4.37⇤⇤⇤ —
(0.85) (0.09) (1.35) (0.37)
ln Shape 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.21 —
(0.05) (0.08) — (0.14)
ln Level — — — —  6.37⇤⇤⇤
(1.42)
Intercept —  3.25⇤⇤ —  2.00 —
(1.37) (1.44)
Log Likelihood -2023.45 -1976.82 -2055.94 -1993.73 -2054.3
Number of events 4211 4211 4211 4211 4211
Number of observations 286 286 286 286 286
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1 Reference group for Party is: ”Conservative”.
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Table SM3.20: Repeated event survival analysis (alt. specifications for neighbour variable)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables
Party: Labour 0.510⇤⇤ 0.445⇤⇤ 0.558⇤⇤⇤
(0.213) (0.216) (0.208)
Party: Other 0.358⇤ 0.319⇤ 0.369⇤
(0.192) (0.193) (0.191)
Public debtt 1  0.095⇤⇤  0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.163⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.039) (0.044)
Public debtt 1 * ln(t) 0.012⇤⇤ 0.014⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Deprivationt 1 0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.142⇤⇤⇤ 0.162⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
Deprivationt 1 * ln(t)  0.018⇤⇤⇤  0.019⇤⇤⇤  0.021⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Finance power  3.947⇤⇤  4.163⇤⇤⇤  3.459⇤⇤
(1.549) (1.552) (1.611)
Finance power * ln population 0.677⇤⇤ 0.716⇤⇤ 0.599⇤⇤
(0.280) (0.280) (0.292)
Neighbour (second-order contiguity) 1.781⇤ — —
(1.008)
Neighbour (inverse distance) — 6.098 —
(4.020)
Neighbour (PWP) — — 0.081
(0.464)
Controls
Number of previous adoptions 0.242⇤⇤⇤ 0.236⇤⇤⇤ —
(0.037) (0.037)
ln population 0.021 0.003  0.015
(0.246) (0.242) (0.255)
Election year  0.009  0.092  0.032
(0.151) (0.154) (0.145)
Type of local government  2.187⇤⇤⇤  2.163⇤⇤⇤  1.931⇤⇤⇤
(0.287) (0.288) (0.304)
AIC 2632.105 2632.636 1720.538
Num. events 286 286 286
Num. obs. 4211 4211 4211
PH test 0.341 0.454 0.453
Model 3 = PWP-Model.
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤⇤p < 0.05, ⇤p < 0.1
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SM3.3 Correlation Matrix
Table SM3.21: Correlation matrix of all covariates
Labour Conservative Other Debt Deprivation Finance
Labour 1  0.466  0.424 0.419 0.530 0.005
Conservative  0.466 1  0.604  0.309  0.436  0.004
Other  0.424  0.604 1  0.072  0.017  0.0001
Debt 0.419  0.309  0.072 1 0.546 0.209
Deprivation 0.530  0.436  0.017 0.546 1 0.044
Finance 0.005  0.004  0.0001 0.209 0.044 1
Neighbour 0.152  0.155 0.022 0.300 0.347 0.050
Previous adoptions 0.193  0.165  0.006 0.400 0.343 0.061
ln Population 0.263  0.173  0.060 0.534 0.387 0.246
Election year 0.079  0.091 0.022 0.053 0.086 0.047
Type  0.365 0.266 0.056  0.594  0.481  0.183
Table SM3.22: Correlation matrix of all covariates (contin.)
Neighbour Prev. adoptions ln Population Election year Type
Labour 0.152 0.193 0.263 0.079  0.365
Conservative  0.155  0.165  0.173  0.091 0.266
Other 0.022  0.006  0.060 0.022 0.056
Debt 0.300 0.400 0.534 0.053  0.594
Deprivation 0.347 0.343 0.387 0.086  0.481
Finance 0.050 0.061 0.246 0.047  0.183
Neighbour 1 0.539 0.293 0.064  0.356
Previous adoptions 0.539 1 0.429 0.045  0.457
ln Population 0.293 0.429 1 0.075  0.737
Election year 0.064 0.045 0.075 1  0.058
Type  0.356  0.457  0.737  0.058 1
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SM3.4 Organisation of Local Governments in England
In England, the majority of local governments are organised in a two-tier system. The
Counties as an upper level are composed by Districts at the lower tier. The table
below lists their respective responsibilities.1 Apart from this system, there are also
single-tier authorities that combine both levels and services. These are mainly Unitary
Authorities, Metropolitan districts and London Boroughs. Furthermore, the City of
London and the Isles of Scilly form two sui generis authorities.
Table SM3.23: Types of English local governments
Type Services Total Relative
County Economic development, highways, streets, waste disposal, transport, 27 0.08
social services, education, libraries, public health
Shire District Building, council tax, business rates, environment, housing, waste 201 0.57
collection, street cleaning
Unitary Authority All local government services 55 0.16
Metropolitan Districts All local government services, although certain conurbation wide ser- 36 0.10
vices (fire, civil defence, police, waste disposal, passenger transport)
are provided through joint authorities (districts acting jointly)
London Boroughs All local government services, although the Greater London Authority 32 0.09
provides certain London-wide functions (police, fire and transport)
City of London Economic development, education, environment, highways, housing 1 <0.01
libraries, police, social services, waste collection, town planning
Isles of Scilly Provides same services as Unitary Authorities, but some services are 1 <0.01
being provided in conjunction with Cornwall Council.
Total 353 100
Source: Constructed by authors based on data by the UK government: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/local-government-structure-and-elections.
Local authorities are governed following the ‘leader and cabinet model’ or the
‘elected-mayor model.’2 In the former, the leader is appointed by councillors whereas
the latter describes the election of a mayor directly by local residents. In both systems,
the chosen mayor or leader appoints a cabinet; together they form the Executive of
the council to govern the municipality. They are held to account by an Overview and
Scrutiny Committee, whose members are not part of the cabinet. Full council meet-
ings are only held for key decisions such as significant cuts or spending, appointing
chief o cers, the policy framework and budget setting. Currently, only sixteen local
authorities have an elected-mayor. He has more administrative powers than a leader
since changes to his budget and major policy decisions require a two-third majority, as
opposed to a simple majority in the ‘leader and cabinet model.’
1House of Commons (2017): Local government in England: structures, p. 15.
2Local Government Act (2000), the ‘committee system’ was reintroduced in 2011 but is neglected in
this analysis due to its marginality.
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SM3.5 Expert Interviews
Table SM3.24: Actor types and date of expert interviews with abbreviations as cited in
the main manuscript. Names and more detailed type descriptions have been anonymised due
to issues of confidentiality.
Nr. Abbreviationa Actor type Date
1 INT 1 Treasury Management Advisor November 2017
2 INT 2 Member of Parliament November 2017
3 INT 3 Former Investment Banker November 2017
4 INT 4 Councillor (London Borough) November 2017
5 INT 5 Campaigner November 2017
6 INT 6 Councillor (Shire District) November 2017
a Abbreviations as cited in the manuscript. Interviews listed in the order they were conducted.
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SM3.6 Additional Literature and Data Sources
British Local Election Database (2015), University of Plymouth, available at: http://
gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES/L010011/1 (accessed: 28.06.2018).
Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA) (2015) Treasury and
Capital Management Panel Bulletin. Treasury Management. 2015 Update, avail-
able at: http://www.cipfa.org/ /media/files/policy%20and%20guidance/panels/
treasury%20and%20capital%20management/bulletins/tm-bulletin-final.pdf?la=
en (accessed: 23. 01.2018).
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) (2018) Capital Ex-
penditure and Treasury Management Statistics (1997-2014), available for pur-
chase at: https://www.cipfastats.net/general/capitalexpenditure.
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) (1998) Mod-
ernising Local Government: In Touch with the People, CM 4014, London: HMSO.
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) (2000) Mod-
ernising Local Government Finance: A Green Paper, London: DETR.
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2018) Borrowing and
Investment Live Table, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-
data-sets/live-tables-on-local-government-finance (access: 28.06.2018).
Local Government Act (2003) Local Government Act, London: Stationery O ce Lim-
ited.
Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (2015) English indices of
deprivation, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/english-
indices-of-deprivation, (access date: 28.06.2018).
O ce for National Statistics (2018) Population Estimates for UK, England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland.
O ce for National Statistics (2016) Regional Gross Value Added (Income Approach)
by Local Authority in England.
O ce for National Statistics (2011) Census: boundary data (England and Wales).
Society of County Treasurers (2008): Memorandum from Society of County Treasur-
ers (LAI 19). House of Commons. Communities and Local Government Com-
mittee, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/
cmcomloc/memo/locauinv/ucla1902.htm (accessed: 13.03.2018).
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SM3.7 Statistical Software
R Core Team (2018). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Bivand, R. et al. (2019) maptools: Tools for Reading and Handling Spatial Objects,
available at: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/maptools/index.html
Bivand, R. et a. (2018) rgeos: Interface to Geometry Engine – Open Source (‘GEOS’),
available at: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/rgeos/index.html
Brostro¨m, G. (2018) eha: Event History Analysis, available at: https://cran.r-project.
org/web/packages/eha/index.html
Gandrud, C. (2017) simPH: Tools for Simulating and Plotting Quantities of Interest
Estimated from Cox Proportional Hazards Models, available at: https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/simPH/index.html
Hlavac, M. (2018) stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Ta-
bles, available at: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/stargazer/index.html
Leifeld, P. (2017) texreg: Conversion of R Regression Output to LaTeX or HTML
Tables, available at: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/texreg/index.html
Lionel, H. and Wickham, H. (2019) purr: Functional Programming Tools, available at:
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/purrr/index.html
Pebesma, E. (2018) sp: Classes and Methods for Spatial Data, available at: https://
cran.r-project.org/web/packages/sp/index.html
Therneau, T. M. (2019) survival: Survival Analysis, available at: https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/survival/index.html (accessed: 24.07.2018).
Wickham, H. (2019) dplyr: A Grammar of Data Manipulation, available at: https://
cran.r-project.org/web/packages/dplyr/index.html
Wickham, H. (2019) readxl: Read Excel Files, available at: https://cran.r-project.
org/web/packages/readxl/index.html
Wickham, H. and Chang, W. (2019) ggplot2: Create Elegant Data Visualisations Using
the Grammar of Graphics, available at: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/
ggplot2/index.html
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